- (1.) THE short point arising for decision in this revision application is whether the petitioner is entitled to exclude the time taken for obtaining copy of the award for reckoning the limitation for making an application for reference under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953.
(2.) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that by virtue of sec. 29 of Indian Limitation Act is not excluded in the present case. It has been argued that the limitations for making such an application is prescribed by a special law namely the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Act) and this period of limitation as prescribed in the Act is different from the period prescribed by the Schdl. to the Limitation Act. THE second branch of the argument of the learned counsel is that even though there is no specific provision for such an application u/s. 12 of the Limitation Act the case would still fall u/s. 12 (2) of the said Act. THE argument proceeds that an application for making a reference u/s. 18 of the Limitation Act would fall within the ambit of the word 'appeal' or 'review'. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon Burjorjee vs. Spl. Collector, Rangoon (l), Nagendra Nath vs. Suresh (2), Raja Kulkarni vs. State of Bombay (3), Shankar vs. Krishna (4), Parduman Singh vs. State of Punjab (5), Chappan vs. Moidin Kutti (6) and Vidya Charan vs. Khub Chand. The solitary authority which held that sec. 12 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the period taken in obtaining copy of the award will be excluded for reckoning limitation is Burjorjee vs. Special Collector, Rangoon (l ). This ruling has been dissented from in a large number of various High Courts and there is a string of decisions holding that sec. 12 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application for making reference under sec. 18 of the Act. These authorities are Nafis-ud-din vs. Secy of State (8), Kunhibi vs. Land Acquisition Officer (9) Hasun Mulia vs. Tasiruddin (l0) Collector of Akola vs. Anand Rao (ll) Kashi Parshad vs. Notified Area, Mahoba (12), Jankibai vs. Nagpur Improvement Trust (13) and Lakshmi Narayan vs. State of Rajasthan (14 ). Learned counsel for the petitioner, however submitted that the "view-point urged by him with respect to the interpretation of the terms 'appeal" and "review" occurring in sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act was not considered in any of these authorities. He has therefore argued that the view taken by this Court in Lakshmi Narayan vs. State of Rajasthan (14) requires reconsideration. The argument that an application for reference under sec. 18 of the Act falls within the ambit of the term "appeal" and/or "review" and therefore sec. 12 would be applicable to the present case is undoubtedly ingenious but in my opinion it is devoid of substance. In Nagendra Nath vs. Suresh (2) the point for consideration before their Lordships of the Privy Council was whether under Art. 182 of the Limitation Act the decree-holder was entitled to exclude the period taken in appeal which was dismissed as an appeal within the meaning of Cl. (2) in Col. 3 of the Article. It may be pointed out that one Madan Mohan presented an application to the High Court purporting to be an appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge alleging that no decree had been drawn up. His objection was only to the decision against him in respect of the assignment and he joined as parties to the appeal only the other decree-holders and not the judgment-debtors. The appeal though irregular in form and not being appeal against the subordinate Judge and being insufficiently stamped for this purpose, was yet admitted and heard in due course by the High Court Madan Mohan asked to amend the form of the appeal but this was refused and in the result the appeal was dismissed, both on the ground of irregularity as well as on merits and the decision was embodied in a decree of the High Court. While considering the effect of this appeal the Privy Council observed that there is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent. The observations of their Lordships have to be read with reference to the context and in my opinion they have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Parduman Singh vs. State of Punjab (5) it was observed that the term 'review' means a judicial re-examination of the case in certain specified and prescribed circumstances. In my opinion, by no stretch of imagination an application under sec 18 requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court can be called a "review". It is apparent that if an application under sec. 18 of the Act can neither be treated as an application for review of a judgment, then even if sec. 12 is pressed into service, the petitioner can derive no benefit out of it. Here, it may be pointed out that sec. 12 (4) of the Limitation Act makes provision Tor an application to set aside an award. This shows that the legislature had no intention to make provision for exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining copy of the award for making an application for reference under sec 18 of the Act lest it would have made an express provision for it. The view taken in Lakshmi Narayan's case (14) therefore does not require reconsideration. This revision application fails and is hereby dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. ;