- (1.) SHRI Shyam Lal This is an application in revision under sec. 10 (2) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 against an order of the S. D. O. Behror, dated 31. 10. 52 refusing to grant protection to the applicant under sec. 7 of the Ordinance.
(2.) WE have heard the parties and have examined the record carefully. The case has been disposed of by the lower court on the ground that the opposite party is a discharged military personnel and hence in accordance with the terms of the Government Notification No. F. 1 (4) Rev-J/51, dated Jaipur, the 11th January, 1951, the provisions of the Ordinance are not applicable to the case. The applicant's contention is that the opposite party had (in exercise of this right) ejected a tenant once and thereafter another tenant (applicant) was put in possession of the land by him. Therefore, he can seek protection under the Ordinance. The contention of the opposite party is that the exemption granted to him by the Notification referred to above is always available for him. The Notification in question is as below: - "in exercise of the power conferred by sec. 15 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (No. IX of 1949) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to exempt the following land from the provisions of the said Ordinance, namely, (i) land belonging to persons who are in military employment of the Government; or (ii) land belonging to persons who are discharged from military employment of the Government after the coming into force of the said ordinance. " Sec. 4 of the Ordinance lays down that no tenant shall be liable to ejectment or dispossession from the whole or a part of his holding in any area of Rajasthan during the continuance of the Ordinance. Sec. 5 makes it mandatory for the courts to temporarily consign to record all pending suits, appeals, revision, etc. having for their object the ejectment of tenants. Sec. 7 provides a summary remedy for reinstatement of tenants wrongfully dispossessed. It seems that the legislature felt that these provisions would adversely affect the morale of the military personnel as, on return from service to their home land they would not be in a position to acquire the lands for their own cultivation. To obviate this hardship the notification referred to above was issued by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by sec. 15 of the Ordinance. This notification, therefore, has to be interpreted in a manner as would not frustrate the very object of the legislation. A discharged military personnel is to have the right to seek ejectment of a tenant from his land after obtaining his discharge. The reason for such an exemption is not far to seek. A military employees is obviously compelled by exigencies of his service to grant his land on lease to others. If the Ordinance had not been promulgated he would have obviously been able to regain possession of his land. The natural and logical interpretation of the Notification to our mind, therefore, is that after discharge he should be able to eject the tenant under the Ordinary Tenancy Laws, but if after obtaining his discharge and taking possession of his land by ejecting the tenant, he grants it to another tenant instead of cultivating it himself, the tenant put in possession of the land after discharge should not be deprived of the protection granted by the Ordinance. To hold otherwise would amount to discrimination between persons discharged from the military service and persons not so discharged in respect of rights and liabilities after discharge. In the present case, the opposite party was discharged sometime in January, 1951 and the applicant was admitted to tenancy by him after this discharge. The tenant whose tenancy originates after discharge is Certainly eligible to all the benefits of the Ordinance. The first contention that the landholder was once discharged from military service would not take the land out of the operation of the ordinance for all time to come. In the present case the applicant was put in possession as a tenant of the land in dispute by opposite party after discharge from the military service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this revision should be allowed and the case be remanded to the lower court for a decision on merits. .;