KAN SINGH, J. - (1.) SHRI Laxmi Narain Mishra, who is opposing certain proceedings instituted against him under sec. 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1930 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) before the District Judge, Alwar, constituting the Claims Tribunal under the Act, moves this Court for transferring the proceedings to another Claims Tribunal and invokes the powers of this Court under sec. 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2.) THE transfer was sought principally on two grounds: One on account of his having an apprehension against Shri Sohanraj Kothari, District Judge, on the basis of certain orders passed by him from time to time, that the petitioner would not get justice from Shri Kothari. THE other one was of hardship caused to the petitioner as no advocate at Alwar was accepting any brief for him, as Shri Kailash Narain Gupta, the applicant before the Claims Tribunal as also his father were advocates practising at Alwar. The first ground is no longer available as Shri Kothari has since been transferred from Alwar to another place and Shri M. C. Jain is at present the District Judge at Alwar. The question that confronts the petitioner here at the very outset is whether a District Judge appointed as a Claims Tribunal under the Act is a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of sec. 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There can be no controversy regarding even a Claims Tribunal being subordinate to the High Court as appeals lie to the High Court under sec. 110-D of the Act. Apart from this, there is Art. 227 of the Constitution under which the High Court exercises the powers of superintendence over all Tribunals functioning in the State. The hub of the matter, however, is whether the Claims Tribunal is a court as to entitle the petitioner to invoke the powers of this Court under sec. 24, C. P. C. The learned counsel on other side have placed a number of cases before me but they disclose a divergence of judicial opinion. In none of the cases, however, the question has been considered whether a Claims Tribunal under the Act is a court for the purposes of sec. 24, C. P. C. I will have occasion to refer to the various decided cases hereinafter. In the growing complexities of the present day life and the administration, the dividing line between the functions of the regularly constituted courts as such and the administrative bodies dealing with rights and obligations of the citizen is becoming thinner and thinner. Under the system of our laws even judicial Tribunals may exercise both judicial and administrative powers. Likewise, administrative bodies may enjoy not only administrative powers but also such powers as are exercisable by the regularly constituted courts. The term "court" has not been defined by statute though inclusive definitions are available in several of them. One thing is, however, conspicuous and it is that the courts belong to the judicial hierarchy and constitute the country's judiciary as distinct from the executive or legislative branches of the State. There are nevertheless other administrative bodies or functionaries who, though outside the judicial hierarchy, are yet acting like courts for certain purposes. Whether a person or a body dealing with the rights and obligations of a citizen is a court or a Tribunal will by and large depend on the nature of functions assigned to such person or body by the statute. The problem will thus be one of ascertainment of the nature of the functions. It is well settled that judicial functions involve the decision of rights and liabilities and an inquiry and investigation into facts is a material part of the function. I am not concerned with the administrative functions in which the rights and obligations of a citizen are not determined or dealt with.
(3.) NOW, a Claims Tribunal functioning under the Act deals very much with the rights and obligations of the citizens. Prior to the enactment of the fascicule of sec. 110 A and onwards, the liability of owners of motor vehicles arising out of accidents involving such motor vehicles was determined by regularly constituted civil courts. Parliament, however, felt that the remedy, apart from being burdened with heavy court fee, was tardy in its working. It could not speedily deal with large number of claims of aggrieved persons and therefore by the Amendment Act (100 of 1956) these new sections were added. These provisions were designed to ensure a speedy remedy to persons receiving bodily injuries and to the heirs of persons meeting with death in such accidents. Therefore, I have to gather, in the first instance from the relevant provisions of the statute, as to what the parliament meant to provide as an adjunct or a substitute of the prevailing remedy to an aggrieved person. It will be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act at this stage. Sec. 110a provides for the making of application for compensation by the aggrieved persons. Sec. 110 AA relates to the contingency where claim could also be made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 but I am not concerned with it. Sec. 110 lays down how a Claims Tribunal would constituted. I may read this section in extenso: 110. (I) A State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of meter vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both: Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a Civil Court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. (2) A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he - (a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or (b) is, or has been, a District Judge, or (c) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court ; (4) Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government may, by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them. " This section authorises the State Government to constitute a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, briefly referred to as the Claims Tribunal, for such area as may be specified in the notification. The proviso to sub-sec. (1) lays down that where the claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, it is open to a claimant to refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication and where a reference is so made the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain the question relating to any such claim. Sub-sec. (3) lays down the necessary qualifications for a person to be appointed as a member of the Claims Tribunal. What is important to be noficed in sub-sec. (3) is that a person need not be actually in office as a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge when he is so appointed. Likewise, he may have never held any office in the past but he should be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. An advocate who has practised for ten years or more could be appointed a member of the Tribunal. Likewise, a person who had held a judicial office for ten years or more could also be appointed a member of the Tribunal. He might be Civil Judge or a Munsif only. However, if he is a District Judge then he can be appointed a member of the Claims Tribunal, irrespective of his possessing or not possessing the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. The question, in the circumstances is whether the mere coincidence that the Claims Tribunal at Alwar is a one man's Tribunal and the District Judge of Alwar is the Claims Tribunal will be enough for holding that the Claims Tribunal is a court within the meaning of sec. 24, CPC as to entitle this court to transfer the proceedings before it to another Claims Tribunal for another area. One thing that again deserves notice is that parliament has designedly used the term "tribunal" in creating the machinery for speedy disposal of claims arising out of the accidents involving motor vehicles. Parliament was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between what is a civil court and what is a Claims Tribunal when in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 110 of the Act it specifically laid down that a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand could be referred by a claimant to the civil court for adjudication and in that event the Claims Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. Then, I may turn to other relevant sections. Sec. 113 B lays down that on receipt of an application for compensation under sec. 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and it will also specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid, and it shall further specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. Sec. 110-C deals with the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal and I may read this section: "110c (1) In holding any inquiry under sec. HOB, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witness and of compelling the (recovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of sec. 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. (2a) Where in the course of any injury, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that - (i) there is conclusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on ail or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claim Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensatin, choose, one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. What is remarkable here is that the Tribunal is given the power to lay down its own procedure, though that is subject to any rules that may be made in that connection. Such a procedure has to be summary. This is however, not to say that the principles of natural justice are not required to be observed. They have to be observed by the Claims Tribunal like any other Tribunal acting quasi judicially. But this is unlike the regularly constituted courts which are not authorised to devise their own procedure in dealing with the cases before them. Their procedure is laid down in the codes of procedure and other relevant rules. In other words, the civil court itself has no hand in devising the procedure in dealing with matters before it. Sec. 110-CC is about award of interest where any claim is allowed. Sec. 110ccc is for award of compensatory costs in certain cases. ;