MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by Kishanlal and Pyarelal, by special leave, against a judgment and decree dated 24th November, 1948, of a learned single Judge of the High Court of the former State of Jodhpur.
(2.) IT is only necessary to state a few facts as the point for determination in this appeal is a narrow one. On 31st July, 1946 (corresponding to Sawan Sudi 3rd, Svt. 2003) the appellants Kishanlal and Pyarelal obtained a decree against one Alladin, who is now represented by Ibrahim, in the court of the learned Judicial Superintendent, Jodhpur City, for possession of a house by preemption. The trial court directed that the plaintiffs shall deposit a sum of Rs. 2500/- within two months from the date of the decree failing which their suit shall stand dismissed with costs. The plaintiff appellants actually deposited the decretal amount on 30th September, 1946, corresponding to Asoj Sudi 5th, Svt. 2003. The respondent objected in the course of the execution of the decree by the plaintiff appellants that the latter had deposited the money after the period of two months stipulated in the decree, that such time should be calculated on the basis of the Vikram Samvat and not the Gregorian calendar and that when so calculated the deposit had been made out of time and so the suit stood automatically dismissed. This objection was upheld by the learned Judicial Superintendent, Jodhpur City, by his order dated 19th November, 1947. The learned District Judge on appeal took the same view. On a further appeal to the former High Court of Jodhpur, a learned single Judge affirmed the judgment of the Courts below and held that the proper basis of calculation in Marwar was Vikram Samvat only and that that basis of calculation must be followed to the exclusion of the Gregorian calendar. IT was further urged before the learned Judge that although the pre-emption money come to be deposited on 30th September, 1946, the money had been actually brought in court and presented for deposit on 23rd September, 1946, and it was on account of the delay on the part of the office of the Court that the plaintiffs were prevented from actually depositing the money into the Treasury till 30th September, 1946. As the plaintiffs submitted that no opportunity had been given to them for proving the above mentioned facts, the learned Judge held that the matter merited a thorough enquiry and a definite finding and he, therefore, directed the learned Judicial Superintendent, Jodhpur City, to go into that question and give his finding thereon and remanded the case for further proceedings on the lines indicated above. From the above judgment, a Bench of this Court granted special leave for appeal which is now before us. The only point for determination in this appeal is whether by the word "month" as used in the decree passed by the learned Judicial Superintendent, Jodhpur City on 31st July, 1946, was meant a month according to the Vikram Samvat or according to the Gregorian calendar. Unfortunately, the respondent has not entered appearance in this appeal and, therefore, we have not had any assistance from his side as we should have liked to receive in the decision of the matter before us. We may mention, however, that reliance appears to have been placed on behalf of the respondent in the courts below on the provisions of the Marwar Limitation Act, 1945, in this connection. Sub-sec. (12) of sec. 2 of that Act defines month as follows : " Month shall mean a month reckoned according to the Vikram Calendar. " Reference may also be made here to sec. 25 of the Act which reads as follows: " All instruments shall for the purpose of this Act be deemed to be made with reference to the Vikram Calendar. " There is no doubt, therefore, that the legislative authorities of the former State of Jodhpur unequivocally showed their preference in favour of the Vikram Calendar as against the Gregorian, so far as the purpose of the Marwar Limitation Act of 1945 were concerned. But it must be borne in mind that the Marwar Limitation Act prescribed limitation for suits, appeals and certain applications to courts and was not intended to and did not govern the period of limitation specified by a court in a decree. Besides, sec. 25 of the Act clearly lays down that all instruments shall be deemed to be made with reference to the Vikram calendar for the purpose of the said Act. The definition of the word "month" as laid down in the Limitation Act, therefore, cannot, strictly, speaking, apply to the case before us. Unfortunately, the word "month" has not been defined in any other enactment of the former State of Jodhpur, and, therefore, the matter is not free from difficulty. There is nothing to show, however, that the word "month" meant a month according to the Vikram calender for all purposes apart from those of the Limitation Act in the former State at Jodhpur. It is indeed common knowledge that the other calendar was freely in use in that State. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the trial court's decree in question was passed under the provisions of O. XX, r. 14 of the C. P. C. which lays down that the decree in a pre-emption suit shall, inter alia, specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be paid. It would not be a sufficient or satisfactory compliance with the aforesaid provision of law if a court were to mention in its decree the stating day of limitation as a date according to the Gregorian calendar, and the period prescribed therein, such as one or two months, were to be computed according to the Vikram calendar. If such a thing were permitted, it is bound to cause considerable confusion in the interpretation and satisfaction of a decree. We reproduce below the relevant portion of the decree in the present case:- ***it is remarkable that the learned trial Judge used the expression *** as the starting point of limitation for the calculation of the period of two months specified In the decree. This furnishes us with a clue as to which basis of calculation the learned trial Judge had in his mind when he passed the decree. It would not be right and proper, in our opinion, to construe the limitation of time as respects its commencement with reference to***according to the Gregorian calendar and as respects the duration prescribed for the satisfaction of the decree according to the Vikram calendar. We have, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the decree in the present case fixed a period of two months as computed according to the Gregorian calender and not the Vikram, and we hold accordingly. If the time of two months specified in the decree is thus computed on the basis of the Gregorian calendar, it is obvious that the deposit of the pre-emption money made by the plaintiff appellants on the 30th September, 1946, was within the period of two months prescribed in the decree and was clearly within time. We may further point out that the use of the word *** may well have misled the plaintiff appellants into thinking that the period was to be computed on the basis of the Gregorian calendar, and it is a well settled principle of law that no party should be made to suffer on account of any mistake committed by the court. We are also of the opinion that a liberal construction favouring the enforcement of a right should be adopted in cases of real doubt, and we have no hesitation in stating that the present case is one which satisfies this test. The result is that we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge of the former High Court of Jodhpur, and dismiss the respondent's objection, and hold that the deposit made by the plaintiff-appellants on 30th September, 1946, was within the period of time specified in the decree. The execution of the trial court's decree dated the 30th September, 1946, will now proceed according to law. In the special circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in all the courts.;