DAVE, C. J - (1.) THIS is writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE petitioner is the Union of Motor Workers representing workmen-employees in the transport services at Ajmer, its membership being 372. Respondent No. 2 Thakur Pratap Singh Rathore & Sons is a firm operating buses in the Jaipur region. One Kishen Singh was in service of respondent No. 2 since 1943. In November, 1951, he was transferred to Vijaynagar on a salary of Rs. 100/- p. m. In March, 1957, he was transferred to Kishangarh and then his pay was reduced from Rs. 100/- to Rs. 80/- per month. He protested against what he considered to be an illegal cut in his salary made without assigning any reason and so he presented an application to the petitioner Union on the 20th October, 1957 and requested it to take up his cause. THE petitioner thereupon moved the Labour Officer, Ajmer, and requested him to get the dispute settled (vide Ex. P. 2 ). THE Labour Officer held a meeting for reconciliation on 18th November, 1957, and it appears from Ex. P. 3 that he addressed a letter to respondent No. 2 saying that in the said meeting he (respondent No. 2) had agreed to take Shri Kishan Singh back in the service, that he was informed by the Union that he (respondent No. 2) had later on refused to take him (Kishan Singh) back and so he (respondent No. 2) was requested to attend his office on 10th February, 1958, failing which legal action would be taken. THE petitioner proceeds to say that several meetings between it and respondent No. 2 were held for purposes of reconciliation but to no effect and so the Labour Officer, Ajmer,reported the failure of the reconciliation proceedings to the State of Rajasthan, respondent No. 1. THE petitioner was informed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner that action in. the matter was being taken, but since nothing was done, the petitioner approached the State Government to expedite the case. THE State Government thereupon sent the case back to the Labour Officer asking him to reopen the reconciliation proceedings. When those proceedings were continuing, it was proposed by the Conciliation Officer that the case may be disposed of by arbitration. Respondent No. 2 conveyed its agreement to the proposal and suggested certain names, but later on it resiled from that position. THE petitioner again approached the State Government with a request that the matter may be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. This time the petitioner was informed by the Govt. of Rajasthan by its letter No. F. 5 (46)Lab/60/6414, dated 29th October, 1960, that the Government did not consider the dispute fit for reference. THE petitioner came to know of this decision from a copy of the said letter which was sent by the section Officer, Labour Department, to the Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur (Ex. P. 8 ). It is this letter which is the subject of challenge in the writ application. The petitioner's contention is that Shri Kishan Singh's pay was first illegally reduced by respondent No. 2 and later on his services were also terminated illegally. It is point out that sec. 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) prescribes the manner in which the workman may be retrenched. It is further submitted that by virtue of sec. 25-E (b) Kishan Singh's services could not be dispensed with without payment of compensation and thus respondent No. 2 had acted in complete violation of the said provisions. The petitioner espoused the case of Kishan Singh and tried to get it decided in conciliation proceedings. Those proceedings, however, failed and so the Conciliation Officer acted under sec. 12 (4) of the Act and reported failure of conciliation proceedings to the State Government. According to the petitioner, it was then incumbent upon the State Government to refer the matter for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under sec. 10 (1) of the Act, but the State Government turned down the petitioner's request and refused to make a reference without assigning any reason. Learned counsel has referred to sec. 12 (5) of the Act and pointed out that while refusing to make a reference, it was the bounden duty of the Government to record, and also to communicate to the parties concerned, its reason for such a refusal and since it had violated the clear provisions of law, it is prayed that the State Government may be directed to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal according to law, or, in the alternative, it should be directed to reconsider the question of making a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. No reply in writing has been submitted either on behalf of respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2. Learned Deputy Government Advocate and learned counsel for respondent No. 1 have, however, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitioner-union was not an aggrieved party and, therefore, it had no right to file the writ application. In support of their contention, they have relied upon Industrial Employees Union Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1 ). In that case, the services of an electric wireman were terminated by the Kanpur Tannery Ltd. , and the matter was taken up by the Industrial Employees Union, which was registered as a 'miscellaneous' Trade Union and referred to the adjudicator. The adjudicator held that the wireman was rightly discharged and was not entitled to any relief. The Union, therefore, applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the order. It was held that the petitioner-Union had no right to present the petition, firstly, because in a writ jurisdiction, it was only the individual or the corporation whose rights were affected which could come to the High Court, and, secondly, because the case of the discharged wireman had not been taken up by any of the Unions of leather industry to which the wireman belonged and the petitioner-Union, which was registered only as a miscellaneous Union, was not entitled to take up his case. Learned counsel has also referred to Government Press Employees' Association, Bangalore Vs. Government of Mysore (2) and General Secretary, Eastern Zone Insurance Employees's Association vs. Zonal Manager, Eastern Zone, Life Insurance Corporation (3 ). In the Mysore case (2), certain employees in a Government Press were superseded in promotion severally by individual orders. They were, no doubt, members of an Employees' Association registered under the Trade Unions Act as a corporate body. But it was found that the subject-matter of the writ petition was not the grievance of Employees' Association as a corporate body, but was made up of individual grievances of the several employees who claimed that they should have been promoted in preference to certain other named employees. It was held that although the reason of the basis for the grievances of several persons may be of the same kind, but the several grievances of the several individuals could not be converted into a common grievance of a class. Similarly, in the Calcutta case (3), it was found that the writ application was made by the General Secretary of the Eastern Zone Insurance Employees Association, who had no personal interest in the matter. As we shall point out presently, these cases are easily distinguishable on facts from the