RANAWAT, J. - (1.) THIS is an application by one Misri under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, against Changa, the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur Division (Alwar ). It is stated by the petitioner that he owns certain lands in village Talfara, Tehsil Kumhar, which were in the occupation of Changa and were delivered to him through the agency of the Tahsildar of Kumhar on the 12th June, 1948. But after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenants (Protection) Ordinance, 1949, on the 21st June, 1949 Changa filed an application under sec. 7 of the Ordinance in the court of the Special Sub-Divisional Officer Bharatpur, for restoration of possession over the disputed land. The Sub-Divisional Officer, it is said, on the 15th of September, 1949 allowed the application and ordered Changa to be put in possession of the said land. A revision application was moved by Misri, the petitioner, before the Revenue Board of the Matsya Union of the State of Rajasthan by virtue of Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, No. 1 of 1949. In the place of the Matsya Revenue Board, Rajasthan Board of Revenue was established by the Ordinance (No. 22 of 1949) and by sec. 19 of said Ordinance the Matsya Union Board of Revenue was abolished. Cases which were pending before the Matsya Revenue Board were transferred to the Rajasthan Revenue Board under sec. 19 of the said Ordinance and the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur Division, at Alwar was specially appointed by the Government under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Ordinance to dispose of the pending cases. The revision application of the petitioner thus came before the Additional Commissioner in exercise of his powers of the Revenue Board and it was allowed on the 9th of March, 1950 and the order of the Special Sub-Divisional Officer reinstating Changa in respect of the said land was set aside. Changa then moved a review application before the Additional Commissioner, which was allowed on the 17th June, 1950 and by which the order of the Additional Commissioner of the 9th March, 1950 was cancelled and order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated the 15th September, 1949 was restored. Misri then moved a revision application before the Rajasthan Revenue Board but he did not succeed as, on the 31st March, 1951, the Rajasthan Revenue Board decided that it had no power to hear a revision application against the judgment of the Additional Commissioner who was performing the duties of the Revenue Board under sec. 19 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance. Misri then filed this application before this court and prayed that the order of the Additional Commissioner of the 17th of June, 1950 be declared to be without jurisdiction and that he be ordered to be put in possession of the disputed lands. Both Changa and the Rajasthan Board of Revenue filed written statements and it was stated by Changa that he was in the occupation of the land and that possession was given to the petitioner on the 12th of June, 1948 but it was not in accordance with the process of law and that his application under the Tenants Protection Ordinance was competent. It was further stated that the revenue authorities reconsidered the case and on the 8th of April, 1950 the previous order by which possession had been transferred to the petitioner had been set aside and he was ordered to be put into the possession of the land. Nothing was said by Changa as regards the jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner to hear a review application. The Board of Revenue however in its reply said that the Additional Commissioner was competent to hear review applications against his own decisions.
(2.) MR. Rastogi on behalf of the petitioner has laid emphasis on the following four points at the time of the hearing of this petition: - (1) that the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur Division at Alwar was a persona designate, under s. 19 of the Rajasthan Revenue Board Ordinance and that no powers to review his own decisions was given to him by the statute. His order of review was therefore without jurisdiction. (2) that even if it be assumed that the Additional Commissioner had any such powers of review the Additional Commissioner in the present case disregarded the provisions of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and exercised his powers of review on the grounds which could not be made the basis of a review petition in this case. The case in Kotaghiri Venkata Subbamma Rao vs. Vellanki Venkataram Rao (1) (I. L. R. 24 Mad 1.) has been cited on this point. (3) that the petitioner got possession of the land under a process of law by sec. 7 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance an officer acting under sec. 7 had no jurisdiction to interfere in this case, and (4) that there is an error apparent on the face of the record and on this ground the decision of the Additional Commissioner which he gave in exercise of his powers of review should be held without jurisdiction. Even though it has been stated on behalf of Changa that he was dispossessed on the 12th of June, 1948 not in accordance with law, yet no material has been put on the record of this case to support this contention. Mr. Yadav who has appeared on his behalf has urged that he remained under the impression that the opposite party would concede to this statement of his client and he did not, therefore, try to put the relevant documents on the record of this case in support of his contention. In course of the hearing of this petition he prayed that further time might be allowed to him to bring further material on the record of the case but as the case could be disposed of on other grounds, it was not considered necessary to allow him at that stage to put fresh material on the record on this point. We would therefore not deal with the third point of the petitioner in deciding this application. The main question which is involved here relates to the power of the Additional Commissioner to review his own Judgments. In Kishore Singh vs. Revenue Board, Rajasthan (1) (1953 R. L. W. 21.) it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court as follows: - "therefore when these cases continued to be heard and disposed of by Additional Commissioners after the 17th January, 1950, the