Chhangani, J. - (1.) THESE Civil Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 24/60 and 32/60 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 5/62 raise inter-alia a question as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha's decrees (Enforceability) Act No. 26 of 1958 (hereinafter called the "validating Act") and since they were argued together, they shall be disposed of by one judgment and order.
(2.) THE facts of the three cases may shortly be stated at the out set. 1. D. B Civil execution 1st Appeal No. 32/60 - THE estate of the appellant Madan Singh, Jagirdar of village Saredi, was under the management of Shishu Hitkarini Sabha in the Samvat year 1994 under the provisions of the Mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikano Ka Qanoon Sambat 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "mewar Act" in connection with the liquidation of debts against the jagirdar. THE respondent's father Bhuralal had a debt outstanding against the thikana and he, therefore, filed a claim in accordance with the provisions of Mewar Act. A decree for Rs. 11,750/-was eventually passed by the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha on Asar Badi 8, Samvat 1996. Learned counsel for the parties did not place before us the necessary information as to how long the estate of the appellant remained under the charge of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha or any succeeding authority, if any, after the promulgation of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the 'rajasthan Act') which came into force on 17. 10. 1951 and when the appellant's estate was released. Similarly, the details as to the various payments received by the decree-holder were also not placed before us. On behalf of the creditors, it is however, admitted that an amount of Rs. 6,118/5/3 was received, although, the appellant judgment-debtor alleged an additional payment of Rs. 800/- more. The appellant's jagir was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (Act No. VI of 1952 - hereinafter to be referred as to the "jagir Act") and thereafter the decree-holder-respondents failed to secure further satisfaction of the decree, either out of the jagir or compensation payable to the jagirdar. They, therefore, submitted an application for execution of the decree in the court of District Judge, Bhilwara, who vide his order dated 9. 11. 57, dismissed the execution application, holding the decree of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha inexecutable. The Validating Act came into force on 6. 6. 1958 and the present respondent's, sons of the original decree-holder, presented an application for execution of the decree on 8. 10. 58. The judgment-debtor-appellant objected to the execution of the decree on the following grounds - 1. On Asar Badi 8, Samvat 1896 when the decree was passed, the appellant was minor and, therefore, the decree passed against him was a nullity. 2. That the original debt was against his father and, therefore, the decree in respect of that debt is not executable against the Jagir which is the personal property of the appellant. 3. That for various reasons which will be discussed hereafter, the provisions of the Validating Act were not attracted to the present case and the decree could not be executed. The judgment-debtor also pleaded that the decree could only be executed by attachment of 50% of the annual compensation payable to the jagirdar and not by an attachment of a lump-sum. The judgment-debtor also pleaded that the execution application was not properly signed and presented. A plea of payment of additional amount of Rs. 800/- was also raised. The execution court, after framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, dismissed the objection petition. The judgment-debtor has consequently filed this appeal. 2. D. B. Civil Execution 1st Appeal No. 24/60 - In this appeal, the respondents Shyamsunder and Balkishen obtained a decree against the appellant for on amount of Rs. 14,143/3/3 from the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha of the former Mewar State on 6. 1. 43, the appellant's estate being under the management of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha, in connection with the liquidation of debts outstanding against him under the provisions of the Mewar Act. The decree-holder-respondent could recover Rs. 2,732/10/3 towards the satisfaction of the decree and the balance of Rs. 11,410/9/- has yet to be recovered. After the Validating Act came into force, the decree-holder-respondents applied for the execution of the decree to the court of the Civil Judge, Udaipur, from which court it was transferred to the court of District Judge, Bhilwara. The appellant objected to the execution of the decree against him. The case of the appellant was that the decree in favour of the respondent had been partially satisfied and did not remain unsatisfied in full at the time of the promulgation of the Validating Act and, consequently, it is not covered by sec. 4 (1) of the Validating Act, according to which, such decrees of the Mewar Act as had remained unsatisfied in full could be treated as the decreets of the civil courts. The objection was over-ruled by the District Judge, Bhilwara, by his order dated 7. 4. 60. The judgment-debtor has filed appeal No. 20/60. 3. Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 5/62 - In this case the applicant, holder of thikana Karol, District Bhilwara, was declared Qarzdar thikana under the provisions of Mewar Act in 1939 A. D. and the estate was taken under the management of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha. Under sec. 9 of the Mewar Act, the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha on taking over an estate under its management issued a Notification on 21. 1. 40 requiring all creditors against the Thikana to present their claims within four months. Fatehlal the grand father of the respondents had debts outstanding against the Jagirdar under some documents and he consequently filed a claim for Rs. 40,000/-on 1. 