KAN SINGH, J - (1.) THE question falling for consideration in the second appeal before us is whether a tenant inducted on the mortgaged property by a mortgagee in possession could invoke the protection of sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, hereinafter to be referred as the "act". , as against the mortgagor, after the latter had redeemed the mortgage and it has arisen in this way:
(2.) RESPONDENT Shanker Lal had mortgaged his shop situate at Hanumangarh with Dwarkadass by a registered mortgage deed on 14-9-53. In terms of the mortgage Dwarkadass was put in actual possession of the shop. Thereafter he let out the shop to the appellants Ghamandiram & Sohanlal. After some time Shankerlal demanded from Dwarkadass vacant possession of the shop, as he was prepared to pay off the mortgage debt. Dwarka Dass, however, could not do so on the sole ground that the physical possession of the mortgaged shop was not with himself, but with the defendants Ghamandi Ram and Sohanlal. Shankerlal consequently brought the suit against the mortgagee and the tenants in the court of Civil Judge, Hanumangarh, and deposited the mortgage amount in the court. Dwarka Dass, however, did not contest the action, but the present appellants pleaded that the mortgagor was not entitled to evict them on account of the provisions of the Act and they were prepared to attorn to Shanker Lal. The learned Civil Judge held that the appellants were not entitled to the protection of the Act, as with the redemption of the mortgage the rights of the mortgagee came to an end and the appellants who derived title from the mortgagee could not be permitted to continue in possession of the premises. Accordingly, he passed a decree for possession in favour of the mortgagor. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge the appellants went up in appeal to the District Judge, Ganganagar, who dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the trial court. This is how the appellants have come to this Court in second appeal. The appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court on 21-8-64. Quite a large number of authorities, both of this Court, as well as of the other High Courts, were cited before the learned Judge, who however felt that the case required consideration by a larger Bench and accordingly he made a reference to a larger Bench which has now come up before us. Before we consider the various cases cited before us, we find it convenient to refer to the salient features of the Act. The Act was passed in the year 1950, to control eviction from, letting of, and rents for, certain premises in the State of Rajasthan. Sec. 3 (iii) of the Act defines the term "landlord" to mean "any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant; it includes a tenant in relation to sub-tenant. " The term "tenant" means "the person by whom rent is, or but for &. contract express or implied would be, payable for any premises and includes any person holding or occupying the premises as a sub-tenant, (or any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of the Act )". Sec. 5 of the Act declares that the rent payable for any premises situated within the areas to which this Act extends for the time being shall, subject to the other provisions thereof, be ordinarily such, as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Sec. 13, which is the section under which the protection is claimed by the appellants reads as under (omitting portions which are not relevant): - "sec. 13. Eviction of tenants - (1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant as long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied - (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for any two months; (b) that the tenant has wilfully caused substantial damage to premises ; or (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord made or permitted to be caused any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof; or (d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to effect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein; or (e) that the tenant has assigned, sub-let, or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the the permission of the landlord; or (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant; or (g) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service of employment of the landlord and that the tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (h) that the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord - (i) for the use or occupation of himself or his family, or (ii) for the use or occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held, or (iii) for a public purpose, or (iv) for philanthropic use, or (i) that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence; or (j) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. (k) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work - (i) at the instance of the (State Government) in pursuance of an improvement scheme or development scheme; or (ii) because the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation; or (iii) upon the requisition of a local authority, or. " It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the mortgagor is covered by the definition of the term "landlord" and particularly the second part of that definition namely, the words "or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. " "qua the tenants let in by the mortgagee. He also contends that the term "tenant" will cover the appellants as the inclusive part of the definition "or any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of the Act" will cover the ex-tanants of the mortgagee. He also submits that the term "rent" has not been defined by the Act, and though sec. 5 declares that ordinary rent is to be payable according to the agreement between the landlord and the tenant, the term "rent" will embrace whatever is payable by an ex-tenant for use and occupation of the premises. He, therefore, argues that sec. 13 of the Act forbids a court from evicting the appellants so long as they were ready and willing to pay the rent, as their case was not covered by any of the conditions specified in clauses A to K