Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THESE are three connected revisions, and we shall deal with them in one judgment as the main point raised in them is the same.
(2.) CIVIL revision No. 178 is by Shivdayal. He was tenant of a house in Jodhpur and his. landlords were Naraindas and others. The tenant Shivdayal made a complaint on 29. 4. 49 under sec. 3 of the Marwar House Rent Control Act (No. XXV) of 1949 to be hereinafter called the Marwar Act to the Controller that the rent of his house was excessive and fair rent should be determined. This matter was decided by the Controller on the 15th January, 1951, after the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, (hereinafter called the Rajasthan Act) had come into force. Shivdayal then filed an appeal before the District Judge, which was dismissed. The landlord Naraindas first filed an appeal before the Collector, but that was returned for presentation to the proper court, and then that appeal also was filed before the District Judge who disposed of both the appeals by one judgment. Shivdayal has come in revision to this Court, and even though he himself filed an appeal before the District Judge has now taken the curious position: that that court had no jurisdiction. Civil Revision No. 31 of 1952 is by Mardan Khan. He filed a complaint on the 21st of December, 1949, before the Controller under sec. 3 of the Marwar Act for fixing fair rent. The matter was decided by the Controller on the 11th January, 1951. Thereupon, the landlord Heeralal filed an appeal before the District Judge on 10. 2. 51. That appeal succeeded partially, and therefore Mardan Khan has come to this Court in revision. The third revision is by Shambhoo Ram and Sampatram who are landlords. Meghraj and Tarachand, who are tenants, made a complaint under sec. 3 of the Marwar Act on 17th January, 1950, for fixing fair rent. That application was decided by the Controller on the 26th of May, 1951. Thereupon, the tenants Meghraj and Tarachand went in appeal to the District Judge, which was partially allowed. Hence Shambhooram and Sampatram have come up in revision to this Court. The cases came up for decision before a learned Single Judge of this Court, who, considering the importance of the point involved, has referred them to a Division Bench. In all the three cases it is contended before us that, in view of the provisions of the Rajasthan Act, the appeal lie's not to the District Judge under sec. 22 (1) of the Act, but to such authority as the Government may appoint in that behalf under sec. 22 (3) of the Act. This authority, we understand, is the District Magistrate of Jodhpur under the orders of Government. The main question, therefore, that requires consideration is whether the appeal lies under sec. 22 (1) of the Rajasthan Act, or under sec. 22 (3 ). It is common ground between the parties that the cases were disposed of by the Controller under the provisions of sec, 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act, which provides that cases pending before a Controller or any other authority before the commencement of the Rajasthan Act shall be determined and disposed of by such controller or authority in accordance with such law, as was in force before the Rajasthan Act came into force. The decision therefore of the Controller in each of three cases was under sec. 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act and appeals from that decision would lie under sec. 22 (1) or 22 (3) as the case may be depending upon the nature of the matter decided, and the position of the authority deciding the matter. We are not taking into account the recent amendment of the Rajasthan Act by Act IX of 1952, because that amendment came into force on the 1st March, 1952, and the right of appeal in this case would be governed by the Rajasthan Act as it stood before the amendment. Before we consider the terms of sec. 22 (1) and 22 (3) of the Rajasthan Act, we would like to make a reference to Sewaram vs. Government of Rajasthan (1) (A. I. R. 1552 Raj. 109. ). That case seems to have given rise to a misapprehension that appeals from orders of Controllers, which are decided under the provisions of sec 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act, would lie to the authorities to which appeals lay under the law as it stood before the Rajasthan Act came into force. In Sewaram's case the point really involved was whether a revision lay to Government under sec. 22 (4) of the Rajasthan Act where the decision of the appellate authority under the former law was under sec. 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act. It was decided in that case that no revision lay from an order of the appellate authority under sec. 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act, because sec. 22 (4) specifically provided that the Government would have power to revise orders of appellate authority passed under sec. 22 (3) of the Act. That case, therefore, is only direct authority for the proposition that where the appellate authority decides an appeal pending before it on the date the Rajasthan Act came into force under the provisions of sec. 27 (2), that decision is not open to revision under sec. 22 (4 ). But as was pointed out in that case, the proviso to sec. 30 makes it quite clear that things done and actions taken before the date on which the Rajasthan Act came into force, namely the 28th November, 1950, were saved by the proviso, and were to continue as if they had been done or taken under the Rajasthan Act. That proviso, however, has no application to cases like the present, which were decided by the Controller after the 28th November, 1950, and therefore the forum of appeal in all those cases, which have been decided after the 28th November, 1950 will have to be