7. 41, admittedly after the expiry of 4 months notice period, though the claim was stated to be within limitation under the general law. The plaint was examined in the office of the Sabha and it was reported that it was barred by limitation. Since in a similar matter a reference had been made by the Sabha to the Mewar Government as to whether a claim lodged after the expiry of notice period should be entertained, the Sabha ordered that action shall be taken in the case in terms of the direction that might be received from the Government. A direction was issued on 7th June, 1947 and thereafter the Sabha undertook the examination of the case on merits. The claim, however, could not be adjudicated by the Sabha. In the meanwhile, there was integration of the various States and there was formed the State of Raj. After the promulgation of Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, the respondents' claim was scrutinised by the Collector, Bhilwara, who submitted the case to the Revenue Board with the recommendation that the claim against the jagirdar amounting to Rs. 34,345/10/6 be allowed under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951. In the meanwhile, the Validating Act came into force and the respondents filed a regular civil suit in the court of Civil Judge, Udaipur, for an amount of Rs. 40,000/-on 24. 6. 1959. The claim proceedings of the respondent, which were pending before the Revenue Board, were dropped with the observations that after the promulgation of the Validating Act the only remedy open to the plaintiff would be to bring a suit in a civil court within a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Act. In his written statement, the petitioner did not admit the debt and raised several points in his defence, one of which relates to the validity of the Act. The suit, initially filed in the court of the Senior Civil Judge was transferred to the court of District Judge where the trial has been concluded. Arguments in the case have also been heard. Before judgment could be pronounced, the petitioner submitted this application under Article 228 of the Constitution, contending that as the matter concerns the constitutionality of the Validating Act and the interpretation of the Art, 14 of the Constitution and as the same question is pending in this Court in some cases, the case should be withdrawn from the Court of District Judge, for determining the question of law and for disposing of the case in the light of the decision on the question of law. The question as to the constitutionality of the Validating Act is common to all and that being so, we shall first deal with it. The contention in this behalf is that in the various covenanting States which have merged into the bigger unit of Rajasthan State, there were Court of Wards Acts and Jagirdars Encumbered Estates Acts. These Acts were similar to the Mewar Act and a law governing creditors and debtors only in the territories of the former Mewar State is clearly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, as there was no justification for enacting a law affecting the creditors and debtors in areas comprised in the former Mewar State when the creditors and debtors in other parts of the State were in the same position. In connection with the hearing of the appeals, emphasis was laid on the invalidity of sec. 4 of the Act, whereas, in the miscellaneous application, sec. 5 of the Validating Act was strongly challenged. The State has opposed the contention on behalf of the appellants and the applicant and seeks to uphold the validity of the law on the ground of reasonable classification. Shri Sheoram Jain, Officer on Special Duty for Jagir matters in the Rajasthan Secretariate, has filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances under which the Validating Act has been passed. The case for the State is that when the Rajasthan State promulgated the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951 (Act No. XXVIII of 1951) on the 17th day of October, 1951, it could not know fully about the existence of the various laws in force in other States. The Legislature, therefore, thought it expedient to repeal all such laws by a general mention of "laws of other covenanting States relating to the Court of Wards". That in Mewar, there was a law known as "mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikanon Ka Qanoon" Sambat 1994 and that various persons had obtained decrees or orders for payment of dues passed by the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha, an authority appointed under the above Mewar Law, and that after the resumption of the jagir under the Jagir Act. attempts were made by the creditors to attach the compensation amount. The Jagir Commissioner. Rajasthan, felt doubts about the executability of such orders and decrees and he referred the matter to the Government. Legal opinion available to the Government was that the Mewar law had been repealed by the Court of Wards Act and that the decrees of orders of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha passed or made under the said Act were not executable or enforceable as decrees of civil courts against the compensation amount payable to the jagirdars. It was pointed out that injustice and hardship would be caused to persons and it was suggested that the only way in which justice could be done to them was to enact a special law declaring the decrees of Shishu Hitkarini Sabha to be the decrees of a competent civil court and enforceable as such, and providing for such persons who had not brought their claims by reason of the Mewar law either in a civil court or before the said Sabha and the exclusion of the period from the date of cause of action till the date of commencement of such law in calculating the period of limitation for suits based on such action. Representations were also made to the Government by persons affected for suitable redress and the enquiries made from the Collectors of the districts of Chittor, Bhilwara