- (1.) SHRI Gajendra Singh The Government Adovocate has filed this appeal alongwith 50 other appeals against the various respondents Ex-Jagirdars of Jhunjhunu under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 against the judgment of the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Jhunjhunu dated the 25th October 1952.
(2.) A common point of law has been raised in all these 51 appeals filed by the Government Advocate against the various Ex-Jagirdars respondents and therefore the larger Bench was constituted for the purpose of hearing this special point of law raised in these appeals. This one order, therefore, disposes of all these appeals. The only contention raised by the Government Advocate was that the Deputy Collector, Jagir has committed an error of law in allowing an income to the respondents from the sale of abadi land though such sale was not effected through a registered instrument. Such sale in the opinion of the Government Advocate was not a legal sale and could not form the basis of assessment of income. The Govt. Advocate urged that sale has been defined under sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as follow - "54. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promi-ssed or part paid and part promissed. " (Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards or in the case of revision or other tangible thing, can be made only by a registered instruments ). Thus a sale of an immovable property of more than Rs. 100/- in value could only be effected under the law by means of a registered instrument in writing, which alone can pass ownership in the property sold. The Govt. Advocate urged that the term sale used in Sch. II cl. 2 (f) of the Jagir Act relating to the income from the sale of abadi land means a legal sale. He, therefore, argued that as no legal sale took place consequently no income could be permitted for such transactions to the Jagirdar. District Jhunjhunu was part of the former Jaipur State when Jaipur Transfer of Property Act, 1944 was enforced on the 8th of February, 1944. It extended to the whole of Jaipur State except the Sambhar Samlat area. The provisions of the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act were similar to the Indian Transfer of Property Act. The Jaipur Registration Act, 1955 was also promulgated on the same date the Jaipur Transfer of Property was enforced. Under sec. 17 sub-sec. 5 of the Jaipur Registration Act all documents containing a transfer of immovable property of more than Rs. 100/- were compulsarily registrable under the aforesaid Act. The Government Advocate further pointed out that the provision of sec. 53 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act relating to the doctrine of part performance, does not make a a transaction of sale complete by transfer of possession to the buyer, but it operates only as a contract of sale. It only enables a vendee to claim specific performance of the contract by getting the sale deed registered. In support the Government Advocate cited R. R. D. 1950 page 177 where in a matter relating to the sale of agricultural land, the Full Bench of this Board had held that the essential ingredients to constitute a sale is a complete transfer of ownership of property by the vendor in favour of the vendee for consideration. Similar view was also taken in the case of Mohannath versus the State of Rajasthan reported in R. L. J. 1962 Part III page 6 or R. R. D. 1962 page 297. Shri Dhonkal Singh appearing on behalf of the respondent in case No. 29 argued by saying that with the introduction of the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, the Ex-Jagirdar of the former Jaipur State made a representation to the Government that (heir rights relating to sale of abadi land, mortgage of jagir lands and other alienations of the jagir property should not be affected by these legislations. The Government of Jaipur considered these matters and passed the revenue standing Order No. 12 of 1948 by which the sale of land in abadi area was permitted without the previous sanction of the Jaipur Government. He also pointed out that there was a standing practice in the former Jaipur State that the pattas granted by the Ex-Jagirdars as evidencing the sale of land by them, were not required to be registered by the Jaipur Government. Similarly, pattas granted by the Jagirdars of Marwar to evidence the sale of abadi land were not required to be registered and were treated as Sanad. This practice was recognised by the High Court in 1963 R. L. W. 167. He also pointed out that a sale certificate issued by the executing Court under O. 21, r. 24 of the C. P. C. does not require to be registered on the ground that it was the ministerial act of the Court and no registration was necessary. Similarly, the Advocate pointed out that the Jagirdars exercised extensive revenue and judicial powers in their own rights in their territories and when they sold any land issued a patta to recognise its sale such documents or Sanads were not required to be registered. Finally, the Advocate stated that the invalidity of any sale could only be challenged by the parties to the transaction and not by a third party like the State in the present case and in support he cited 9 Indian Cases page 770, 20 Indian Cases page 952 and 29 Indian Cases page 305, A. I. R. 1935 Allahabad page 437, and A. I. R. 1935 Patna page 45. In one of these cases, the counsel pointed out that an equity of