DWARKA PRASAD, J. - (1.) THIS appeal raises a short question as to whether a counter claim can be allowed in a claim petition filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly in the circumstances of the present case.
(2.) THE undisputed facts of the case are that a collision took place on January 7, 1977 between a Jeep belonging to the Government of India and the truck belonging to the appellant on the main highway between Barmer and Balotra. THE persons, who were travelling in the jeep, were injured in the accident and they filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' ), which was allowed by the Tribunal and compensation was awarded to the injured persons by the Tribunal in respect of which a separate appeal has been preferred by the appellant which is pending in this Court. The Union of India filed a separate claim petition on August 22, 1977 before the Tribunal and claimed compensation for the damage caused to the jeep, as a result of the accident. The appellant filed his written-statement on January 10, 1978. No claim in respect of any damage to the truck of the appellant was made when the original written-statement was filed by the appellant on January 10, 1978. The Union of India amended the claim petition on March 13, 1979. The appellant filed an amended written-statement on March 11, 1980 almost after one year of the filing of the amended claim petition and the amended written-statement of the appellant claimed a sum of Rs. 34, 040/- by way of compensation for the damage caused to his truck, on account of the accident. As the original claim petition filed by the Union of India was brought after the statutory period of six months, the Tribunal dismissed the aforesaid claim petition filed by the union of India on the ground that it was barred by time. The counter-claim filed by the appellant was also dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that the counter-claim was filed after the lapse of the statutory period after the date of the accident and no reason was assigned as to why the counter-claim was not filed along-with the original written-statement and further on the ground that the counter-claim could not be filed in a claim petition filed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called "the Act"), before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove by satisfactory evidence that any loss was caused to him on account of the alleged damage to the truck. In this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant argued in the first place that a counter-claim could be filed in a claim petition before the Tribunal and the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to entertain the counter-claim filed by appellant on this ground. It cannot be disputed that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 6-A C. P. C. are not specifically applicable to claim petitions filed before the Tribunal in cases arising out of motor accidents. Section 110-A of the Act provides a speedy remedy for enforcing the liability in the case of a motor accident, by means of an application made under Sub-section (1) of that section, before the Claims Tribunal, having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident had occurred. Sub-section (2) of Section 110-A provides that such a claim petition shall be made in the prescribed form and shall contain the prescribed particulars; while sub-sec. (3) of sec. 110-A prescribes a special period of limitation for filing a claim petition and it has been provided that an application for compensation under sec. 110-A shall be entertained unless the same is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Of course, the Tribunal is empowered to entertain a claim petition beyond the aforesaid period of six months, provided it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented from making an application within the specific time, on account of sufficient cause. Section 111-A authorises the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Section 110 to 110-E, particularly inter alia in respect of the form of application for claim of compensation and the particulars to be contained therein and the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal in holding the enquiry in respect of such claim petitions. The State Government has made rules in pursuance of the powers vested in it by the provisions of Section 111-A, and they are called the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called 'the Rules' ). Rule 3 provides that every application for payment of compensation shall be made in the form prescribed under the Rules. Rule 7 of the Rules provides as under:- "7. Appearance and examination of parties:- (1)The owner of the motor vehicle and the insurer may, and if so required by the Claims Tribunal shall at or before the first hearing or within such further time as the Claims Tribunal may allow, file a written-statement dealing with the claim raised in the application, and any such written-statement shall form part of the record. (2)If the owner or insurer contests the claim, the Claims Tribunal may and if no written-statement has been filed, it shall, proceed to examine the owner and the insurer upon the claim and shall reduce the substance of the examination to writing. " I may here also refer to rule 20, which runs as under:- "20-Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.- The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908)shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunals, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX: Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII; and Order XVIII, Rules 1 to 3. " The form of application for claim of compensation, arising out of a motor accident, is appended to the Rules and Rule 3 requires all applications to be filed in the prescribed form, giving particulars specified therein. A perusal of Rule 20 will lead to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the provisions of Order 7 and Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and more particularly the provisions of Order 8 Rules 6 and 6-A C. P. C. have not been specifically made applicable to claim proceedings.
