Modi, J - (1.) THIS is a special appeal by the temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji through one Rampal against the judgement and order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated the 18th March, 1960, upholding the order of the Compensation Commissioner dated the 12th June. , 1956, in a compensation matter under the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Act No. III of 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1955 ).
(2.) AS we have come to definite conclusion that this appeal, which purports to have been filed under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, (Ordinance No. XV of 1949, hereinafter called the Ordinance), is not maintainable, we consider it unnecessary to state the facts of the case at any length. Suffice it to state that Rampal, acting as manager of the temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji, applied to the Compensation Commissioner for grant of compensation in respect of what were alleged to be [certain Muafi lands held by the temple, in pursuance of a notification under sec. 4 of the Act of 1955 declaring that the said lands had vested in the State. The Compensation Commissioner held that the appellant was not an intermediary within the meaning of the said Act and this finding was upheld by the learned single Judge in appeal. It is from that judgment that the present appeal has been preferred, and this brings us to a decision of the preliminary question whether this appeal is competent. The matter clearly seems to us to be governed by sec. 66 of the Act of 1955 which in its third sub-section (which is the only relevant portion for our purposes) makes the following provision - "66 (1 ). . . . . . . . . 66 (2 ). . . . . . . . . 66 (3) The State Government or any person aggrieved by an order of the Compensation Commissioner under this Act may within ninety days from the date of communication of such order appeal to the Judical Commissioner, Ajmer, whose decision there on shall be final. " It is admitted before us that after the State of Ajmer came to be integrated with the State of Rajasthan under the States Reorganisation Act (Act No. XXXI of 1956,) the expression' 'judicial Commissioner' in the provision quoted above must be read as the High Court of Rajasthan. As already stated, the appellant aggrieved by the decision of the Compensation Commissioner filed an appeal to this Court which came up for final disposal before a learned single Judge of the Court and was disposed as such by his order under appeal. The question which then arises is whether a further appeal from the order of the learned single Judge lies to a Division Bench under sec. 18 of the Ordinance. The question assumes importance because sec. 66 (3) of the Act of 1955 clearly says that the decision of the authority, which was designated as the Judicial Commissioner Ajmer and which has now to be read as the High Court of this State, shall be final. The contention of learned counsel is that his client has a right of appeal from a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court under sec. 18 of the Ordinance and that this right has not been taken away by anything contained in the Act of 1955. We are not impressed by this argument. The principal reasons which induce us to come to this conclusion are (1) that a right of appeal is not an inherent right and has got to be given by a statute before a party can lay claim to it and (2) that such a right has definitely been limited by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 66 which lays down in effect that the order of the Judicial Commissioner (or now the High Court) passed in first appeal must be final; or, in other words, no further appeal lies from it. We also wish to point out in this connection that the provision contained in sec. 18 of the Ordinance is a general one governing the matter of appeals within the High Court itself, and such a general provision cannot over-ride a provision governing a right of appeal in the parent Act out of which the proceeding in question comes before the High Court and but for which the proceeding need not have come to this Court at all. That being so, we are clearly of the opinion that after a litigant has exercised his right of one appeal to the High Court in accordance with sec. 66 (3), he cannot lay any claim to a further right of appeal by virtue of any general provision contained in the Ordinance in face of the special provision enacted in sec. 66 (3) by virtue of which alone he was enabled to come to this Court. Reference may be made at this place to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in In re Light of Asia Insurance Company (l) on which learned counsel for the appellant placed his main reliance. This was a case under the Companies Act, 1913, and related to the Light of Asia Insurance Company Limited. The Shareholders of the Company passed a resolution for a, voluntary winding up. A scheme for reconstruction of the Company was then submitted to the High Court of Calcutta in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction in Company matters. A learned Single Judge refused to sanction the scheme and directed a fresh meeting of the creditors and policy-holders for a reconsideration thereof. The scheme as eventually passed at a joint meeting of the creditors and policy-holders was placed for consideration before the learned Judge who then sanctioned the scheme subject to certain modifications. The learned Judge thus gave certain directions under sec. 153 of the Companies Act read with sec. 9 and 61 (1) of the Insurance Act. From this order, a Letters Patent appeal was filed in the High Court itself. A preliminary objection was raised that this appeal was incompetent on the ground that the right of appeal must have been conferred expressly by a statute and that the Insurance Act did not provide for any appeals under sec. 9 and 61 of the Insurance Act and that clause 15 of the Letters Patent was excluded because of the provisions of sec. 110 of the Insurance Act. Now, sec. 110 of the Insurance Act, 1938, lays down that an appeal shall lie from the various orders specified under sub-sec. (1) to the authority authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the Court making the same and the