of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act, as may disentitle the appellants from calling in aid the protection of the section. We may pause to observe that it is nobody's case that the present appellants were disentitled from claiming the protection, if they are otherwise entitled to it, by virtue of the conditions specified in clauses A to K of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that protection of sec. 13 of the Act is available only to such persons as were let in by a landlord. In other words, the relationship between the parties must have been at one time that of a landlord and tenant, were there once such relationship established, then thereafter, even though the tenancy had terminated, the tenant could claim the protection of the Act. The learned counsel, however, does not dispute the position that where a transferor of the property had already inducted any tenant the transferee of the property will become the landlord within the meaning of the Act. But, according to the learned counsel, the interest created by the mortgagee will stand extinguished on the redemption of the mortgage and the tenant of the mortgagee will at once become a trespasser qua the mortgagor as by no means could the mortgagor be said to be a successor in interest of the mortgagee. It is argued that a mortgagor claims the property in his own right and, therefore, the tenancy created by the mortgagee will not enure against the mortgagor, the moment mortgagee's interest in the property has come to an end with the redemption of the mortgage. As regards the definition of the term "landlord" as given in the Act, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that though this term may in a certain context cover on owner of the property as well, yet within the range of sec. 13 of the Act it has to be construed in co-relation to the term "tenant" and "rent" used therein. In other words, according to him, the term "landlord" within the meaning of sec. 13 will only mean such person, who, for the time being, is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person. According to him, the words of the definition "orwho would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant" will be inapplicable for interpreting the term "landlord" as used in sec. 13 of the Act. He further submits that the meaning given to the various terms in sec. 3 of the Act has to be taken unless there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context and, according to the learned counsel, the context of sec. 13 cuts down the meaning of the term "landlord" as used in sec. 3. The learned counsel for the respondents at one time contended before us that unless a contractual tenancy had at any time commenced between the parties there could be no question of there being a statutory tenancy in favour of the ex-tenant by operation of law. But, later on, in the course of the arguments, the learned counsel felt that he had overstated his case and, therefore, he modified his stand that though a tenancy need not begin as a contractual tenancy, yet so that the person concerned could be held entitled to the protection of sec. 13, the tenancy with the owner must be there, though by operation of law. The learned counsel points out that if the term ''landlord" were to be construed in the wide sense so as to include an owner who is entitled to let out the premises to a tenant then even a tenant let in by a trespasser of a property might be able to claim protection of sec. 13 against the real owner. He, therefore, submits that the term "landlord" as used in sec. 13 should be construed to cover only such persons with whom tenancy had commenced either by contract or by operation of law so that the relationship could transform in a. statutory on termination. We have given our anxious consideration to the matter. The scheme of the Act is to control eviction, amongst other things, from certain premises. The Act also provides for making certain premises available to persons who are in need of accommodation, provided they are prepared to pay a reasonable rent. Sec. 17 of the Act provides that whenever any premises become vacant, either by the landlord ceasing to occupy the same, or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction of a tenant or by the release of the premises from requisition or otherwise, the Magistrate may, on the application of any person standing in need of such premises for his occupation and use or otherwise, if satisfied of actual necessity, may, in the manner laid down in the section, take the premises from the landlord and make them over to the person in need. It is also open to the Magistrate taking action under sec. 17 to determine the terms of tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under sec. 19 of the Act, the Magistrate is empowered to help a landlord in getting vacant sites in possession of a tenant and permit the landlord to build on such premises. The obvious object of the Act is not only to protect tenants from eviction and to prevent the landlords from charging exorbitant rents, but the Act is obviously designed to meet the situation created by the shortage of housing accommodation in Rajasthan. While sec. 17 empowers a Magistrate to make available premises which are not already occupied by tenants for the use of persons in need, sec. 18 enables a landlord to secure speedily the vacant sites in possession of the tenants for building purposes. This provision is designed to augment housing accomodation. The use of the term "landlord" in sec. 17 where there is no existing tenant of the premises shows that the legislature is using the term "landlord" in a wide sense, and not in narrow sense, to mean a person who, for the time being, is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises. We are quite unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the word "landlord" has to be given a varying meaning in different sections of the Act. Normally when the same word is used in several provisions of a statute and the statute has provided a dictionary of its own for the words used therein, then it has to be presumed that the legislature intended to use the same word in the