and Udaipur, revealed that a large number of cases involving a huge amount would be affected. It was, in these circumstances, that the Act was passed by the State Legislature. The various other allegations made by the petitioner were denied in this affidavit. The respondents have supported the contentions of the State. Now, the principles governing such cases are well settled by a series of the Supreme Court decisions and we need only refer to a few of them. In Budhan Choudhry Vs. The State of Bihar (1), the Supreme Court laid down the rule in the following terms : "it is now well established that while, Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis, namely, geographical, or according to objects or like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. " In Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (2) earlier case-law was reviewed and the position was summed up in six propositions - " (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there; is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles ; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds ; (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest ; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation ; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classifications may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. " Their Lordships further observed that statutes coming for consideration on a question of validity will fall into five categories. Category No. 1 referred to by their Lordships is relevant for our purposes and it will be useful to quote the observations made in this behalf - "a statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differential has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the Court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the Court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal vs. Union of India (Supra) State of Bombay vs. F. N. Balsara (Supra), Kedarnath Bajoria vs. State of West Bengal, (1954 S. C. R. 39; AIR 1955 S. C. 404) (I), V. M. Syed Mohammad & Co. vs. State of Andhra, (1954 S. C. R. 1117 ; AIR 1954 SC. 314) (J) and Budhan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar (Supra ). " The question of the constitutionality of law has to be examined in the light of the principles enunciated above. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the provisions of the Act under challenge. The long preamble to the Act sets forth, in the first instance, four important features, namely, (i) the holder of a Thikana in the former Mewar State placed under the administration of the Mewar Shishu Hitkarini Sabha was not competent to contract new debts, (ii) a suit by a creditor of such holder was not entertainable in any Court, (iii) a suit pending at the time of the issue of a notice under the said Mewar Act for the proving of debts against such Thikana could not be proceeded with in a civil court and was, according to the provisions of the said Act, to be treated as transferred to the said Sabha, and (iv) the jurisdiction of civil courts was barred in respect of any claim against such Thikana, even though based on a previously arisen cause of action ; under the Mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikanon Ka Qanoon, and then referred to the doubts as to the implied repeal of the Mewar Act with the passing of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1961 and the unenfoceability of the decrees of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha as civil court decrees. The preamble then recited that there was reason to believe that some of the creditors of such Thikanas, while they could not bring suits in respect of their debts against such Thikanas in respect of causes of action that had arisen previously to the latter being placed under the administration of the said Sabha, were also afforded no opportunity to prove these debts before the said Sabha, and proceeded to say "that with a view to mitigating the hardship thereby caused, it was expedient to make legislative pronouncements removing the aforesaid doubts, declaring the decrees passed by the said Sabha under the said Mewar Act to be enforceable as decrees of civil courts and providing for the exclusion of time to be calculated for the institution of certain suits. "the Act consists of five sections. Sec. 1 relates to the title of the Act. Sec. 2 defines the various terms. Sec. 3 provides that for the removal of the doubts it is hereby declared that the Mewar Act was repealed by implication on and from the date of the commencement of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act and is hereby repealed expressly. Proviso to sec. 3 saves actions all taken under the Mewar Act upto the commencement of this Act. Sec. 4 provides that the decrees of the Sabha remaining unsatisfied in full at the commencement of the Act shall be deemed to be the decrees passed by competent civil court at Udaipur on the date of such commencement for the reliefs thereby originally granted and then remaining unsatisfied. Sub-sec. (2) takes away the right of appeal or revision from the decrees deemed to have been passed by competent civil courts. Sub-sec. (4) states that the previous dismissal of the application for execution of the decrees of the Sabha on the ground of want of jurisdiction shall not be a bar to their executability and enforceability by competent civil courts. Sec. 5 provides that suits on causes of action arising previously to thikanas being placed under the administration of the Sabha may be brought within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Act or within the limitation provided by law for such suits whichever is later, by persons (a) who had no opportunity to prove their debts before the Sabha, or (b) who, notwithstanding such opportunity being afforded to him after the commencement of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951, did not prove his debts before the Sabha. The provisions of the Indian Limitation Act or any other law would not affect such