Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS is an application for revision by one of the defendants against the appellate order of the District Judge, Alwar granting an application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has brought a suit out of which these proceedings have arisen for perpetual induction restraining the five defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's fitting a motor engine in the well known as Khatiwala and from interfering with the plaintiff's cultivating the land under the said well. The plaintiff's case is that" the defendants No. 1 to 3 i. e. , Sheo Sahai, Musa and Gyarsa had executed a lease for two years i. e. , for the years 2007, 2008 on the 11th of May, 1950 in favour of the plaintiff. On the expiry of term of the lease, the defendants No. 1 to 3 surrendered their possession and the plaintiff came into possession of the fields in dispute. The plaintiff wanted to fit a motor engine in the well, known as Khatiwala, but the defendants interfered with his fitting the said engine. Along with this plaint, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's fitting the motor engine in the well and from interfering with the plaintiff's cultivating the land.
(2.) AN interim injunction was issued by the learned Civil Judge, Alwar on the 28th July, 1952, but on objection by the defendants, it was vacated on the 9th September, 1952. Against this order, the plaintiff went in appeal to the court of District Judge, Alwar who allow the appeal and granted a temporary injunction to the plaintiff asking the defendants to maintain status quo and not interfere with the cultivation of the land in dispute and with the installation of the motor in the well. Against this appellate order of the learned District Judge, the defendant Musa has come in revision to this Court and has also made the remaining four defendants proforma opposite parties. It was argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit as it was barred by the provisions of clause 9 Group B of the first schedule to the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction), Act, 1951, inasmuch as a suit for injunction when the landholder does not sue for ejectment is specifically provided in the said clause and is to be heard by the revenue court. It was also argued that the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff had a prima facie title and the five defendants were tenants of old standing and were never dispossessed from the fields. The so called kabuliat and relinquishment deed were never executed by any of the defendants and were simply factitious documents fabricated in order to defeat the right of the defendants. It was argued that the kabuliat as well as the relinquishment deed purported to be executed by only three of the five defendants should also dispute the genuineness of those deeds. The plaintiff had not proved that those deeds were executed by these three defendants and, therefore, they could not have any effect against the three defendants. So far as the remaining two defendants were concerned, they were not even parties to the alleged kabuliat or the relinquishment deed. So far as they are concerned, the plaintiff has absolutely no prima facie title against them. He also relied upon the copy of the khasra filed by him in order to show that upto Smt. 2008 all the defendants are recorded as tenants and the length of their cultivation is given as fourteen years. He argued that if the injunction was maintained the result would be that the defendants would not be able to cultivate the land and would not get water which they are entitled to do. On behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party it was argued by Mr. Umadutt that the suit was within the cognizance of Civil Court, and clause 9 of Group B of Schedule I of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951 did not apply to it. It was also argued that the appellate court had held that there was prima facie title with the plaintiff and this Court should not interfere with that finding in revision. It was also argued that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the two documents i. e. . the lease and the relinquishment deed, as at present stage all that was necessary, was to show the prima facie title. As regards the two defendants who are not parties to the lesase or the relinquishment deed, it was argued that they were brothers of the defendants Musa and Sheo Sahai and the act of these two was binding upon these defendants. Moreover, it was argued that the defendants never tried to differentiate the cases of the remaining defendants with those of the three who are parties to the lease and relinquishment deed, and this objection of theirs should not be considered. We have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. We need not say anything at this stage about the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the present case. The point is an arguable one and it would be better to leave it for decision by the trial court in due course. It is a well established principle in the matter of temporary injunctions that it is a discretionary order and the decision of the first court should not be easily interfered with even by the appellate court. In the present case, the decision of the first court was in favour of the defendants. Ordinarily, therefore, the appellate court ought to have been slow in interfering with the order of the first court. Another well established principle in connection with temporary injunctions is that the plaintiff should be able to satisfy that the following conditions exist: - (1) that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. (2) that the court's interference is necessary to protect the party applying for temporary injunction from the species of injury which the court calls irreparable, before his legal right is established by the trial court, and, (3) that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to ensue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. The first condition, therefore, which is to be made out is that the party applying for temporary injunction has a prima facie case. In this case the first court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove the prima facie case, If the judgment of the learned Civil Judge was not as perfunctory as it is, we would have vacated the temporary injunction on the ground that the lower appellate court should have been slow to interfere with that order. However, we are ourselves not satisfied by the way in which the case has been treated by the trial court. We have therefore, to see the merits of the judgment of the lower appellate court. The appellate court in coming to a finding that the plaintiff has a prima facie title has relied upon some documentary evidence filed by the plaintiff. They have been enumerated in the judgment of the appellate court and are as follows (1) A lease-deed dated 11. 