- (1.) THIS is an appeal under sec. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1923 (Act No. VIII of 1923) against the orders of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Bhilwara dated 14th May 1954 and 24th February 1954. It arises out of an application which was filed by the respondent under sec. 22 of the said Act.
(2.) THE appellant in this case is the proprietor of Vasundra Products, Bhilwara, and prospecting operations regarding mica mines were being carried on his behalf. THE respondent's case was that he was a workman of the appellant and that on the 3rd of April, 1953 he and one Hulas Rai were busy carrying on prospecting operations in Chatar-pura village under the appellant's instructions On that day the owner of the field along with his relatives took the applicant unawares and made an attack upon him and Hulas Rai. Hulas Rai was killed on the spot while the respondent received grievious injuries on account of which his right hand had to be amputated below the elbow. He. therefore, claimed a compensation of Rs. 2940/ -. THE appellant admitted before the Compensation Commissioner that the respondent was his Assistant Manager and also that he was injured on the said date. It was, however, contended by him that the respondent was specially instructed by the appellant's circle manager not to carry on prospecting operations at the site of occurrence, and that he had worked in that area contrary to the appellant's instructions. It was further urged that the incident did not take place during the course of the respondent's employment and therefore he was not entitled to any compensation. THE following five issues were framed by the Commissioner - (1) Whether the accident of Shanker Datta arose out of his employment; (2) Whether the accident was in the course of his employment; (3) Whether the amount of compensation claimed or any part of that amount is due. (4) Whether Shanker Dutt is a workman; (5) Whether the applicant was drawing Rs. 100/- as monthly salary. After recording evidence of both the parties the learned Commissioner decided all the issues against the appellant and ordered him to pay Rs. 2940/- as compensation to the respondent. This order was given on 24th February, 1954. It was later amended by him and the compensation was fixed at Rs. 2520/- on 14th May, 1954 It is against these two orders that the present appeal has been filed. The first contention raised by appellant's learned advocate is that there was certainly an occurrence in which the respondent was injured, but it was not an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore the application was misconceived. He has proceeded to argue that the term "accident" connotes something which comes to happen by chance and not that which is done deliberately. According to learned counsel the respondent and his companion, Hulas Rai, were deliberately attacked upon by some persons who claimed to be the owners of the plots and therefore the injury received by the respondent was not accidental. The words "accident" has not been defined in the Act itself. In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar the meaning given to this word is "an undesigned, sudden or unexpected even; mishap; misfortune; disaster. " It is, therefore, true that the word "accident" is generally used in the sense of some mishap, which is unexpected but in order to decide whether a particular occurrence is "accident" or not it must be looked upon not only from the view point of the person who causes it but also from the angle of that person's vision who suffers from it. In the case of Hensey vs. While (1) it was once held that the word "accident" in Workmen's Compensation Act involved the idea of something fortuitous and unexpected; but in the case of Fenton vs. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd. it was observed that "it was to be regretted that the word 'fortuitous' should have been applied to the term 'injury by accident' in the Workmen's Compensation Act. If it means exactly the same thing as 'accidental' the use of the word is superfluous. It was held that the word "accident" in the Workmen's Compensation J Act was used in its popular and ordinary sense and means a mishap or untoward event not expected or designed. In that case a workman was employed to turn the wheel of a machine. By an act of over-exertion he ruptured himself and still it was held that it was an "injury by accident" within the meaning of the Act and he was entitled to compensation. In the case of Nisbet vs. Rayne & Burn (3) a cashier,while travelling in a railway carriage to a colliery with a large sum of money for the payment of his employers' workmen, was robbed and murdered. His widow applied for compensation. The application was contested on the ground that it was not an "accident", but it was held that the murder was an "accident"from the standpoint of the person who suffered from it and that it arose "out of" an employment which involved more than the ordinary risk, and consequently the widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Similarly in another case, Board of Management of Trim Joint District School vs. Kelly (4),one Mr, John Kelly was an Assistant Master in an industrial school at Trim. One day when he was superintending the boys in the school at exercise in a school