suits. For a proper appreciation of the merits of the contention relating to the constitutionality of the Act, it will be desirable to refer to the comparative law in the various covenanting States on the subject. It may be observed that in most of the States the class of the Jagirdars or land holders had peculiar position. They had their grants from the Rulers. In theory these grants were for the life time of the grantee but in practice the grants were inherited by heirs according to personal law subject to the rule of primogeniture in some cases. The grantees could realise rent and revenue and had to pay a 'rekh' or 'chatun-chakri' to the Ruler. The holders had no right to effect permanent alienations of the grant, although temporary alienations in the prescribed forms were permissible. In view of the peculiar problems prevailing in this class, the various States felt the need of legislation for protecting the persons and properties of the land-holders, who on account of minority or other mental incapacity could not manage their property as also for the liquidation of the debts of the land-holders who became excessively indebted on account of extravagance or otherwise. The States had their own perterns of legislation. The following review will show that both in form and in substance the legislation was not uniform. Besides, the former Mewar State, the rest of the States may be classified into two catagories - 1. States other than the Marwar or the Jodhpur State. 2. Jodhpur State. . It is conceded that so far as it was known to the parties, the States in the former category had enacted only the Court of Wards Acts providing for both matters in that Act. References in this connection were made only to the provisions of the Jaipur Court of Wards Act and the Bikaner Court of Wards Act and we also consider it sufficient to refer to them only, of course illustratively. Under sec. 7 of the Jaipur Court of Wards Act (a) minors, (b) persons declared by the Durbar to be incapable of managing or unfit to manage their own property, (i) on account of any physical or mental defect or infirmity unfitting them for the management of their own property; (ii) owing to their having been convicted of a nonbailable offence and being unfitted by vicious habits or bad character, for the management of their own property; (iii) owing to their failure without sufficient reasons to discharge the debts and liabilities due by them to the Raj and other creditors; were to be deemed disqualified to manage their property. Thus, minors, mentally incompetent and indebted jagirdars were placed on the same footing. After the assumption of the superintendence of the person and property of a land-holder by a Court of Wards a notice calling upon persons having claims, including decrees for money, against the ward to notify the same in writing within six months, had to be given. Under sec. 19, the effect of the failure to notify the claims within the prescribed time was that the claim was to be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions whether during continuance of superintendence of Court of Wards or afterwards to have been duly discharged. Under the proviso the Manager had discretion to receive the claims even after the expiry of six months. Under sec. 20, the Manager was authorised to adjudicate against the claims filed against the wards. Sec. 21, however, gave a right to a claimant to institute a civil suit for a claim disallowed in whole or in part. Chapter VII secs. 42 to 46 provided for the suit against wards and it is clear that the jurisdiction of the civil courts was not barred. Similar are the provisions of the Bikaner Court of Wards Act and, we consider it unnecessary to refer to them in any great detail. The position in Marwar was slightly different. In the first place, there was the Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923. The provision of this were similar to those of other similar Acts and need not be referred. Then, there was in force the Marwar Jagirdars Encumbered Estates Act, 1922 which provided for indebted jagirdars and which is comparable with the Mewar Act. We need only refer to three sections of this Act as useful for comparison purposes. Sec. 8 sub-sec. (1) of the Act provided that "when the statement or information referred to in sec. 7 has been submitted or furnished, the Haisiyat Court shall cause to be published in three consecutive issues of the gazette a notice in the vernacular calling upon all persons, including officers in charge of State Departments having any claim against the jagirdar by or in respect of whom application has been made under s. 5 to present to the Haisiyat Court within three months from the date of the first publication of the notice a written statement of their claim. " Sub-sec. (2) provided for service on the persons named in the statement submitted under sec. 7 (f ). Under sub-sec. (4) the claimants were required to present their claims within the period specified in notice but the Haisiyat Court was given discretion to admit claims within a further period of three months, if they could show sufficient cause for non presenting the statements within the period specified in the notice. Sec. 9 mentions the various consequences following the publication of the notice. Firstly, all proceedings in any court or before any officer in Marwar, and all processes, executions and attachments issued by any such court or officer and then in force in respect of any such debt, shall become null and void, and no fresh process, execution or attachment shall, except as hereinafter provided, be issued. Secondly, in respect of any such debt, no fresh suit or other proceeding shall, except as hereinafter provided, be instituted in any court or before any officer. Thus, the jurisdiction of the civil courts was ousted save in exceptional cases (which it is unnecessary to refer for the purposes of this case) and the Haisiyat Court was given exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims against the indebted