redemption was sold and receipt of earnest money was passed and still it was considered a good sale. In the Patna ruling cited above, it was laid down that the intention of the parties have to be seen as to when the title in an immovable property passes, registration alone never passed the title. Therefore the Advocate concluded by saying that only an income from the sale alone is to be considered in these Jagir Compensation cases and the aspect of the transaction whether the sale has been completed or not is not to be examined. The term sale as mentioned in Second Schedule is to be considered in its popular parlance and should not be given its technical meaning. Shri Jyoti Swaroop Advocate appearing amicus curie contended by saying that as far as the Jagir Act, 1952 is concerned the term 'sale' has no where been defined. Therefore one has to consider the popular meaning of sale in the absence of the definition in the Act. As regards the title which would pass to the vendee on the sale of the property, it is merely a question of law. Where there is no dispute between the vendor and the vendee it is immaterial whether the documents transferring the title is registered or not, the title passes when the sale deed is executed. In support he cited A. I. R. 1954 Madhya Bharat page 24. He also cited A. I. R. 1958 Patna page 123/195 in support of the law, that sale is complete on execution of a sale deed by the vendor. Citing AIR 1951 Cal. 151 the counsel urged that the sale ordinarily means a transfer of property for a consideration. He submitted that the term sale has not been defined also in the Indian Income Tax Act and various transactions of sale not by registered instrument were nevertheless considered as sale within the meaning of the Act. There the popular meaning of the term sale was taken and not the restricted meaning as given under the Transfer of Property Act. He also pointed out the absurdity that by applying the definition of the term sale as given in the Transfer of Property Act, it would produce different results when applied to the pre 1944 and post 1944 transaction of sale in the former Jaipur State areas. He also reiterated the argument advanced by Shri Dhonkar Singh that other party to a sale cannot question the transaction as in the present case done by the Government. Shri S. N. Pareek appearing amicus curie argued by saying that the intention of the legislature has to be looked into in order to interpret the term sale in any statute or an Act where it has not been defined. It has to be given its natural and popular meaning. Here in the Jagir Act the term sale in the absence of definition in the Act itself was intended to be used by the legislature of Rajasthan in its natural, popular and general sense, and not in any particular sense. In support he cited AIR 1957, Punjab, p. 5 and 1958 S. C. , p. 107. Whartan's Law Lexicon has given many meanings to the term sale and one that suits to the present case in the Act has to be applied. The terms sale has not been defined in the Rajasthan Land Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. This Act, the counsel pointed out as it is clear from the preamble was intended to provide for the resumption of Jagir lands and other measures of land reforms and to pay compensation to the Jagirdar. Whereas the term sale defined in the Transfer of Property Act was used in a different sense. That Act, was enacted to define and amend certain parts of law relating to the transfer of property, as laid down in its preamble. The purpose of the two Acts were thus different and the definition of the term sale in one cannot be used for the purpose of other. The counsel cited number of preemption cases and rulings under Land Acquisition, where sale deeds were admitted into evidence to prove the transaction of sale, though unregistered and the sale was considered as complete and valid. These Cases were 73 Indian Cases p. 758, 54 Indian Cases p. 215 and ILR 16 All. p. 351. This was a case of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, where in a preemption matter the definition of sale as given in the Transfer of Property Act was not made applicable, but the term sale as used in the Mohammadan Law was considered as valid. ILR 22 All. p. 343/345 was a land acquisition case, and there the sale was considered as complete when price was paid and possession delivered and unregistered sale deed was held admissible for the collateral purpose of proving the price of the land sold. The counsel pointed out that here in the Jagir Act, income from the sale of land alone has to be proved with reference to pattas and entries in books of account for purpose of payment of compensation to an Ex-Jagirdar. The validity or otherwise of the sale transaction is neither to be looked into nor such transactions for sale are to be enforced. He further cited ILR 1935 Bom. p. 438, RLW 1953 p. 472 to show that the unregistered sale deed has been used for various purposes to prove certain transactions, such as payment of money in the former and redemption of mortgage in the latter. He cited AIR 1942 Mad. 558 to show that the Transfer of Property Act is not an exhaustive legislation and in various cases not an exhaustive legislation and in various cases not covered by the. Act rules of equity, justice and good conscience have to be applied to dispose of such cases. The Jagir-dars have transferred the land by issue of patta and delivered the possession and in his opinion, such