Additional Commissioners were acting as authorities empowered by the Government under sec. 19 of Ordinance XXII of 1949 to hear and dispose of the same, and their jurisdiction for that purpose was co-ordinate with the jurisdiction of the Board. These Officers who were designated to hear these cases under sec. 19 could not thus be called courts subordinate to the Board of Revenue. We may point out that it was only a matter of chance that Additional Commissioners were designated by the Government for this purpose. The Government could have well designated some other authorities, and merely because the name of the person designated was Additional Commissioner, it does not follow that the person so designated under sec. 19 was a court subordinate to the Board on that ground. " Further on in the same judgment at para 9 it has been observed as given below: - "the Additional Commissioners came in to the picture merely as per sona designate as sec. 19 specifically provided that the cases transferred under it to the Board may be disposed of by the Board or such other authority as the Government may deem fit to appoint. " It would appear from the judgment of this court in Kishore Singh's case that the position of the Additional Commissioners acting in exercise of their powers of the Board of Revenue by virtue of their appointment under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance was that of a persona designata and they could exercise only such powers as were conferred upon them by the statute under which they were so appointed. It may be noted that there is no mention in the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance about the powers of review of such officers. Similarly, in the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance there is no provision that the Board of Revenue acting under sec. 10 (2) has the powers of review in such cases. The position in this behalf of the Revenue Board might be a little different from the position of the Additional Commissioners acting under sec. 19 of the Revenue Ordinance. But we need not go and discuss the position of the Board of Revenue, because in the present case there is no question about the jurisdiction of the Board. We would confine our attention to the position of the Additional Commissioner who acted under sec. 10 (2) of the Protection of Tenants Ordinance and who subsequently went on to review his own decision. It has not been disputed by the other side at the time of the hearing that the Additional Commissioner in the present case acted only as a persona designate. In Harji vs. Revenue Board of Rajasthan (2) (1952 R. L. W. 338.) it has been held that a court cannot review its own decision unless it is permitted to do so by statute, except in exceptional cases where the previous judgment cannot be regarded as a judgment according to law. Mr. Ram Avtar on behalf of the Board of Revenue contended that this was a case of extension of powers of the Additional Commissioners and that they should be deemed to possess all the powers which the Board of Revenue would exercise in such cases. This point has also been finally concluded in Kishore Singh's case which has been discussed above. In that judgment observations of Lord Parker of Waddington were quoted with approval in National Telephone Company Limited (in liquidation) and another vs. His Majesty's Postmaster-General (1913 A. C. 546 at p. 562) which are as follows: - "where by statute matters are referred to the determination of Court of Record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same. " It was observed in that judgment that the argument relating to extension of powers was not applicable to the Additional Commissioners, because they were not courts and they acted as persona designate only. The relevant observation in that judgment is as follows: - "we are of opinion that this case has no application to the facts before us. The statute transferred the cases to the Board under sec. 19, and if there was any extension of the powers of any court it was the powers of the Board which were extended. So far as the Additional Commissioners are concerned, the cases were not transferred to them by the statute, and it cannot therefore be said that the powers of the Additional Commissioners were extended under sec. 19. " The conclusion thus is that the Additional Commissioners acting by virtue of their appointment under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance had no powers to review their own judgments. The judgment of the Additional Commissioner in the present case which he gave on the 17th of June 1950 in exercise of his supposed powers of review is, therefore, clearly without jurisdiction and cannot be allowed to stand. Mr. Yadav on behalf of Changa has urged that the order on the basis of which the Additional Commissioner decided the case on the 9th of March, 1950 had been set aside by the very same authority on the 8th of April, 1950 and thus the basis of the judgment of the Additional Commissioner having lost its position his client should not be deprived of the possession of the property. There are two decisions of the Tehsildar, which are one against the other, as regards the question of the right to delivery of possession. Under these circumstances, unless this matter is closely examined, it is difficult to say that the petitioner is entitled to be put into the possession of the disputed land irrespective of the proceedings under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance. We would, therefore, not like to make any order regarding delivery of possession of the disputed property to the petitioner but would leave this matter for the determination of the appropriate authority. It would suffice to limit the order of this court to a declaration that the decision of the Additional Commissioner in exercise of his powers of review is ultra vires.
(3.) IT may be noted here that in view of the decision arrived at on the point noted above it is not necessary to deal with the other points raised by the learned counsel of the petitioner in this case. This writ application is therefore allowed and the decision of the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur Division, at Alwar dated the 17th June, 1950 is set aside. As regards possession of the disputed lands the parties are left to seek their remedy in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs. .;