same sense in the various provisions of the statute. The term "tenant" as used in the Act has also a wider range than what is normally comprehended therein and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of this Act. These words will clearly show that a person who has once entered the premises as a tenant in a lawful manner, in other words, having been inducted by a person who was at the time entitled to so induct him, then he will, by operation of law, be deemed to be a tenant till the tenancy is terminated under the provisions of this Act and not otherwise. This means that where the tenancy comes to an end in terms of the contract or by operation of laws other than the Act, such as the Transfer of Property Act, so far as the Act is concerned, the tenancy shall be deemed to be there and will subsist as long as it is not brought to an end in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Thus, to our mind, even though it is true that by virtue of sec. 111 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act the appellants ceased to be tenants on the redemption of the mortgage, they shall be deemed to be tenants within the meaning of the Act as the termination of the tenancy has been brought about otherwise than under the provisions of the Act. There is no substance, to our mind, in the anomalous position envisaged by the learned counsel for the respondents when he visualises that a tenant let in by a trespasser could also claim protection against the real owner who would come under the term "landlord" as defined in the Act. Since a trespasser has no right, title and interest in the property, the tenancy created by him cannot be said to be a lawful one. The Act does not purport to protect persons who have not lawfully entered upon the property. The position is quite different in the case of a mortgagee inducting tenants. The mortgagee has the right to manage the property as his own, while he continues in possession of the mortgage property. Therefore, a person inducted by him as a tenant enters upon the property in a lawful manner. He cannot, therefore, be equated with a trespasser on the property. The provisions of the statute (viz: the Act) are needed only when the tenancy comes to an end, either in terms of the contract, or by operation of other laws. It is only when the tenancies are terminated in accordance with the Act that its protection ceases to be available. We may now refer to the cases cited before us by both the parties. We may begin with the cases of this Court.
(3.) IN Hansraj Vs. Gappulal (1), to which one of us was a party, it was held, in construing the provisions of the Act, that it was a remedial legislation and a strictly literal interpretation in the case of remedial legislation would wholly or in part nullify the benefits which the legislature intends to confer on those for whom the legislation is intended. IN that case the landlord determined the tenancy by notice and then filed the suit against the tenant for damages for use and occupation of the premises. It was observed by this Court that a suit for recovery of damages was more or less the same as a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. Reliance was placed in deciding this case on Remon Vs. City of London Real Property Company, Limited (2 ). Hansraj's case was followed in Gyarsilal vs. Chogalal (3), which was a Single Bench case of this Court. The question whether a tenant of the mortgagee could claim the protection of the Act as against the owner of the property after the redemption of the mortgage, pointedly came up for consideration before Modi J. , in Brahm Singh Vs. Mohan Singh (Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 318 of 1960) decided by him on 13-5-60. As regards the position of a mortgagor vis a vis tenants of mortgagees under the ordinary law the learned Judge observed that "ordinarily speaking, the mortgagor would be perfectly within his rights, to evict the tenant on the redemption of the mortgage, and if he should thereafter refuse to vacate the premises, if so desired by the mortgagor, he would undoubtedly be a trespasser qua the mortgagor. " Thereafter, the learned Judge proceeded to observe as follows: - "but, (and this is important to note) to my mind, the mortgagor would not be able to ask such a person in occupation to quit on redemption, where a Rent Restriction Act is in force as here, and such a person would under such law be able to stave off ejectment so long as the mortgagor is unable to bring his case within the four walls of, say, sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XVII) of 1950 or a similar provision. In other words, the answer is that the defendant, in such a case, even though he would have no right to continue in his tenancy under the ordinary law, would possess such a right under the Rajasthan Premises Act of 1950 and he thereby becomes a statutory tenant by force of the aforesaid Act. " In taking note of the definition of the term "landlord" and the term "tenant" as used in the Act, the learned Judge further observed as follows: - "the definition of a landlord as given in sec. 3 (iii) is comprehensive and inter alia includes a person who receives it if the premises were let to a tenant. A mortgagor of a property on redemption qua a tenant of the mortgagees would clearly seem to me to fall within this definition; so also a purchaser from him. Similarly, the definition off a "tenant" applies to a person by whom rent is or but for an express or implied contract to the contrary would be payable ; and this definition further includes "any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy' in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of this Act. " If, therefore, a person whose tenancy has been terminated, say, under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, but he continues in possession, he will still be a tenant, that is, a statutory tenant within the meaning of the definition of the expression "tenant" given under this Act. It is in this setting that sec. 13 of the Act of 1950 gives protection to a tenant and enables him to continue in tenancy notwithstanding that it may have been terminated under the Transfer