jagirdars. Sec. 22 fixed the period of disqualification at 3g years and the debts against the jagirdars were required to be liquidated within the shortest period not exceeding 30 years. Mewar State, however, had a unique position. Learned counsel for both the parties in spite of our repeated questioning submitted that there was no legislation in the nature of a Court of Wards Act providing for the protection of the persons and properties of minors, or other mentally incompetent persons in the former Mewar State. It was stated that the State, however, had passed only the Mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikanon Ka Qanoon which merely provided for the liquidation of the debts of the jagirdars indebted to the extent prescribed in the Act. The peculiar features of this Act may be indicated here. According to sec. 9 thereof the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha was required to issue a notice calling upon the creditors to submit the claims against the indebted jagirdars within a period of four months and no discretion was given in express terms to the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha to entertain claims after the expiry of the four months. As has been mentioned earlier, the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha therefore felt the need of making a reference to the Government on the point whether the claims could be entertained after the expiry of four months and it took the Mewar Government six years to come to a decision that the claims could be entertained even after the expiry of four months. The claims of the various-creditors thus remained unadjudicated upon for a number of years. Sec. 17 of the Mewar Act provided that the civil courts would not be competent to entertain suits in respect of debts outstanding against such jagirdars. It further provided that all suits pending against such jagirdars shall be transferred to the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha. Thirdly, the estates of the indebted jagirdars were to remain in the charge of the. Shishu Hitkarini Sabha till the debts were repaid under sec. 22 of the Act and no limit was fixed for that period.
(3.) IT will be seen from the above review that the legislation in Mewar was different from the other States. The Mewar Legislation provided only for a part of the subject matter legislated in other States. Whereas, the Court of Wards Acts, for the various States did not oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the Mewar law clearly barred the jurisdiction of the civil courts. There are also obvious differences in the Marwar Jagirdars Encumbered Estates Act and the Mewar Act, namely. (1) in the matter of the period of notice requiring the creditors to present their claims ; (2) the effect on pending suits. While under the Marwar law suits became null and void, under the Mewar law suits had to be transferred to the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha ; (3) the maximum period for liquidation of debts. The Marwar law prescribed 30 years but under the Mewar law the estates had to be kept in management upto liquidation of all debts. IT may also be significantly pointed when the Mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikanon Ka Qanoon was enacted, there was no Civil Procedure Code in force in the former Mewar State. Indeed, the law in the Mewar State was scanty and in a nebulous State. This position was further responsible for doubts as to the effect of the promulgation of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951. Sec. 8 thereof specifies the land-holders who shall be deemed to be disqualified to manage their own estate : - (a) minors ; (b) persons adjudged by a competent civil court to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing their own estate ; (c) persons declared by the Government to be incapable of managing or unfitted to manage their own estate - (i) owing to any physical or mental defect or infirmity unfitting them for the management of their own estate ; (ii) owing to their having been convicted of a non-bailable offence or being unfitted by vicious habits or bad character for the management of their own estate ; (iii) owing to their having entered upon a course of extravagance ; (iv) owing to their failure within sufficient reason to discharge the debts and liabilities due by them ; (v) owing to such mismanagement as has caused general discontent among the tenants ; The provisions of sec. 8 (l) (c) (ii) (iii) and (iv) were declared ultra vires by a Bench of this Court in Rao Bhagwat Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (3) being inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 19 (l) (f ). A careful consideration of the provisions of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act as they now stand will show that it does not contemplate superintendence of the estate on the ground of mere indebtedness irrespective of the mental incompetence of a land-holder. It follows that a doubt could reasonably be entertained whether the Mewar Act, which provided for assumption of the estate of a land-holder by the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha only on the ground of indebtedness, could be considered to have been impliedly repealed by the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act. Similarly, doubts could be entertained whether jagirdars whose estates were taken under the control of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha merely on the ground of indebtedness could continue under the superintendence of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha under the Mewar Act or could be taken over by the authority under the Court of Wards Act under the provisions of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act. There was also reasonable basis for uncertainty as to the forum where the judgment creditors under adjudication of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha or other creditors should secure the satisfaction or adjudication of their