SHARMA, J. - (1.) THIS is an application by Prabhulal against whom the Receiver Imamuddin in the insolvency proceedings against Bajranghlal, Gujarmal and Kesarlal has obtained an order from the court of the Civil Judge, Tonk, giving leave to file a suit in forma pauperis.
(2.) WE have heard Mr. H. S. Sahai on behalf of the petitioner. The opposite party is unrepresented nor has the Receiver himself appeared in court. It was urged by Mr. Sahai that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. means only a natural person and not a juristic person. The Receiver would not therefore be deemed to be a person within the meaning of Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. and permission was wrongly accorded to him to file a suit in forma pauperis. For his contention, the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the rulings in the cases of Associated Pictures Ltd. vs. The National Studios Ltd. (1) (AIR, 1951 Pun. 447.); S. M. Mitra vs. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance (2) (AIR, 1930 Ran. 259.); Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh (3) (AIR, 1938 Cal. 745. ). In these cases it was decided that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. is confined to a natural person and does not apply to a juristic person like a limited company or an official receiver. With due respect to the learned Judges who took his view of the word "person" in Order, 33 Rule 1, C. P. C. we are of opinion that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1, has the same meaning as in clause (2) of sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. There the word "person" is defined as including any company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. There does not appears to be anything repugnant in Order 33, Rule 1 so as to limit the meaning of the word "person" only to natural persons. Mr. H. S. Sahai was frank enough to put before us also those authorities wherein the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 has been given the same meaning, which think it should bear. In Peru Mal Koundan vs. Tirumalrayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sanka Nidhi Ltd. (4) (AIR, 1918 Mad. 362.) it was held that Order 33, Rule 1 applies to suits by companies and nidhis and the latter can take advantage of its provisions if they are paupers. It was further observed that the word "person" in the order has the same meaning as in the General Clauses Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context and includes any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. In that case the intending plaintiff was a joint stock company. Again in Syed Ali vs. The Deccan Commercial Bank Ltd. (1) (AIR 1951 Hydbd. 124.) is was held by a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court that the word "person" includes not only a natural person but also a juristic person and there is nothing in the Code to prevent a juristic person from filing a suit. If, therefore, such a person has no sufficient means to pay the court fee, Order 33 will apply, as its object is to facilitate the filing of a pauper suit and on principle that facility should be given to all litigants entitled to it. Thus, a joint stock company which has gone into liquidation is entitled to it. Thus, a joint stock company which has gone into liquidation is entitled to sue as a pauper. The explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33 C. P. C. was also taken into consideration and it was observed that an explanation had not the same merit as a definition and that there was nothing repugnant in the Code which made the definition of "person" given in sec. 3 (39) now (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, inapplicable to "person" in Order 33 of the Code. The explanation of "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 is merely illustrative without being exhaustive. In the case of Sripal Singh vs. U. P. Cineton Ltd. (2) (AIR 1944 oudh, 248.) it was held that a person includes juristic person. The rulings of Rangoon and Calcutta High Courts cited by the learned counsel for the applicant were fully taken into consideration. There is yet another ruling of Rangoon High Court in the case of D. K. Cassim & Sons vs. Abdul Rahman and another (3) (AIR 1950 Ran, 272.) which was also taken notice of and therein it was held that the word "person" in O. 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. includes a juristic person and therefore a firm was a person within the meaning of O. 33, Rule 1 C. P. C. On a careful consideration of a number of authorities it was held that the word "person" could not be restricted to a natural person but also includes a juristic person. The reason given by the Punjab High Court in the case of Associated Pictures Ltd. vs. The National Studios Ltd. (4) (AIR 1951 Punjab 447.), was that the latter part of the explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33 cannot apply to a juristic person. In the latter paragraph the following words find place on which emphasis was laid by the learned court: - "when he is not entitled to property worth the hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit. " It was observed that it was hard to believe that any part of explanation could be (intended to be inapplicable to any "person" referred to in the rule, and because the words "wearing apparel" could not have any relation to juristic person, therefore, the word "person" was used in a limited sense of natural person. Again reliance was placed upon Rule 3 of Order 33 C. P. C. wherein it is provided that the application should be presented to the Court by the applicant in person, unless he is exempted from appearing in Court, in which case the application may be presented by an authorised agent who can answer all material questions relating to the application, and who may be examined in the same manner as the party represented by him might have been examined had such party attended in person. It was observed that it was difficult to interpret the word "person" as used in R. 3 in any other than in its ordinary sense of an individual. Lastly R. 4 was taken into consideration and it was held that it confirmed the interpretation of the word "person" as natural. To the argument of the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court based on explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33 C. P. C. , answer is to be found in the case of Peru Mal Coundan vs. Tirumalrayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sankha Nidhi Ltd. (1) (AIR, 1918 Mad. 362.) referred to above, wherein the learned Judges have said that the explanation to Rule 1 simply allows deduction of the value of wearing apparel where the applicant has such apparel, and it cannot be construed to mean that only persons who, in law, can possess wearing apparel, can sue as paupers. As regards Rule 3, the learned Judges say as follows: - "as regards Rule 3, which requires personal presentation of the application to sue in forma pauperis, it seem to us that where the law in consequence of personal appearance in Courts being impossible either by reason of the party being a Company or infant or lunatic, allows appearance by somebody else, appearance by such person would be sufficient. " It is clear that an infant or a lunatic too like a limited company cannot be expected to present the pauper application in person nor can he be personally examined even though he is a natural person. If the interpretation of rule 3 given by those Courts which have held that the word "person" in Order 33, rule 1 cannot be extended to persons other than natural persons is accepted, then a suit cannot be brought in forma pauperis even on behalf of the lunatics or minors. To our mind rule 3 does not throw any light upon the interpretation of the word "person" in Order 33, rule 1 C. P. C. In rule 4 it is provided that whether the application is in proper form and duly presented the court, may, if it thinks fit, examine the applicant of his agent when the applicant is allowed to appear by agent regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. This rule too cannot in our opinion, be taken to restrict the definition of the word "person" in Order 33, rule 1 to natural person only. The discussion relating to rule 3 above applies in the case of rule 4 as well. Considering carefully all the authorities on the point, we are unable to attach such a meaning to the word "person" in Order 33, rule 1 C. P. C. as would disable the juristic persons who are not in a position to spend money over court fees from bringing a suit in forma pauperis. To give a meaning to the word 'person" which is other than that which is given in the General Clauses Act, there ought to have been very strong grounds, which we do not find in provision of Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Code. The application for revision to our mind is without force and it is dismissed. As the opposite party has not appeared we make no order as to costs. . ;