of Property Act by a notice to quit or otherwise, subject to certain conditions mentioned in that section. " Referring to the earlier decisions of this Court the learned Judge observed as follows: - "this is Gyarsilal vs. Chogalal (1), where a landlord terminated the tenancy of a person by a notice to quit and otherwise to pay damages for use and occupation, and the tenant continued in occupation, and the landlord then filed a suit for ejectment and damages, it was held that the tenant would not be liable to eviction so long as he was ready and willing to pay rent unless the other conditions mentioned in that section were fulfilled. It was further held that he would not be liable to pay damages, but his liability would extend to payment of the agreed rent, and it was observed that any other view if permitted would amount to a complete defeat of the remedial provisions of the Act of 1950. I would next refer to an earlier bench decision of this Court in Hansraj vs. Gappu Lal (2) where Wanchoo C. J. , as he then was, after having discussed certain English and Indian authorities, held the expressions landlord, and tenant in relation to the purpose of the Act of 1950 should given a broad and liberal (and not the literal or the conventional meaning) so as to include an ex-tenant or an ex-landlord, and further that where a suit has been filed for damages for use and occupation, sec. 7 of the Act of 1950 would still be applicable, as such a suit would be more or less the same as a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, and that such a suit must be stayed pending the decision of another suit brought under sec. 6 of the same Act. " Apart from the principle of stare decisis we are in full agreement with the view propounded by Modi J. We may now briefly refer to other cases cited before us. 15. In Ganga Dutt Murarka Vs. Kartik Chandra Das (4), the contractual tenancy of the tenant was determined by efflux of time and thereafter the tenant continued in possession of the premises without any fresh contract, but under the Rent Control Ordinance and subsequent legislation he was held to become a statutory tenant and was held not liable to eviction except under the conditions laid down by those Acts. The erstwhile tenant continued to pay rent every month equal to the old contractual rent. It was held that the tenant had not acquired the status of a tenant holding over. This case is obviously not helpful in dealing with the point before us. Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory Vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha (5), the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, came up for consideration. This Act was applied ' to the place where the premises were situate with effect from 16-8-58, by a notification and a suit for eviction of the premises on the termination of the tenancy by efflux of time had been filed on 25-4-57, that is, earlier to the application of the Rent Restriction Act to the place. It was held that the tenant was entitled to the protection of sec. 12 of the Rent Restruction Act. This case is also not of any assistance in dealing with the question before us. In Jaswantrai Tricumlal Vyas Vs. Bai Jiwi W/o Somabhai Valdas (6), the matter related to an agricultural tenancy. We may observe that the considerations in dealing with agricultural tenancies are not exactly alike those that govern cases relating to other properties. In agricultural tenancies the protection is afforded to an actual tiller of the soil. We need not, therefore, deal with this case in any detail, though we accept the principle enunciated therein that a Court must be very loath to hold that, when a legislature, in an important social measure, solemnly enacts a provision to give protection to a particular class of tenants, such a provision is a mere surplusage to which no effect should be given. The learned counsel for the respondents placed before us four cases: two of the Punjab High Court and two of the Bombay High Court which dealt with the question of protection available to a tenant inducted by a mortgagee. In Lala Som Nath Vs. L. D. Desai (7), the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court had to deal with the definition of the term 'landlord" as used in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which was as follows: - "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, or any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter autho rized, and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. " It was in the light of the provisions of that Act, that the learned Judges made the following observations on which the learned counsel for the respondents places strong reliance: "an owner of property does not become a person entitled to receive rent of the property until there is brought into existence a contract of lease between himself and another person, Plaintiffs have not entered into any such contract which is binding upon them. Plaintiffs, therefore, are not landlords within the meaning of the definition. It is true that the words of cl. (1) of sec. 13 appear wide and to protect any person who has incurred a liability to pay rent, but in my opinion some limitation must be placed upon the scope of this clause. The Act is not designed to protect trespassers from eviction. Nor would a trespasser become entitied to protection because he has created by contract with a third person, not having rights in the property, a formal relationship of tenant to landlord. Such a contract as between the third person and the trespasser may be enforceable but could be no shield against action by the owner of the property. To hold otherwise would involve that the owner as against a trespasser might find himself in a worse position than as against a tenant, for the limited right of a landlord under cl. (2) of sec. 13 is available against his tenant. In the present instance Janki Nath could claim that he is not and has not been the tenant of plaintiffs and that he cannot be evicted on any ground whatever. In my opinion the protection of the Rent Restriction Act is available only to a tenant against a landlord, and the present plaintiffs are not landlords. " ;