transactions of complete sale need not conform to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The counsel further pointed out that the Grown Grants Act of 1895 was adopted to the State of Rajasthan under the Rajasthan Central Laws Adaptation Ordinance, 1950, the Registration Act do not apply to transactions under that Act. Similarly the grants of land by the Jagirdars also fall in this category of the Crown Grants and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act do not apply to such cases. Shri Achal Singh also appearing amicus curie argued by saying that the Rulers of the State while granting jagirs also transferred part of their sovereign rights and powers Over the Jagir lands subject to such restrictions as imposed by them. The Ex-Jagirdars in the course of the administration of their Jagirs exercised certain powers of judicial and executive nature over the Jagir lands. In this limited sphere, and it was in exercise of these powers the Jagirdars sold land simply by means of pattas without the necessity of registration under the Marwar Patta Act The counsel further urged that the Jagirdars exercised certain powers of the escheat and issued pattas without the necessity of their being registered. Shri R. C. Sogani, Advocate appearing amicus curie argued by saying that the office of the Jagir Commissioner is not a Court. He is a quasi-judicial officer and charged with a duty to determine compensation on the income received by the Jagirdar from the sale of land, his jurisdiction is limited to the question of examining from the books of account and pattas produced by such jagirdars to prove the income in the sale of land only. He is not to examine each and every transaction whether the sale was valid or not. He was only to make an assessment of the income derived from the source of the sale of abadi land. It made no difference whether the document produced for getting the income assessed from the sale of abadi land were registered or unregistered. The scope of the duty of the Jagir Commissioner is to make an assessment of the income and to examine the documentary evidence in support of such transaction for simply collateral purpose of checking the amount of income that accrued to the Ex-Jagirdar. The counsel therefore, pointed out that it could never be the intention of the Legislature, while using the term sale of abadi land in the Second Schedule of the Act to make the Jagir Commissioner investigate the title of the vendees or to adjudicate upon the rights of third party. A question whether the transfer of land under the Jagir Act is valid or not can only be decided by a Civil Court and between the parties to the transaction. Such questions cannot be decided in a proceedings between the Jagirdar and a third party as in the present case the State. It is a common law of interpretation of statute that the term has to be interpreted in the context in which it is used by the legislature and not in any other manner. Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes gives many examples of this nature. Finally he pleaded that sub-grants made by Jagirdars in favour of their Chhuthbahis in lieu of maintenance were never required to be registered, a mere patta to transfer a part of the Jagir land for that purpose was considered effective. Shri P. D. Kudal, Government Advocate replying to the various points raised by the counsel for the respondents, stated that firstly, the contention of the learned counsel that the State was a third party and that the transaction of sale was not to be questioned is not correct. In Jagir compensation cases, the State is a direct party to the proceedings sand cannot be called a third party. Secondly, the analogy that no registration is required to consider the transaction of sale for Land Acquisition cases, has no application to the jagir cases. In the Land Acquisition case when a land is acquired it vests in the State and only the price has to be determined with reference to a sale deed. In Jagir case a land has been sold by a Jagirdar long time back and it does not vest in the State, but has been passed on to other persons and therefore the rulings relating to land acquisition cases has no application here. In fact, the Government Advocate pointed out that this was a wrong provision in the Act, that the income from the sale of those lands has been allowed, which had already been sold and the Jagirdar had pocketed the income long time back and yet he was paid compensation for it. The legislature instead should have allowed the income of those lands which were not sold and vested in the State as a result of resumption of Jagir. As regards the rulings relating to preemption cases the Government Advocate pointed out that Transfer of Property Act has been modified as far as the Punjab was concerned, where Registration Act has not been made compulsory. The provisions of Mohammadan Law relating to sale cannot apply as the sale has been defined differently. Thereafter the enforcement of the Constitution of India, Preemption Act has been held to be ultra vires by the Supreme Court in the ruling AIR 1961, p. 1747. He finally pointed out that ruling cited by the counsel for the respondent relating to transactions of sale under the Income Tax Act cannot be applied to the Jagir Act because under the Income Tax Act all income whether valid or invalid was considered proper for the purpose of assessment of the income of the tax payer. We have considered