determined under the provisions of sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Act. Before we consider the actual words of sec. 22, we may briefly analyse the provisions of the Marwar Act as well as the Rajasthan Act, as that will help in considering the words used in sec. 22. The Marwar Act defined the Controller as well as the Court, and the scheme of the Act was that certain functions were assigned to the Controller, and his orders were appealable to the Deputy Commissioner of the District. Certain other functions were assigned to the court, and the orders of the court were appealable in the usual course as provided under the Civil Procedure Code. The same scheme is to be found in the Rajasthan Act as it was on the relevant dates. We are not considering the effect of the amending Act No. IX of 1952 in this case, and what we say should be taken as confined to the Rajasthan Act as it stood before the 1st March, 1952. Under the Rajasthan Act also, 'controller' was defined, but the word 'court' was not defined. But it is clear that certain functions were assigned to the Controller, and certain other functions were assigned to the court, though the division was not exactly on the same lines as in the Marwar Act. Appeals from the Controller were provided for by sec. 22 (3), while appeals from the court were to be under sec. 22 (1 ). There is, therefore, in our opinion, no scope for holding that a Controller, either under the Marwar Act, or under the Rajasthan Act, was a court. It is true that the Controller was a quasi-judicial tribunal, but considering the scheme of the two Acts, there was a clear distinction between the Controller and the court, and we cannot accept the argument of learned counsel for the opposite parties that considering the functions assigned to the Controller, it must also be held to be a court. Now let us turn to the words of sec. 22. The relevant provisions for our purposes are as follows : - " (1) An appeal shall lie to the court of District Judge from every decree or order passed by a court under this Act in a suit for fixation of, or increase in, rent or standard rent in respect of any premises. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, appeal therefrom to such authority as the Government may from time to time appoint in that behalf. "
(3.) IT will be seen that the impugned orders in this case were with reference to fixation of fair rent under the Marwar Act. That function was assigned to the Controller and not to the court. But under the Rajasthan Act that function is assigned to the court and not to the Controller. All the three orders, which were taken in appeal to the District Judge, were passed in this case by the Controller under the provisions of sec. 27 (2) of the Rajasthan Act. Ordinarily such cases of fixation of rent would, under the Rajasthan Act, now be suits and would lie in the court. But the legislature specifically provided under sec. 27 (2) that all cases; pending before the Controllers, whatever may be their nature, would be decided by Controllers notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Rajasthan Act. This clearly means that even cases relating to fixation of fair rent, which would alter the passing of the Rajasthan Act be decided by the court, were allowed by sec. 27 (2) to be decided by the Controllers notwithstanding the provisions of the Rajasthan Act. There is no doubt in our mind that these cases were decided by Controllers and not by courts. Under these circumstances, no appeal will lie to the District Judge under sec. 22 (1) from such orders, because an appeal under that section lies only from the orders of a court and not from the order of a Controller. Sec. 22 (1) provides for certain specific appeals, while sec. 22 (3) is very much wider in application, and allows appeals from all orders passed by the Controller to such authority as the Government may, from time to time, appoint in that behalf. Where of course an appeal would come within the terms of sec. 22 (1), sec. 22 (3) will not apply. But where, as in this case, the appeal does not come within the terms of sec. 22 (1), because, the order in appeal was not passed by the court but by the Controller, the appeal from an order of the Controller under sec. 27 (2) also would lie, under sec. 22 (3), to such authority as the Government may, from time to time, appoint in that behalf. We are, therefore, of opinion that the appeal in all these three cases lay under sec. 22 (3) to such authority as the Government may appoint and not to the court of the District Judge. This disposes of the three revisions before us. There is however one more case which was before the District Judge, and it is connected with civil revision No. 178 of 1951. That was an appeal by the landlord, which was allowed. Strictly the tenant should have filed another revision in that case also; but as the District Judge had no jurisdiction to decide these cases the decision of the District Judge in appeal by the landlord would be a nullity. That file is also before us, and it is but proper that the appeal in that case also should be returned to the landlord for presentation to the proper authority appointed by Government under sec. 22 (3 ). We, therefore, allow the revision, set aside the orders of the District Judge, and direct that the petitions of appeal in these three cases and the fourth petitions by the landlords Naraindas and others against the tenant Shivdayal be returned for presentation to the proper authority appointed under sec. 22 (3) of the Rajasthan Act. In view of the special circumstances of this case, we are of opinion that parties should bear their own costs of the proceedings in the District Judge's court, and in this Court. Costs in the Rent Controller's court will depend upon the final result. . ;