decision on such appeal shall be final. Repelling these contentions, it was held by the Bench that sec. 110 of the Insurance Act did not purport to provide for appeals from the orders of the court but from the orders of certain officers under the Act, that it did not contain any specific limitation to exclude the right of appeal against a judgment of the court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and that there was no provision in the Insurance Act which took away this light of appeal from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court in matters arising out of the Insurance Act, either expressly or by necessary implication; and in this view of the matter, the conclusion was reached that the orders of the court under the Insurance Act were appealable under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent where such an order amounted to a judgment within the meaning of the said clause, and it was further held that the order passed by the learned single Judge did amount to a 'judgment' within the meaning of that clause. We have carefully considered this case and think that it does support the contention of learned counsel to the extent it goes. With all respect to the learned Judges, however, we are unable to accept this decision as beyond question for the simple reason that sufficient notice does not appear to have been taken of the fundamental principle that a right of appeal is not an inherent right available to a litigant as a matter of course but it can only be availed of where it is positively provided by a statute. As we look at sec. 110 of the Insurance Act, its first sub-section provides for an appeal against certain orders only, and the orders passed by the learned Company Judge in this case did not fall within the ambit of those orders, and consequently it seems to us that the orders which were passed in this case were not appealable at all, and, that being so, clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not be construed as providing a right of appeal when none existed. We have felt greatly fortified in the conclusion to which we have come above by a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Union of India v. Mohin-dra Supply Co. (2 ). The facts of this case in so far as they are necessary for our purposes were these. A certain dispute between Messrs. Mohindra Supply and the Governor-General of India in Council was referred to two arbitrators. The aubitrators gave their award which was filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi. The Governor-General applied for setting aside the award on certain grounds. The Subordinate Judge refused to do so. From that order the Governor-General went up in appeal to the Lahore High Court, which, after partition, was transferred to the East Punjab High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the award. Thereafter an appeal was preferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench. The question whether the appeal was maintainable was referred to a Full Bench of the High Court. The Full Bench were of the opinion that an appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge exercising appellate powers was maintainable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent notwithstanding the bar contained in sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sec. 39 (2) enacts that no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The matter was then carried in appeal to the Supreme Court, and the only question which was raised before it was whether an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge was maintainable under the Letters Patent. Their Lordships answered this question in the negative. The ratio of their Lordships' decision is that sec. 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act expressly prohibited a second appeal from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39 (1) except an appeal to the Supreme Court and that the expression "second appeal" as used in that section was used in the sense of a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39 (1) and not in the sense of a second appeal as that expression was used in sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships further held that under sec. 39 (1), an appeal was made to lie only from certain orders specified in that sub-section, and no others, and that if by an express provision contained therein, a right to appeal from a judgment, which might otherwise have been available under the Letters Patent, was restricted, there could be no legitimate ground for the view that sub-sec. (2) would not similarly restrict the exercise of the appellate power granted by the Letters Patent, and in that view of the matter, it was further held that it would be impossible to hold that an appeal under the Letters Patent was competent in spite of the express prohibition contained in that provision. We have no hesitation in saying that the principle of this decision is fully attracted in the present case and must govern it. We can see no difference between a provision which says that no second appeal would lie from a first appellate order, and the one which merely says that such order would be final. The result in both the cases cannot but be the same. As we have already pointed out above, sec. 66 (3) of the Act of 1955 clearly enacts that the order of the Judicial Commissioner or the High Court in first appeal shall be final. The meaning of this is no more and no less than this that no further appeal shall lie against it. We need hardly labour the point that whether it is a single Judge who hears the appeal or a Bench of two Judges, they equally constitute the High Court, and once the right of appeal to such court was availed of by the appellant, that right was then exhausted and did not survive any further. That is the clear effect of sec. 66 (3) of the Act, as we see it, and, therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the present appeal from the decision of the learned Single Judge must be held to be non-maintainable. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to address ourselves to the merits of the case. The result is that this appeal must fail and it is hereby dismissed; but under the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. . ;