the arguments advanced from both the sides and the various rulings cited by the counsel. We have to construe the meaning of the term sale as used in clause 2 (f) of the Second Schedule of the Act and also to ascertain the intention of the legislature under which they wanted this term 'sale' to be interpreted. It is clear that the term 'sale' has not where been defined in the Jagir Act. It is also not defined in the General Clauses Act, either of the Central or of the Rajasthan State. The Government Advocate's plea was that this term 'sale' as used in the Jagir Act should be taken to mean the same as defined in sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, whereas the counsel on behalf of the respondents vehemently argued that in the absence of the definition in the Jagir Act, the term 'sale' should not be used in the manner in which it is defined in the Transfer of Property Act. They pointed out that the scope and functions of the Acts namely the Transfer of Property Act and the Jagir Act were quite different and the definition of the term from one Act cannot be adopted for use in another Act. In the ruling cited by the Government Advocate, R. R. D. 1960 page 177 relating to a case in which the Full Bench of this Board declared that the sale of agricultural land was not a sale at all because the vendors had no proprietary interest in those land. In that case the Full Bench quoted A. I. R. 1956 Travaneore-Cochin page 57/81 with the approval that the legislature are intended to use the words in their popular sense. The Full Bench went further and defined the term 'sale' as given by Blackstone in Wharten's Law Lexicon as follows - "sale means a transmutation of the property from one man to another in consideration of some price. " This is the ordinary and the natural and popular meaning of the term 'sale'. There is much force in the contention of the counsel for the respondents that the term 'sale' as used in the Jagir Act should not be given the restricted meaning as defined in the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of the definition in the Jagir Act. It may also be mentioned here that the Transfer of Property Act according to its preamble was enacted for the purpose of defining and amending certain parts of the law relating to the transfer of property by act of parties. It was, therefore, natural that they had to define sale and the manner in which it has to be effected, that is, by a registered instrument in writing for a immoveable property of the value of Rs. 100/-and above in order to prevent frauds amongst the parties and to create proper evidence so as to mitigate litigation. The purpose of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Jagir Resumption Act, 1952 in using the 'term sale' in the second schedule was quite different. Under the Jagir Act the estates of the Jagirdars were resumed and it was intended to compensate them and rehabilitate them by payment of a certain sum of money on the basis of the average income accrued to them from various sources during the particular span of time. It was for this reason that the term sale was used in the second schedule of the Act to allow a jagirdar to claim an income from the sale of such abadi land. As the counsel for respondents rightly pointed out the emphasis was not on the transaction of the sale itself, but on income that a jagirdar derived from this source. The counsel for the respondents further rightly pointed out that the term 'sale' has been so used in cases relating to land acquisition cases, Preemption Act, and in a suit for redemption of a mortgage and under the Income Tax Act. In these matters the term 'sale' was not given the same meaning as defined in sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The cases cited by the counsel for the respondents and referred to above clearly show that the term 'sale' was used in its ordinary and popular sense whereas even transfer of property took place between the parties; and a document though required by law to be registered was allowed to be admitted in evidence to show the nature of income, price of the land paid and the transaction of sale made etc. The Government Advocate's reply relating to cases under Land Acquisition Act was that these rulings cannot be made applicable to this case under the Jagir Act for simple reason that the Jagirdars have already sold their lands to other persons and received income whereas under the land acquisition cases the property vested in the Government. In our view this reply from the Government Advocate is absolutely incorrect. Under the land acquisition cases the Government intention to compensation for the property acquired on the basis of the market prices determined with reference to the sale transactions in the vicinity of the property, whether it was effected by a registered sale deed or by a unregistered one. Similarly, in the Jagir cases the Government has to assess the income of the Jagirdar on the basis of the average income from the sale transactions in a period of 20 years preceding the basic year. In both cases the intention of the Government is to determine the sale proceeds in order to make an assessment for compensation to be paid to the parties. As regards the preemption cases the Government Advocate's only reply was that the application of the Transfer of Property Act was modified in the Punjab State and the provisions of the Registration Act were not made compulsory. Similarly, the