BERI, C J. - (1.) APPELLANT Basantilal valued this appeal at Rs. 20,000/- and, therefore, the Registrar by his order dated August 18, 1972, admitted it. An ad interim injunction was claimed for which notice was issued to the respondents and some of them are present before us. An objection has been taken that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to admit this appeal and its valuation has been erroneously fixed.
(2.) WE might notice a few facts necessary for the disposal of the point raised before us. On October 3, 1963, Basantilal obtained a decree against Manoharlal in the sum of Rs. 7640/- exclusive of costs. Basantilal levied execution on December 3, 1963, and got attached a house in Mahavir Chowk, Tonk. Judgment-debtor Manohar Lal's wife Smt. Sajjan Devi, objected to the attachment but was unsuccessful. She, therefore, instituted a suit under O. 21. r. 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure on June 3, 1963, claiming the house under attachment to be her own. Manoharlal was made a party to this suit but the joined no issue with wife. Sajjan Devi, however, succeeded in establishing her claim by virtue of judgment and decree dated 10th May, 1972, passed by the learned Additional District Judge Tonk. Against that judgment and decree, decree-holder Bnsantilal has come up in appeal and he has valued it at Rs. 20,000/- as already mentioned. Mr. Khejariwal learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Sobhagmal raised two objections. Tee first is that this was a Single Bench appeal and ought not to have been admitted by the Registrar and the second is that the injunction issued by us should be vacated. In support of the question of jurisdiction Mr. Khejariwal cited before us Moolchand vs. Ramkishan (l),puttamma vs. Veerabhadra (2), Renganath vs. Subram-anian (3) and Nandlal vs. Mt. Baratan (4 ). All these authorities took the line which we might extract from the head-note of Moolchand's case (1), namely, that where a claimant whose objection to an attachment in executing a decree against judgment-debtor is dismissed, files a declaratory suit that the property attached is his own, the valuation of the suit in cases where the value of the property is greater than the amount of the decree, is the amount of the decree. Mr. Tikku learned counsel for the appellant invites our attention to Daw Dut vs. Daw Kwi (5) and Gaindalal vs. Ramsingh (6 ). These two authorities lay down the proposition that where the claim for removal of attachment of the property is dismissed and a suit is instituted against the attaching creditor as well as the judgment debtor for a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the property with respect to which his claim has been dismissed, then if the value of the property attached is more than the value of the decree obtained by the attaching decree-holder, the value which governs the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the suit is the value of the property itself and not merely the value of the decree. The reason advanced for this view in the Rangoon case (5) is that if the claimant is unsuccessful in his suit for declaration not only will the attaching decree-holder realise the value of the decree but as regards any surplus remaining that will also go to the judgment-debtor and the claimant will lose the whole value of the attached property. The correct solution to this controversy in our opinion can be gathered by making a reference to the relevant statutory provisions in this behalf. Sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961, hereinafter called the Act, reads as under : "s. 39. Suits to set aside attachment etc.- (1) In a suit to set aside an attachment by a Civil or Revenue Court of any property, movable or immovable or of any interest therein or of any interest in revenue, or to set aside an order passed on an application made to set aside the attachment, fee shall be computed on the amount for which the property was attached or on onefourth of the market value of the property attached, whichever is less. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . " In this context it will be pertinent to remember that Sajjan Devi in the suit instituted by her in paragraph 7 of the plaint referred to this provision and paid court fee on the sum of Rs. 5000/- being l/4th of the value of the house attached pursuant to the aforesaid section. Another provision of the Act which is attracted is sec. 48 (1) which reads : "s. 48. Suits not otherwise provided for (1) In a suit as to whose value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts specific provision is not otherwise made in this Act or in any other law, value for that purpose of computing the fee payable under this Act shall be the same. (2 ). . . . . . . . " Mr. Tikku conceded frankly that there is no specific provision in the Act or in any other law regulating the fixation of valuation of suits instituted for the establishment of a claim under O. 21 r. 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this makes the applicability of sec. 48 beyond dispute. A remarkable feature of this dispute in that Smt. Sujjan Devi, tee wife of the judgment-debtor, is claiming the house as entirely her own and the husband Manohar Lal judgment-debtor does not controvert her claim. The resultant position is that the judgment debtor is a mere pro forma defendant and will be content if the attached property is declared to be that of his wife. In Khetrapal vs. M. Mumtaz Begum (7) a passage wherefrom has been quoted in extenso by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Moolchand's case (1), it has been recognised that where a wife did not allege a cause of action against her husband in a similar situation the husband was merely a pro forma defendant and the whole of the property attached was not in dispute. Gaindalal's case (6) is clearly distinguishable because the learned Judges did not even refer to their own Full Bench decision of Moolchand's case on account of certain statutory amendments which had taken place in the U. P. Court Fees Act after the decision of the Full Bench. The view taken in Rangoon's case (5) no doubt supports to some extent the contention of Mr. Tikku but we regret our inability to agree with the view propounded by the learned Single Judge. In our opinion, therefore, having regard to the circumstances of the case and specially when the judgment-debtor has not joined any issue with the objector this suit on a combined reading of sec. 39 and 48 of the Act is of a value equivalent to the decretal amount and, therefore, must be laid before a learned Single Judge for admission. The order of admission by the Registrar is set aside. The ad interim injunction issued in favour of the appellant by us is also vacated. It will be laid before the learned Single Judge tomorrow. . ;