- (1.) THE appellant has filed this appeal under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Pali dated the 23rd April, 1963 rejecting the appellant's application for grant of maintenance allowance under sec. 27 of the Jagirs Act. THE counsel for the respondent present resisted the stay application of the appellant on the ground that the appeal itself was not maintainable against the order passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir due to the fact that this was not an order under sec. 32, sub-sec. 2 of the Jagirs Act, as no final award was passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir. THE learned counsel for the appellant's reply was that the appeal was clearly maintainable under sec. 27 of the Jagirs Act read with sec. 32 of the same Act. THE Deputy Collector Jagir has to look into the ingredients for grant of maintenance allowance u/s. 27 of the Jagirs Act after holding an enquiry and this order he has to pass under sec. 32 of the same Act accepting or rejecting an application for grant of maintenance allowance. As far as the Deputy Collector, Jagir was concerned he had made up his mind to reject the application of the appellant by taking an erroneous view of law. He also cited R. R. D. 1957 page 201 in the case of Shri Budh Singh Mehta versus Mehta Chander Singh wherein it has been he d that a decision of the Jagir Commissioner with regard to maintenance allowance falls under sec. 32 of the Act which is appealable.
(2.) WE have considered the arguments advanced and perused the record as well as the ruling cited by the counsel for the appellant. This appeal has come up to-day for stay order, and the respondent with his counsel voluntarily presented himself before this Court to be heard before any order regarding stay could be made in this case. It was therefore, decided to hear that appeal on the ground of its maintainability or otherwise. The question before us is whether the present order of the Deputy Collector is under sec. 32 of the Jagirs Act or not, and whether the R. R. D. 1957 page 201 cited by the appellant has properly laid down the law on that point. Sec. 32 clearly lays down that while a Jagir Commissioner is determining the amount of compensation payable to the Jagirdar under sec. 26 he shall also decide the amount payable by way of maintenance allowance under sec. 27 of the Act to the relatives of the Jagirdar and the amount payable to other co-sharers under sec. 29, if any, of the jagirdar. He has also to decide whether there is any amount which is recoverable from the Jagirdar by way of state dues. He has to determine this amount provisionally first and then under sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 32 he has to make a final order. This clearly shows that a final order must contain all matters which were provisionally determined by the Jagir Commissioner as stated above. It is only that order which is final that is appealable under sec. 39 of the Act. The wordings of sec. 39 which enumerates the orders of the Jagir Commissioner and the Collector which are appealable before the Board of Revenue clearly shows that only sub-sec. 2 of sec. 32 is appealable before the Board of Revenue. It is unfortunate that the Deputy Collector, Jagir has passed a final order rejecting the appellant's application for maintenance allowance without passing a final award and incorporating the order of rejection of the application for maintenance allowance in that order. The plain meaning of sec. 39 of the Act is that only the appeal lies against the final order passed under sec. 32 (2 ). We have carefully examined the ruling R. R. D. 1957 page 251 cited by the counsel for appellant. This case is clearly distinguishable from the present case on the ground that in the case of Shri Budh Singh Mehta Vs. Mehta Chander Singh the order passed by the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 27 of the Act was treated as an order passed under sec. 32 of the Act and hence appealable. There is nothing in the above ruling to show that the order rejecting an application for maintenance allowance was passed prior to or separately from the final award made under sec. 32 sub-sec. (2) of the Act. The facts in the above ruling are completely silent on those matters. The learned Members, therefore, naturally treated the order regarding maintenance allowance under sec. 27 of the Act as if it was passed under sec. 32 of the same Act. Further in the same ruling the learned Members also held that unless a person was not in actual receipt of any maintenance allowance at the time of the resumption of the Jagir he was not entitled to any such allowance under sec. 27 of the Act. To this extent that ruling has already been over-ruled by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mehrunnisa Begum versus Board of Revenue decided on 16. 7. 59 and reported in R. R. D. 1960 at page 121. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that in case this Division Bench took a different view from that laid down in R. R. D. 57 page 201 the proper course for this Bench would be to refer the matter to a larger Bench of this Board for the clarification of the law ana to avoid conflicting decision of Benches in the same Court. In support he cited AIR 1962 S. C. page 84. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has no doubt much force and all conflicting decisions of the same High Court have to be avoided by referring the matter to a larger Bench, but we do not find any conflict with regard to the maintainability of the appeal under sec. 32 of the Jagir Act. R. K. D. 1957 page 251 only says that an order erroneously passed by the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 27 would be treated as if he passed that order under sec. 32 of the same Act and hence appealable. There is nothing in this ruling to show that the order rejecting the application for maintenance allowance was passed by the Jagir Commissioner independently of Sec. 32. It is, therefore, presumed that the order was passed along with the final award regarding maintenance allowance under sec. 32 of the Jagir Act. In the present case no final award has been passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir and he has rejected the application for grant of maintenance allowance and not incorporated it in the final award. The parties admit that the final award in the compensation case has yet to be passed. In such circumstances no appeal is maintainable before this Court simply on the ground that the present order is not an order within the meaning of sec. 32 sub-sec. (2) of the Jagir Act. In fact no final award should be passed by any Officer charged with the function of payment of compensation under the Jagir Act without first determining the amount payable by way of maintenance allowance co-sharers' interest recoverable by way of state dues. If these things are not determined and if they existed in a particular case the award made would be bad in law. If strict and proper interpretation of sec. 32 sub-sec. 2 of the Act is not taken the result would be that (his Court would be flooded with the large number of appeals relating to various types of applications dealing with the subject matter mentioned in sec. 32 sub-sec. (1) such as maintenance allowance co-sharer's interest and state dues. Instead of dealing with one appeal under the award and disposing of all connected cases this Court would be called upon to deal with all matters separately and at different times. This would result in causing great confusion to the parties as well as to the Courts. What the law requires is that all those matters connected with the final award could only be questioned in one appeal before the Board of Revenue after the final award is passed under sec. 32 sub-sec. (2 ). We, therefore, hold that this appeal is clearly not maintainable and is accordingly rejected. We have no hesitation in holding that the appellant would be free to come in appeal against the final award if he finds that his grievances are not redressed under. The stay application is also accordingly rejected. .;