term 'sale' has a different meaning in Mohammadan Law for purposes of preemption, besides after the enforcement of the Constitution as laid down in A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court, 1947 Preemption Act has been held ultra vires. This reply of the Government Advocate in our opinion cannot be considered satisfactory. The idea underlying in the cases cited by the counsel for the respondents was that the term 'sale' has been used differently for preemption cases and Mohammadan Law cases from the definition given in the Transfer of Property Act. As regards the income tax ruling the Government Advocate's only reply was that under the income-tax cases income derived from valid or invalid transaction was assessed by the Income Tax authorities and therefore these cases were distinguishable from the Jagir assessment cases. This argument advanced by the Government Advocate again to our mind is hardly tenable. The function of the Income Tax Officer is to assess the income of a person from various sources and to levy income-tax on him. Similarly an officer charged with the duty under the Jagir Act is to determine the income of a claimant Jagirdar from various sources including from the sale of abadi land and to pay compensation to him in accordance with a formula prescribed under the Act. Thus there is a great similarity in the function and purposes of these two acts. It is, therefore, clear that the term 'sale' as used in the Jagir Act need not be given that restricted meaning as defined in sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. While using the term 'sale' in the second schedule of the Jagir Act, we are convinced that the legislature never intended that the term 'sale' should be used in the sense in which it was defined in the Transfer of Property Act, and that a Jagirdar claimant would be called upon to go into the formalities of proving each transaction of 'sale' to a registered sale deed. The legislature, therefore, presumably used the term 'sale' in its popular sense.
(3.) THE second contention of the Government Advocate was that the sale made by the Ex-Jagirdars without the registered sale deed were not legal in the sense that no title passed to the vendor, it operated as a contract of sale and even the doctrine of part performance, did not complete the transaction as laid down in sec. 53-A. On the question whether the ownership of the title in land sold by the Jagirdar passed to the purchaser of the property or not, the reply given by the counsel arrayed on the respondents side was that where there is no dispute between the parties to the transaction the question whether the title passed to the purchaser or not is of no avail. THE purchaser to whom the land was sold by the Jagirdar through an unregistered sale deed are obviously in possession which is protected by virtue of the enforcement of sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not open for the vendor Jagirdars to claim back this possession. For all practical purpose the vendees are the full owners and in enjoyment of the property purchased by them. In support of this proposition Shri Jyoti Swaroop Advocate cited A. I. R. 1935 Patna, page 193 which clearly lays down that a sale is complete when sale deed is executed by the vendor. Registration of the deed is a matter of course, it does not purport to create a new title, but only affirms the title which was created by the sale deed, the effect of registration is only to make the title absolute and unquestionable. Similarly in AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat at page 26 where there is no dispute with regard to the transaction of sale between the parties affecting the property, the question of proving the transaction, by any evidence does not arise. Consequently the fact that document is an unregistered one becomes wholly immaterial. Similar view was also taken in ILR page 22 All. page 343 and AIR 1931 Cal. page 151, the latter is a case under the Income Tax Act of 1922 in which sale is not defined, but the transaction was given its ordinary grammatical meaning, and was regarded as a voluntary act of transferring of property by the self to the buyer at a price. Thus it would be evident that in sale of immovable property by an unregistered instrument, the sale is complete when the document is signed, and the buyer has gone into the possession. It cannot be questioned except by the parties to the transaction itself. Therefore, for the purpose of the Jagir Act in order to determine the income from the sale of such transaction, we need not go into the matter whether the sale was effected by a registered deed or not. It cannot be said that such sales were void or illegal and therefore there are no sales in the eye of law which are effected by an unregistered instrument. We are, therefore, of opinion that this contention of the Government Advocate cannot be given such importance as to reject the assessment of income under Schedule two of the Jagir Act derived from the sales of abadi land not made by a registered instrument. It was argued by Shri Dhonkal Singh and Achalsingh Advocates for the respondents that the Jagirs were institutions prior to their resumption by the State. The Jagirdars were admittedly exercising certain judicial and executive powers similar to those exercised by the State officials. In fact the counsel urged that they were semi independents in their own estates. They sold surplus abadi lands to their