decrees and claims in accordance with the provisions of the Court of Wards Act. Attempts were made by the judgment creditors to secure satisfaction of their decrees by attachment of the compensation bonds and they were unsuccessful. The position with regard to the Marwar Jagirdars Encumbered Estate Act was quite different in this respect. It was not expressly repealed by the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act and there never arose a question of its implied repeal. It continued to be in force till disposal by Act No. 35 of 1957. The creditors could enjoy rights under this Act without any doubt till its repeal. There are further no materials on record whether the creditors suffered any appreciable hardship on its repeal and whether they demanded or deserved relief. It will be quite clear from the above discussion that the position of the creditors against land-holders governed by the Shishu Hitkarni Sabha was thus indeed very peculiar and cannot be reasonably compared with the position of creditors in other areas. Neither the creditors governed by the Court of Wards Acts nor the creditors governed by the Marwar Jagirdars Encumbered Estate Act can claim similarity with them. In this back-ground, we are clearly of the opinion that there could be and was reasonable basis for the legislature to treat the creditors and debtors affected by the Mewar Ke Qarzdar Thikanon Ka Qanoon as a group different from other creditors and debtors to justify a separate legislation for them. On the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the legislature was perfectly justified in determining the extent of hardship and convenience resulting from a particular process of the development and growth of law in the Mewar area. Indeed, courts are expected to show a good deal of deference to the legislative judgment and in the absence of any materials showing classification as arbitrary or unreasonable they will presume the reasonableness of the classification. We venture to observe that it is hardly permissible to question the validity of a legislation recognising the hardship caused to or felt by a particular class of persons and providing for its redress on a hypothetical reasoning that on future and detailed inquiry it could have been found that other persons might have also suffered some hardship and deserved some relief. It was for the appellants and the applicant to allege and prove beyond doubt that the person outside the group suffered and felt the same extent of hardship and deserved the same relief and that this group has been arbitrarily selected. In this view of the matter, a separate legislation for creditors and debtors governed by the Mewar Act cannot be said to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Even so, it was argued on behalf of the appellants and the applicant that the legislature had no justification for enacting drastic provisions like sec. 4 & 5 and it was contended that they clearly and manifestly indicate inequality. In enacting these provisions, the legislature instead of providing remedy by way of suit and permitting some grace period went to the extent of giving adjudications of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha the status of the decrees of the civil courts, and further disregarded the provisions of the various Limitation Acts in permitting suits even where the creditors had been guilty of laches. They, therefore, seriously challenged the validity of secs. 4 and 5. We are unable to accept the contention. The position properly appreciated is this. The creditors affected by the Mewar Act can reasonably be considered to have been put to hardship in the matter of securing the satisfaction of adjudications in their favour as also securing decisions of their claims and this can be considered as the basis for the classification. The purpose of Validating Act is to provide relief to them and one can easily see the reasonable connection between the two. Secs. 4 and 5 merely prescribe the mode of granting relief. It will be hardly proper and fair to treat these sections individually indicating as if subsidiary objects of the Act and to attempt to relate them with the basis of classification. The mode of relief was entirely a matter for the legislature and this Court does not feel persuaded to examine the appropriateness of the mode. Secondly, we may also observe that the Mewar Act provided for the transfer of the pending civil suits to the Shisu Hitkarini Sabba. Thus, the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha became the successor of the civil courts. This was not the case under any law anywhere. The legislature, therefore, could have reasonable basis for giving the status of the civil court decrees to the adjudications of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha. The provision providing that there will be no right of appeal or revision is of a consequential nature and merely emphasises that the decrees of the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha shall be treated as final decrees of civil courts and the persons affected will not be entitled to claim further right of appeal on account of this deeming provision. It does not imply any violation of the basic principles of justice. As regards sec. 5, the Advocate General contended that sec. 5 was intended for those creditors who in spite of their having filed claims before the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha, could not secure their adjudication by the Shishu Hitkarini Sabha or subsequently under the provisions of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act whose claims were, therefore, pending at the time of the promulgation of the Act. If this was the intention of the legislature, we must observe that the intention has not been expressed in appropriate terms. The language used is wide enough to cover cases where the creditors could not lodge or prove their claims both on account of an illegal denial of reasonable facilities as also on account of their own laches. ;