MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the plaintiffs Sobhalal and Ridhkaran against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Bhilwara, dated 28th November, 1951, in a suit for money.
(2.) THE plaintiffs' case was that they had money dealings with Chunda-watji, mother of the present respondent, and that on 9th August, 1938, accounts were gone into and a sum of Rs. 934/- in Kaldar was acknowledged to be due by her in favour of the plaintiffs. It is further alleged that on the same day, Chundawatji executed a new document wherein she converted the amount due into Chittori coin at the rate of 160 Chittori for 100 Kaldars and agreed that the sum of Rs. 1525/- thus arrived at would be paid by her by annual instalments of Rs. 340/- each, and further agreed to pay rate of 12 annas, per cent, per mensem, in case such instalments Were not paid in time. As the lady did not pay anything towards her debt, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit in the court of the Munsiff Saharda, on 9th November, 1941. THE plaintiffs prayed for a decree for Rs. 1525/- as principal and Rs. 193'- by way of interest making a total of Rs. 1718/- in Chittori coin with pending and future interest. THE defendant Chundawatji contended the suit on all conceivable grounds. She denied her signatures on the document. She also stated that the plaintiffs had not explained the accounts to her and that she was a Pardanashin lady. She further contended that as the original liability was in Kaldar the plaintiffs cannot be granted a decree in Chittori coin. It appears that the suit was decreed ex parte against the defendantion the 22nd August, 1942, for a sum of Rs. 1718/- with costs; but on an application by the defendant Chundawatji, the ex-parte decree was set aside. As Chundawatji died during the pendency of the trial, her son Baghsingh was brought on record as her legal representative. THE trial court held that the execution of Ex. P-l by Chundawatji was proved. In arriving at this finding, the trial court mainly relied on the evidence of the Kamdar of Thikana Mahendragarh, who was the scribe of the suit document, who had stated that had written it at the instance of Chundawatji and that she had signed it, and certain other witnesses into whose evidence it is not necessary to enter for the purposes on this appeal. THE finding of the trial court as regards Chundawatji being a Pardanashin lady is that she kept very light Parda and was accessible to her advisers, and therefore, there was no reason to hold that she had been overreached in any manner. As regards the contention that the plaintiffs were not entitled to bring their suit for recovery of the money alleged to be outstanding against her in Chittori coin the trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring the suit in Chittori coin and to obtain a decree likewise as the transaction which was the basis of the suit was made in Chittori currency four years before the suit was filed. THE trial court, therefore, decreed the plaintiff's suit against the present respondent for a sum of Rs. 1718/- with costs, and gave a direction that the decree would be executed against the estate of Chundawatji in the hands of the respondent. THE defendant preferred an appeal from the above decree to the learned District Judge, Bhilwara, who upheld the findings of the trial court on all findings of fact. That court, however, varied the decree of the trial court and held that as the amount of Rs. 1525/- for which Ex. P-l had been executed by Chundawatji was arrived at by commutation of the original debt of Rs. 934/- in Kaldar the plaintiffs were entitled to sue and get a decree in Kaldar only. It therefore, modified the decree of the trial court and awarded a decree for a sum of Rs. 1074/- in favour of the plaintiffs. Both parties were left to bear their own costs in that court, but proportionate costs of the trial court were allowed to the plaintiffs. THE plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge. The only question for determination in this appeals is whether the decision of the court below on the point on which it deferred from the trial court is correct, It is unfortunate that the respondent has not chosen to enter appearance in this court in spite of service. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has brought two enactments to my notice in this connection. The first in the Conversion of Certain Decrees and Claims Act No. VIII of 1942. It is said that this came into force in the former State of Mewar on the 3rd July, 1942. Sec. 3 of the said Act runs as follows: - A judgment creditor or a judgment debtor against whom proceedings in execution of a decree are pending or may henceforth be instituted may apply for commutation of the whole or part of a decree remaining unsatisfied from Chittori to Kaldar at the rate at which the original amount having been Kaldar was commuted to Chittori for the purposes of that decree. Then follow secs. 4 and 5 which run as under: - 4. The court upon receiving such application, if satisfied that the whole or part of the liability was in Kaldar in the suit in which that decree was passed, shall commute the unsatisfied amount of the decree to Kaldar at the rate at which the Kaldar portion of the claim was changed to Chittori in the decree. Payments already made in execution of a decree passed in lieu of mixed Kaldar and Chittori claim shall be presumed to have been made towards Chittori amount and any sum paid in excess thereof shall be deemed to have been paid towards Kaldar amount at the decretal rate. These provisions, in my opinion, obviously apply to the stage of execution and not to that of trial, and have little relevance at the present stage. Sec. 6 of this Act relates to claims as distinguished from decrees and provides as follows: - No decree shall be passed in Chittori in a suit or appeal in which the claim is based wholly or in part upon a Kaldar transaction except for such claim or portion thereof as is based upon Chittori transaction. As I understand this section, the test is that before a decree can be based in a Chittori coin a suit or appeal, it must be seen whether the claim is based upon a transaction in Kaldar or in Chittori. If the former is the case, then no decree in Chittori coin shall be passed : but if the suit is based upon a Chittori transaction, then to the extent to which it is so based a decree in Chittori can be passed. In ray opinion, the suit in the present case was based upon a Chittori transaction and not upon a transaction in Kaldar. It is true that the transaction in its early history was Kaldar one but that is not the test. The test is whether the suit is based upon the Kaldar or the Chittori transaction, and if it it is based upon Chittori transaction, then a decree could be passed in Chittori coin. These observations are based on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Conversion of Certain Decrees and Claims Act, No. VII of 1942. 5. I would next turn my attention to the second enactment which is called the Mewar Currency (No. XI) of 1942. This Act came into force on 22nd September, 1942, just within a period of less than three months of the former Act. The relevant sections of this Act are reproduced below : - 3. The Chittori and Kaldar shall both be legal tender and be accepted at parity in all transactions except in the case of payments to the Mewar State Railway which as heretofore shall only be made in Kaldar. 4. Whoever refuses to accept either Kaldar or Chittori or demands a premium or, charges a discount shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. " The intention of this Act is, unmistakable. It was passed with a view to end all controversies as regards the conversion of Chittori into Kaldar and vice versa, and the demanding of a premium or charging of a discount while payment was being made and refused in one or the other was made an offence. No reference has been made in the judgments of both courts below to this Act. So far as I understand, once this latter Act was put on the statute book of the former State of Mewar, all controversies as regards the conversion of Kaldar into Chittori or Chittori into Kaldar, and all disputes as regards the demand or refusal to accept either Kaldar or Chittori must have been relegated to the limbs past history. If my interpretation of the Mewar Currency Act is correct, as I think it is, then it follows that the later Act must prevail. It is true that the law does not favour the alteration of a statute by construction. But it is equally true that it is impossible to construe absolute contradictions. If therefore the provisions of a later statute are so inconsistant with or repugnant to those of an earlier Act, that the two cannot stand together, then the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the later. (See Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Ed. pp. 163-164 ). In this view I am constrained to come to the conclusion that the lower appellate court was wrong in commuting the decree of the trial court, which was in Chittori coin into Kaldar, by reliance on the Mewar Conversion of Certain Decrees and Claims Act (No. VIII) of 1942 which stands impliedly repealed by the later Mewar Currency Act (No. XI) of 1942. The result is that this appeal must be allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court set aside and the decree of the trial court restored. It scarcely requires to be added that this decree will be executed as if it was in Kaldar coin. The appellants will be entitled to receive their costs in all the courts from the respondents. . ;