present case. In the present case, it may be pointed out that, according to the facts submitted in the writ application, which have not been controverted, Kishansingh made an application to the petitioner-Union as early in October, 1957 and his case was espoused by the petitioner-Union. It is not alleged on behalf of the respondent that this workman did not belong to this Union, as was done in Industrial Employees Union in State of Uttar Pradesh (1 ). The petitioner-Union moved the Labour Officer and the Labour Officer, thinking that there was an industrial dispute between the Union and respondent No. 6 undertook the conciliation proceedings. The failure of those proceedings once reported to the State Government, but the State Government sent the case back to the Labour Officer, Ajmer, asking him to reopen the conciliation proceedings. Thereafter there was an attempt to get the dispute settled through arbitration, but that attempt could not be successful because respondent No. 2 backed out. It was in those circumstances that the petitioner-Union again approached the State Government with a request that the matter may be referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The State Government has turned down the request of the petitioner-Union and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner is not an aggrieved party. It would be pertinent to refer here to the provisions of sec. 12 (4) and (5) of the Act, which run as follows : Sec. 12 - (1) to (3 ). . . . . . . . . . (4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts, and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion a settlement could not be arrived at. (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-sec. (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate the parties concerned its reasons therefor,'' It would appear from a perusal of the said provisions that sub-sec. (4) requires that if no settlement is arrived at, the Conciliation Officer should as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a report. It should be a full report indicating the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof. That report should also contain a full statement of those facts and circumstances and the reasons on account of which, in the opinion of the officer, settlement could not be arrived at. Sub-sec. (5) then lays down that if on a consideration of the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-sec. (4), the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such references. It further provides that if the appropriate Government does not make such a reference, it must record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. It may be pointed out that the provisions of sec. 12 (5) came for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) vs. K. P. Krishna (4 ). Reference was made to the following observation of Mr. Justice Coleridge in R. vs. Tithe Commissioners, (1849) 14 QB 459: - "the words undoubtedly are only empowering but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in public statutes words only directory, permissory or enabling may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice. " After referring to this observation, it was observed by their Lordships as follows - "the argument is that sec. 12 (5) makes it obligatory on the Government to record and communicate its reasons for not making the reference and Shis obligation shows that the powers to make reference is intended to be exercised for the benefit of the party which raises an industrial dispute and wants it to be referred to the authority for decision. It may be that the Legislature intended that this requirement would avoid casual or capricious decisions in the matter because the recording and communication of reasons postulates that; the reasons in question must stand public examination and scrutiny and would therefore be of such a character as would show that the question was carefully and properly considered by the Government; but that is not the only object in making this provision. The other object is to indicate that an obligation or duty is cast upon the Government, and since the power conferred by the first part is coupled with the duty prescribed by the second part "may" in the context must mean "shall". There is considerable force in this argument. Indeed it has been accepted by the High Court and it has been held that if the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference it is bound to make the reference. " It was further observed as follows - "it is common ground that a writ for mandamus would lie against the Government if the order passed by it under sec. 10 (1) is for instance contrary to the provisions of sec. 10 (1) to (d) in the matter of selecting the appropriate authority; it is also common ground that in refusing to make a reference under sec. 12 (5) if Government does not record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor a writ of mandamus would lie. " The above observations very fittingly apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. A perusal of Ex. P. 8 shows that the appropriate Government did not record nor did it communicate to the parties concerned the reasons for not making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was the petitioner Union which had approached the State Govt. for referring what in considered to be an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and because it was the request of the petitioner, which was turned down by the Govt. without giving any reasons, it is the aggrieved party in the present writ application. If the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is allowed, it would mean that neither the petitioner, nor Kishan Singh would be able to get any relief, because Kishan Singh could not move this Court to direct the Government to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial dispute was raised by the Union and, in our opinion, it is certainly aggrieved on account of the State Government's refusal to refer the matter without giving him any reasons required by sec. 12 (5) of the Act. We thus find no force in the first contention. Another objection raised by learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 2 is that the present application is belated and, therefore, it should be rejected. There is no force in this contention either, because the letter Ex. P. 8 is dated 29th Oct. , 1956. A copy thereof was sent to the Secretary of the petitioner-Union of 24th February, 1961, and the writ application was presented on 7th April, 1961, i. e. , within less than two months from the date of the receipt of Ex. 12. The third contention raised by learned counsel is that Kishan Singh had an alternative remedy by way of suit and so this Court need not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction. It would suffice to say in this connection that we are dealing with the case of the petitioner-Union and not that of Kishan Singh directly. This contention is, therefore, also fit to be dismissed. We, therefore, allow the writ application and direct respondent No. 1 that it should reconsider the question raised by the petitioner-Union about making a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and it should decide it afresh giving reasons for its decision. The petitioner-Union will receive its costs from the respondents. . ;