subjects for purposes of making houses etc. and in token of this sale they issued 'sanads' or 'pattas' which are not in the nature of the sale deeds, and in support they cited RLW 1963 page 167 a judgment given by the High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Bachraj vs. Sumermal in which the previous judgment of the Chief Court of Jodhpur in Jhootha vs. Dhooma was quoted with approval. Therein the following observations were made: - "transfer of Property Act was not in force in Marwar so that the statutory provisions of that Act embodied in sec. 54 as to the modes of transfer to the property cannot be enforced and an oral sale can be recognised as valid, the patta which is issued by the Thikana is not a sale deed. It is only a 'sanad' to evidence sale of land by thikana in case of thikana lands sold by public auction according to the principle of patta Ordinance as in case of khalsa land, it is not necessary to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the purchaser. " This clearly shows that a patta or sanad given by the Jagirdar in various parts of the State is not a sale deed and not required to be registered. They further rigidly pointed out that a sale of a property in execution proceeding under O. 21, R. 94 of the Civil Procedure Code, a certificate of sale is not required to be registered. These cases to our mind are sales by operation of law, and since Courts and State are juristic or not, living persons within the meaning of sec. 2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, read with sec. 5 of the same Act, conveyance by them is not a transfer of property. It is for this purpose that such sales are not required to be registered. It is for consideration whether the 'sanad' or a patta issued by a Jagirdar in his capacity as the Chief Executive of his Jagir area evidencing the sale of land falls within the definition of a sale by operation of law or not, it cannot be denied that Jagirdars and Jagirs were special institutions long before the formation in the State of Rajasthan. It required special enactment for their resumption and payment of compensation. They were governed by their then existing jagir laws. It is a recognised fact of which this Court can take judicial notice of that they issued pattas and sanads evidencing the sale of land in favour of their subjects, and such pattas and sanads were not registered by them. Thus a custom or usage of this kind prevailed where the Jagirdar issued the sanads. In fact the Marwar Patta Ordinance recognised the right of a Jagirdar in Marwar to issue pattas and to follow a certain procedure like the one in a khalsa area. In the former Jodhpur State area judicial recognition was given to the fact that patta and sanads were not sale deeds and do not require to be registered. They all go to show that the Jagirdars were selling land to their subjects in the management of administration of territory as the Chief Executive, exercising certain powers and maintaining records such as books of account patta bahis etc. Those were sales to our mind by operation of law under the then existing jagir law as defined in sec. 2 (d) of the Jagir Act of 1952. This transaction therefore, cannot be called a transfer of property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. We have other examples of the sale of land, by operation of law as is the case of an escheat proceedings under the Crown Grants Act, 1895, as applied to the State of Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Central Law Adaptation Act, 1950, sale of land by Municipal Councils and Committees. In all these cases an oral sale of land takes place which is duly evidenced by a sanad a patta or a certificate. These documents cannot be termed as sale deeds and therefore are not liable to be registered. Similar is the case of the grant of Jagir land by a principal jagirdar by way of maintenance, or a share in the property to his co-sharers, as sub-grants by means of an ordinary patta and which does not require any registration. The counsel arrayed on the side of the respondents also rightly urged that in a compensation proceedings the Government is entirely a third party with regard to the transaction of sale between the Jagirdar and the buyer and the validity of such transaction cannot be questioned by a third party. The Govt. Advocate's reply, that the State was a necessary party in the compensation proceedings and it has right to question the transactions validly in the present compensation proceedings is hardly tenable. It is beyond the ambit and the scope of the Jagir Act to pass any order relating to the title of the buyer's over the land sold to him. It could hardly be of any value either to the State or to the Jagirdar and will in no case affect the right or title of the purchaser in possession of the property. To summarise the term sale as used in the Jagir Act, it has to be given its ordinary meaning. In order to ascertain the income derived from such sale transaction, the term 'sale' has been used quite differently in the Income Tax Act, Pre-emption Act, Land Acquisition Act from the definition given in the Transfer of Property Act. It has been used in its ordinary sense in cases for determining the nature of possession of the land for the price of the land sold in mortgage and redemption suits, Besides, sale by a Jagirdar and an issue of patta operates as a sale by operation of law and such pattas are not required to be registered. ;