5. 1950 executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. (2) A relinquishment deed dated 23 5-1952 written by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. (3) A partnership deed between the plaintiff and his brother, Narain Sahai dated 23rd March, 1952. (4) Vouchers dated respectively 6. 6. 1952 and 21. 5. 1952 regarding the purchase of the motor etc. (5) An application dated 22. 5. 1952 presented to the Customs Department in (regard to the exemption of customs duty. (6) A registered partition deed dated 9th January. 1950 executed between the plaintiff, his brother and his father. (7) An order of the khasra Girdawri included in the Jamabandi of Svt. 2004. The most important documents from the point of view of the plaintiff are the lease deed dated the 11th May, 1950 and relinquishment deed dated the 28th May, 1952. The lease deed purports to be executed by Sheo Sahai, Musa and Gyarsa defendants and the relinquishment deed also purports to be executed by these three defendants. So far as the remaining two defendants Rupa and Bodia are concerned they are not parties to thesis two documents. Learned counsel for the plaintiff says that because their brothers have executed these two documents they are prima facie binding upon Bodia and Rupa. Taking these two deeds to have been executed by Sheo Sahai, Musa and Gyarsa, we do not find any material at the present stage from which we might infer that the act of these three will bind Bodia and Rupa. It may be that at the trial the plaintiff might be able to prove such circumstances, but on the present material on the record, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been able to satisfy that these two deeds are prima facie binding upon Rupa and Bodia. So far as the remaining three are concerned no doubt the case of the plaintiff is that they were executed by these three defendants. These defendants have however, stoutly denied their execution in the affidavit which they have filed and have stated that they are fictitious and farzi documents. In the face of this denial on oath in their affidavit filed by the defendants, we do not find that the plaintiff has been able to prove prima facie that these two documents were executed by Sheo Sahai, Musa or Gyarsa. It may be that at the time of the trial he might be able to establish their execution by these three defendants. But at present, there is nothing to show excepting that the names of these three find place in these two documents and their thumb impression which are described to be theirs to show against the denial on oath to the defendants that they were executed by these defendants. The lower appellate court had before it a certified copy of the khasra in which the names of all the five defendants appear and in which they are shown to be tenants upto Svt. 2008 and their length of cultivation is shown as fourteen years. The plaintiff has not shown at this stage that the kabuliat which is relied upon by him was given effect to in revenue papers. Learned District Judge, should not have, therefore, been misled by these two documents in holding that the plaintiff had proved their prima facie title. It appears that the learned District Judge did not apply his judicial mind to this aspect of the case. He has not considered the affidavit of the defendants in which they have denied the execution of these two documents which are most important from the point of view of the plaintiff. He has again altogether ignored the fact that these two documents were executed by three of the five defendants only and has assumed as if they were executed by all the defendants. While enumerating the documents filed by the plaintiff, the learned District Judge particularly describes at No. 1 the lease deed as follows : - "the lease deed dated the 11th May, 1950 executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. " As regards relinquishment deed also, he says at No. 2: "a relinquishment deed, dated the 28th May, 1952 written by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. " He does not take into consideration the fact that these documents were executed by only three defendants. The learned District Judge, therefore, altogether failed to apply his mind while arriving at the question of prima facie title to the nature of the material put up on the record in respect of prima facie title. He altogether ignored the important documentary evidence produced by the defendants in the shape of the khasra for four years i. e. from Svt. 2005 and 2008. He also ignored the fact that even according to the plaintiffs, till within two months of the suit, the defendants were in possession of the property in dispute. We are of opinion that the learned District Judge committed an illegality in the exercise of his jurisdiction when he decided the question of prima facie title without applying his judicial mind to the material which was put up on the record. In the view of the fact that the plaintiff failed to prove his prima facie title, it is not necessary for us to say whether the plaintiff has been able to make out an irreparable injury and balance of convenience. It is sufficient to observe that a party who wants a temporary injunction has to satisfy all the three grounds mentioned above and not only one or two of them. The application for revision is allowed. The order of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the learned Civil Judge restored. The applicant shall get his costs of this revision from the contesting opposite party. .;