(3.) THE argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that several other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been specifically made applicable to claim proceedings by Rule 20 or similar provisions contained in the Rules of other States, but they have been applied in the motor accident claim cases. Learned counsel referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Darshana Devi (1), wherein the provisions of Order 33 Rule 9a of the Code of Civil Procedure have been held to apply to the Tribunals, which have trapping of civil courts. But their Lordships of the Supreme Court have themselves observed, in the aforesaid decision, that access to justice by indigent persons is an integral part of the concept of social justice and the basis principles contained in Article 14 and 39a of the Constitution; and the law enacted for the benefit of the poor cannot be stultified by non-application thereof to the indigent persons, who must be given benefit doubt against levy of price to enter the temple of justice. A reference was also made by the learned counsel for the appellant to the decision of their Lordships of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in M/s. National Carriers vs. Mrs. M. J. Stone (2) wherein the question of the applicability of Rule 7 of Order 32 C. P. C. to the proceedings in a claim petition came up for consideration. In that case, it was held that although Order 32 Rule 7 C. P. C. may not be specifically applicable to claim proceedings, yet the principles embodied in the aforesaid provision would apply to the claim proceedings. The following observations of the learned Chief Justice, occurring in the aforesaid decision may be reproduced:- "in our opinion, however, this would not mean that the principles embodied in Order 32 rule 7 would not apply to the claim proceedings under Motor Vehicles Act. The rule embodied in Order 32, rule 7 C. P. C. is based on sound equitable principles which require that whenever the interest of a minor is involved in any judicial proceedings, the Presiding authority, who is expected to settle the dispute, should stand in a quasi tutelary position with regard to the concerned minor and see that minor's interest is not jeopardised. This would be so even if the minor is represented in the proceeding-by a natural guardian, because it sometimes happens that even me natural guardians are not very much alive to the interest of the minors at the time of arriving at a settlement. So far as the Claims Tribunal is concerned, we find that this duty to safeguard the interest of the minors is greater in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act which says that the Claims Tribunal should make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it 'to be just'. Thus, the Motor Vehicles Act itself casts a duty on the Tribunal to give only that award which is 'just'. This statutory duty of the Tribunal to look to the justness of the award would obviously be greater in cases where the interest of a minor is involved. Under the circumstances, we agree with the learned Single Judge that even though the provisions contained in Order 32 rule 7 are not specifically applicable to the facts of the case, the principles contained in that rule would be applicable on the principle of equity, justice and good conscience. " Thus, it clearly emerges from the aforesaid decision that the applicability of the principles embodied in Order 32 rule 7 C. P. C. to the claim petitions was upheld on the ground that such provisions were based on sound principles of equity, justice and good conscience. So far as the provisions of Order 8 rule 6a C. P. C. are concerned, I am unable to hold that they are based upon any equitable principles as may be applicable to the claim petitions. The claim petition can be filed by a person who has sustained injury or has sustained the loss of property at a motor accident by way of a speedier remedy in place of the normal and usual remedy of a civil suit and no principle of equity, justice or good conscience is involved for allowing his adversary to file a counter-claim, although there is no express provision permitting the filing of such a counter claim either in section 110-A of the Motor Venules Act or Rule 20. Nor any such provision is contained in rule 7, which allows the owner of the vehicle, which has caused the accident, and the insurer an opportunity to file a written-statement. Thus, in my considered view, the provisions of Order 8 Rule 6-A C. P. C. cannot be pressed into service for filing a counter-claim in claim proceedings under Section 110-A of the Act, so as to allow the owner of the vehicle which caused the accident or the insurer thereof, an additional opportunity of presenting his claim in the garb of a counter-claim. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that a counter-claim could have been entertained in a claim petition, even then I am in agreement with the learned Tribunal that the counter-claim filed in the present case is not maintainable on the ground that the appellant failed to file the counter-claim when he filed the original written-statement on January 10, 1978. It may also be pointed out that Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act provides that any claim by way of counter-claim shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted, in the case of a counter-claim, on the date on which the counter-claim is made in the court. In the present case, the counter-claim was made on March 11, 1980 after the expiry of more than three years of the date on which the accident took place while no claim or counter-claim could have been entertained after the expiry of the period of six months. Even if the appellant would have desired to file a regular suit in a civil court for the recovery of the amount of damages caused to his truck as a result of the accident, then the remedy by way of a suit would have been barred by time after the expiry of 3 years from the date of the accident. Thus, no counter-claim could have been entertained after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation for filing a claim petition or even a suit for the same relief. ;