CHETAN Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
LAWS(RAJ)-1983-8-9
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on August 18,1983

CHETAN Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

D. L. MEHTA, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel. In the writ petition, the petitioner has submitted that the land in dispute was purchased by him from respondents No. 4 and 5. It is an admitted position that the petitioner is not a person of the scheduled caste and respondents No. 4 and 5 are the persons of the scheduled caste.
(2.) THIS Court in Govind Ram vs. Chittar and others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1404 of 1983, decided on August 1, 1983 at Jaipur Bench) has held that the provisions of s. 53a of the T. P. Act cannot override the provisions of s. 42 (b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In that case, it was further held that the law of limitation applicable in such matters should be considered not qua-the seller and the purchaser but it should be considered qua the State Government and the person who claims the possession. The seller of the agricultural land is a tenant and is not landholder. The landholder is the State Government and if the question of limitation arises then, the adverse possession has to be considered against the State Government and for this reason, the period prescribed for the purpose of adverse possession against the State can only be considered and not the period prescribed interse purchaser and seller in the matter of agricultural land. In Govind Ram's case (supra), the matter relating to sale was also considered and it was held that the transaction of oral sale, requiring compulsory registration under s. 54 of the T. P. Act is not saved by the doctrine of part performance and further more, in a case like this where the provisions of s. 42 (b) of the Act admittedly applies, there cannot be any transfer of the interest of a person belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribes in favour of the persons of the other communities and that for this also, the transfer is nonest and the question of applicability of s. 53 A of the T. P. Act does not apply. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to para 13 of the writ petition and has submitted that a criminal case against the petitioner has been registered by the S. H. O. , Pipar and the investigation is going on. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not even cared to file the copy of the First Information Report. In such circumstances, the question of malafides or otherwise of the investigation cannot be considered at all and the investigating authorities should be give free hand in the matter of investigation. The wild allegations about the malafide cannot be entertained. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further invited my attention to para 7 of the writ petition and has submitted that an appeal was tiled before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur and the Revenue Appellate Authority by its judgment dated December 17, 1975 remanded the case back to the trial Court, that after remand, the Assistant Collector, Jodhpur again passed a decree in favour of respondents No. 4 and 5 and that thereafter an appeal was again filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur which was again accepted and the case was remanded back to the trial court after framing an additional issue. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that since then, the matter is pending before the Assistant Collector, Jodhpur and no progress has been made. Learned counsel has not taken care of submitting any copy of the proceedings which have been taken after March 12, 1983. The wild allegation that the case is not progressing, is not sufficient for the purpose of consideration of the submissions made by the petitioner. During the course of arguments, learned counsel has submitted that forcible possession has been taken by the authorities concerned. In Shahoodul Haque Vs. Registrar, Co-op. Societies, Bihar (1), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed: "that the undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post of duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds for his absence, was so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admitted could serve no useful purpose. " The petitioner has not stated in the writ petition that who has forcibly ejected him without due process of law. Any authority ejecting the petitioner from the land is a necessary party. The petitioner has only stated in para 12 of the writ petition that a couple of days back, when the petitioners came back, they were arrested by the S. H. O Pipar on the ground that they have committed tresspass on the land in question. It was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to state that who has ejected him and whether the persons who have ejected him are parties in this case or not? Apart from that, if the petitioners feel aggrieved, that they have wrongly been ejected then they can file a suit under s. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or they can take any appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of law. If it is a case of dispossession within a period of 2 months, then the petitioners are entitled to get the redress from the proper Court by moving an application only on the ground of possession without dealing the title. If the petitioners feel that he is owner and he has wrongly been ejected then s. 183 will also come into operation. This Court is not meant for the protection of those who are not coming to the Court with a specific plea. This Court will also take into consideration that the persons who have been tortured or exploited by the Society have been given protection under the Constitution and this Court should not come in the way of the implementation of the protection given to the persons who have been exploited by the Society for centuries together. Respondents No. 4 and 5 are the persons of the scheduled caste and they are having a special protection under the law. Whether respondents No. 4 and 5 are eligible for that protection is altogether a different question but in the matter of exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction under s. 226 of the Constitution, I will not like to pass any order. Apart from that the disputed questions of fact and other matters are also involved in the matter and it is not expected from this Court that in such matters, this Court should exercise extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited before me the case of M/s Chandra & Co. V. State (2 ). I agree with the proposition laid down in M/s Chandra & Co. 's case (2 ). The case on hand is not a case of not following the procedure laid down under a particular law. The petitioner has not made out any foundation in his writ petition to show that the procedure has not been following. The petitioner is ignorant about the names of the persons who ejected him and who have taken the law in their hand. Even if the petitioner submits that he was out of station then it was also obligatory for the petitioner to substantiate his case by submitting the affidavits of the persons who have informed him. It has not been disclosed in the writ petition. Thus, I do not find any force in this writ petition. 7, The writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. . ;


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