Beri, J. - (1.) A tenant, decree against whom for ejectment and arrears of rent has been affirmed by the Civil Judge, Ajmer, in his appellate jurisdiction, has preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge dated 17th September, 1962.
(2.) THE premises to which the present appeal relates are situate in the city of Ajmer of which the appellant has been a tenant for many years on a monthly rent of Rs. 7/7/ -. THE landlord claimed the tenant's eviction on the grounds of (a) nuisance arising out of an unauthorised extension of electric connection to the suit premises; (b) disclaimer by the tenant of the landlord's title in a written statement in another suit between the parties and (c) default in payment of rent. All these grounds have been found to exist by both the courts below and they have ordered the ejectment of the tenant and decreed the arrears of rent. THE tenant as an appellant has again agitated all these points before me. I shall deal with the grounds relating to the default in payment of rent first. The suit out of which the present appeal arises was instituted on the 22nd September, 1958. The landlord claimed rent from 1. 8. 1957 to 31. 8. 1958 in the sum of Rs. 36/11 /- and damages from 1. 9. 58 to 22. 9. 58 in the sum of Rs. 5/4/ -. The correctness of the amount claimed has not been in dispute. The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) became the law applicable to the district of Ajmer from 27. 11. 1957. Under sec. 13 (l) (a) of the Act, broadly speaking, if a tenant neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for any two months the tenant became liable to ejectment subject to the provisions of sec. 13 (4) of the Act. It has been urged on behalf of the tenant-appellant that notwithstanding his default for consecutive six months he cannot be ejected because the amendment to the provisions of sec. 13 of the Act came into force on 26th May, 1958 and the tenant's protection envisaged under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 cannot be denied to him unless he was in default for two months each time on three occasions within a period of 18 months from 26th May, 1958. This argument is based on the doctrine that the proviso to sec. 13 (4) must be presumed to be prospective. In the case before me according to the learned counsel all the defaults of the tenant prior to 26th May, 1958, could not be taken into account and the defaults subsequent thereto were less than three of two months each and, therefore, he was not liable to be ejected on the ground that he defaulted in making payment of rent. This argument is met by the respondent on the ground that the benefit of sec. 13 (4) is available if a suit for ejectment on the ground of only non-payment of rent was instituted and it did not apply to the suits like the one before me in which there were additional grounds on which ejectment was claimed. It was further contended that the period of 18 months contemplated by the proviso to sec. 13 (4) necessarily related to a period of 18 months and is inclusive of any period anterior to 16th May, 1958 when the amendment came into force. The first question which emerges for consideration is that whether the benefit of sec. 13 (4) of the Act is available in suits for ejectment based on the only ground of defaults in payment of rent and not to the suits of composite character. The material part of sec. 13 after the amendment reads : Sec. 13 (1) - Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract no court shall pass any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant, so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent thereof to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied : - (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for any two months ; (4) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. (i), the Court shall on the first day fixed for the hearing thereof by order determine the amount of rent due from tenant, which is in arrears, upto the date of such order as also the amount of interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum and of the costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the aggregate of the amount so specified on or before a date fixed thereby, which shall not be beyond the fifteenth day from but exclusive of the date thereof. If on or before the date so fixed for payment, the tenant deposits in court the aggregate of such amounts the suit shall be dismissed and the sum so deposited shall be paid to the landlord. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to the benefit of protection against eviction provided by this sub-section if he has made default in the payment or tender of the amount of rent due from him for any two months on three occasions within a period of eighteen months. . . . . . . . . . . . . " This provision came in for consideration in Nandlal Vs. Mohammed Sadiq (l) wherein Modi, J. dealing with it practically in all its facts came to the conclusion that sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 of the Act applies to the suits which are brought exclusively on the ground of default and this provision has no application to the suits which are based on the ground of default coupled with some other ground or grounds. The object of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 of the Act, in my opinion, is that even if a tenant has made default in payment of rent for two months, he has still an opportunity to make amends for this lapse by paying within a time fixed by the Court the determined sum of rent, interest and costs, provided the defaults are not more than three in number of two months each in a period of 18 months. This provision is an additional latitude to defaulting tenants to atone if they like for their omission. This benefit the legislature has in its wisdom deliberately conferred on tenants. The construction placed on sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 in Nandlal's case amounts to this that the benefit of sub-sec. (4) is available only in suits which are exclusively based on the ground of default in payment of rent and not to suits for ejectment which may be found on default in payment of rent coupled with some other ground or grounds. This interpretation, to my mind, is fraught with an obvious danger that any landlord, if he is so minded, can easily defeat the benefit of sec. 13 (4) by adding a ground for ejectment however imaginary it might be. It is correct that all landlords will not adopt such a course but even if some do they succeed in snatching away an advantage which was intended for tenants. If I may say so, sec. 13 (4) is in the nature of a locus paenitentiae. Its availability, if it rests on the pleasure of a landlord then it obviously has an insecure foundation. An interpretation which could avoid such a situation would have been preferable if the language of the statute could bear it. But the language of sec. 13 (4) and the steps envisaged on fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the provision however clearly support the interpretation which it has Received in Nandlal's case. It is not possible to assess the cost and dismiss a suit in full settlement of the claims made therein, as is envisaged by sec. 13 (4) if the plaintiff landlord claims ejectment on grounds in addition to the default in payment of rent regardless of the fact whether such grounds are simulated or ornamental. This and some other considerations mentioned in Nandlal's case persuade me to respectfully agree with the interpretation given by Modi, J. that sec. 13 (4) is only attracted if the suit fee ejectment is solely and exclusively based on the ground of non-payment of rent and not to suits of composite character. If the benefit of sec. 13 (4) was in the nature of an additional opportunity to a tenant to make amends within certain limits, and if it is exposed to the danger of being snatched away at the caprice of a landlord, as I see it-is, then it is for the legislature to step in and provide appropriate safeguards against such a danger. My duty is plain and it is to give effect to the statute as it stands. Now, the suit before me is undoubtedly of a composite character. The additional grounds for ejectment, as already noticed, include the ground of nuisance and disclaimer of title and both these grounds have been found to exist by the two courts below concurrently. It cannot be urged that the grounds are frivolous. The result is that the benefit of sec. 13 (4) is not available to the present appellant. It is equally correct that he has defaulted in payment of rent for two months, even after 26th May, 1958, i. e. , for the months of June, July and August, 1958 and he is, therefore, clearly hit by sec. 13 (l) (a) and is liable to be ejected on that ground. The decree of ejectment passed against the appellant, therefore, calls for no variation or reversal in view of sec. 13 (l) (a) alone. It is not necessary for me to consider the other argument relating to the grounds of nuisance or disclaimer of title. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. . ;