yard, he was assaulted by some of them and was struck with heavy wooden mallets. The assault was premeditated and the out-come of a conspiracy of some of the boys to injure Kelly, who had punished or threatened to punish them and who on the occasion in question was remonstrating with them, Mr. John Kelly died on account of the injuries received by him and therefore his mother claimed compensation. It was contended from the opposite side that the occurence was not an 'accident', and that it did not arise out of and in the course of the deceased's employment. It was further urged that a crime, which is an offence against the State, ought not to increase the burden on the industry. All these objections were repelled by a majority of their Lordships of the Privy Council. Viscount Haldane, L. C, observed in that case that 'accident' includes any injury which is not expected or designed by the workman himself". The views expressed in Nisber vs. Rayne & Burn (3) and Anderson vs. Balfour (5) were followed: The Workmen's Compensation Act (No. VIII of 1932 ). follows the English Workmen's Compensation Acts and it would therefore be proper to give the term 'accident' the same meaning in which it has been interpreted in England. Now coming to the facts of the present case it is true that the injury received by the respondent was knowingly caused by the assailants, but so far as the respondent is concerned it came to him quite unexpected. It was stated by him that he was taken unawares, that the assailants first attacked his companion Hulas Rai and as he tried to rescue him he was also attacked upon by the offenders. The Commissioner has found this allegation to be true. There was no evidence led by the appellant to the effect that the respondent knew that he would be assaulted on that day and therefore, it was certainly an 'accident' if looked upon from the view point of the respondent. The respondent had gone to the filed for carrying on prospecting operations on behalf of his master and it was when he was performing his duty as the appellant's employee that he received the injuries at the hands of third persons who contested the appellant's right over the land, The accident therefore, arose out of and in the course of the respondent's employment and, he was certainly entitled to compensation. Appellant's learned advocate has next contended that the appellant was not allowed any opportunity to cross-examine the respondent and to lead his own evidence. It appears from the record of the Commissioner that the respondent was personally appearing before him and if the appellant had pressed his request for cross-examining him he could do so at any time. The appellant was given opportunity to lead his evidence and he has actually examined a number of witnesses and therefore this objection is also without any force. Appellant's learned advocate has next contended that the respondent was prohibited by the appellant's Circle Manager not to go to the site and since he disobeyed the directions and invited the trouble himself he was not entitled to get any compensation. The question whether the respondent was forbidden to go to the site by the appellant or his Circle Manager is one of fact. The Commissioner has referred to the appellant's letter addressed to the respondent on 27th March 1953. This letter was written only a few days before the occurrence. In that letter the appellant Nathmal Mundra has asked the respondent to carry on prospecting operations along with Hulas Rai This objection was taken before the Commissioner and he has decided it a against the appellant. An appeal to this Court under sec, 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act lies only on a substantial question of law. This is not a question or law but one of fact and therefore, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of the Commissioner on this point. The last argument by appellant's learned Advocate is that the respondent was given Rs. 631/- by the appellant and this amount should have been deducted out of the compensation allowed to him. It is urted that the commissioner has committed an error in not going into this question. I have given consideration over this matter. It appears from the written statement filed by the appellant that in pragraph 4 thereof he had taken an objection that "the opposite party was indebted to him to the amount of Rs 631/-". He did not mention further that amount of the compensation which might be allowed to athe respondent. It was not further mentioned by the appellant as to what was the nature of this debt and for what purpose the loan was advanced. If the respondent owes any debt to the appellant, it is open to the latter to take suitable action in a civil court. It was not the function of the Commissioner to go into the question of debts, It would have been a different matter if the appellant had state that he had given this amount towards compensation and that it should be taken into consideration while awarding the remaining amount. It is clear from his statement that he did not take any such plea and correct in refusing to enter into that question. The Commissioner has already reduced the amount from Rs. 2940/- to Rs. 2520/-, There is thus no good ground to interfere with his orders. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. ;