Bhandari, J - (1.) THIS is a Civil Second Appeal in a suit filed by the plaintiff appellant for cancellation of a certificate filed by the Collector, Sirohi under sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') on a requisition by the Divisional Forest Officer, Sirohi that the amount of Rs. 3,030. 6. 6 was due against the plaintiff-appellant Devichand, who stood surety for the payment of the amount of the contract money for Jagatram (Defendant No. 4) both of them having made default in payment thereof. The Collector, Sirohi caused the notice of certificate to be served upon the defaulter on the 22nd of September 1953. No objection denying the liability was filed by the plaintiff-appellant within 30 days but he sent an application on the 25th November, 1953 by registered post to the office of the Collector, Sirohi, which on office report was dismissed by the Collector on the 1st of Dec, 1953 on the ground that it was barred by time. On the 16th of Jan. , 1945 another application was filed in which a representation was made by the plaintiff appellant to the Collector, Sirohi, that the said amount should not be recovered from him. THIS application was dismissed after hearing the plaintiff-appellant on the 2nd of April, 1954. Thereafter on the 9th of May, 1954 a notice under sec. 80 C. P. C. was given to the Collector, Sirohi. The present suit was filed on the 25th of July 1954 against the State of Rajasthan, Collector, Sirohi, the Divisional Forest Officer, Sirohi District and Jagat Ram (Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 respectively ). In substance the prayer is for the cancellation of the certificate mentioned above. Both the lower courts have held that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by time.
(2.) THE question for determination in this second appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is within limitation. Sec. 20 (2) of the Act, provides that - Such a suit may be brought at any time within six months - (a) from the service upon the defaulter of the notice required by Sec, 6 or (b) from the date of the determination of a petition denying liability, under sec. 8 or sec. 9, or (c) from the date of the protest lodged by him under sec. 15, or (d) from the date of the decision of an appeal filed by him under sec. 23-A Now what has happened in this case is that the petitioner did not file any petition denying liability within 30 days of the service of the notice under sec. 6 but he sent an application on the 25th of November, 1953 by registered post to the office of the Collector which was dismissed as time barred on the 1st of December, 1953. THE contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant is that as his application denying liability was determined on the 1st of December, 1953, he is entitled to count limitation from that date under sec. 20 (2) (b) and adding 60 days of the notice given under sec. 80 C. P. C. His suit is within limitation. This contention appears to be plausible but in my opinion it is not correct in the eye of law. Sec. 8 (1) of the Act runs, as follows : - "the defaulter may, within thirty days from the service of the notice under sec. 6, or where the notice has not been duly served, within thirty days from the Execution of any process in for enforcing the certificate, present to the Collector issuing the notice a petition in the prescribed form signed and verified in the prescribed manner denying his liability in whole or part. " The aforesaid provision shows that an application to be treated as a petition denying liability must be made within 30 days from the service of the notice under sec. 6, or where the notice has not been duly served, within thirty days from the execution of any process for enforcing the certificate. An application which is outside this period cannot be treated as a petition denying such liability. Under sec. 8 (2), the Collector is to forward the petition which has been presented under sub-sec. 1 to the officer or authority charged with the realisation of the public demand for disposal. If any application has not been presented in accordance with the provision of sec. 8 (1), the Collector is not bound to forward it to the officer or authority charged with the realisation of the public demand. Similarly, under sec. 9 if the demand is not recoverable under the Act or that its recovery by suit is barred by any law for the time being in force, the Collector shall himself hear and determine the petition. But again, the petition must be one presented under sec. 8 which means that it must be presented in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 8. These provisions clearly show, that it is only when the application has been filed within the period prescribed under sec. 8 (1) that the Collector is to pass an order either under sec. 8 (2) or under sec. 9. If an application is not filed within the aforesaid period, that application cannot be treated as a petition denying liability and sec. 20 (2) (b) is not attracted because it applies only when a petition denying liability as provided under sec. 8 (1) has been presented. If Sec. 20 (2) (b) does not apply then in the circumstances of the case, it is only section 20 (2) (a) which will apply. It is evident that if that provision applies, the suit is barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, the appeal has got no force and it is dismissed. No order as to costs. .;