- (1.) THIS is a miscellaneous civil appeal against the order of the Civil Judge, Sikar, of the 8th of August 1951, by which a decree was granted on the basis of a compromise, for an amount of Rs. 1250/ -.
(2.) THE facts of the case are that Jodh Raj and Ratanlal filed a suit against Gaurilal and Ramballabh for Rs. 5976/3/- in the court of the Civil Judge, Sikar, on the 24th of October 1954. After some time in course of the trial an application was filed by Jodhraj and Gaurilal on the 9th of May, 1951 in which it was stated that the suit had been compromised between the parties and that Rs. 1250/- had already been paid to Jodhraj in furtherance therefor and that an amount of Rs. 1250/- which remained to the paid shall be paid on the 1st of June 1952 by Gaurilal. A prayer was made that the suit be decided in the terms of the compromise. After some time Ratanlal disowned the compromise entered into by his father. THE learned Civil Judge held that Jodhraj was the father and the manager of the joint Hindu family of the plaintiffs and he could therefore enter into a compromise with the defendants and could give them a valid discharge, even without the consent of Ratanlal. A decree in terms of the compromise was therefore passed by him as stated above Ratanlal has come in appeal against the said judgment and decree of the court of the Civil Judge. His case is that even though Jodhraj was the father of the appellant he had no authority on his behalf to enter into a compromise with the defendants, and that the compromise which, had been entered into by him without the consent of the appellant could not be enforced against him. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that the view adopted by the learned Civil Judge was in consonance with the provisions of the Hindu Law. Judgments in the cases of Varada Bhaktavatsaludu and others vs. Damo-jipurapu Vankatanarasimha Rao and others (1) (AIR 1940 Mad. 530.) and Kanshiram vs. Harnamdas and others (2) (AIR 1940 Lah. 73.) have been cited in support of the case of the respondents. It may be noted that the authorities cited by the respondents are on the point of the powers of the manager of a joint Hindu family. These cases do not deal with the provisions of Order 1, Rule 12 C. P. C. which is as follows : " (1) Where there are more plaintiffs than one, any one or more of them may be authorised by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding; and in like manner, where there are more defendants than one, any one or more of them may be authorised by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding. (2) The authority shall be in writing signed by the party giving it and shall be filed in the court. " Where there are two plaintiffs, one cannot act for the other in the suit without authority in writing of the other, as is provided in Order 1, Rule 12 C. P. C. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 12 cannot be ignored on account of the fact that one of the plaintiffs was the manager of the joint Hindu family and the other was a member of such family. When both, a father and his son, are co-plaintiffs in a suit, each one of them has an authority to act for himself only and unless authority is given by one to the other, one cannot act in the suit for the other. The proposition which is propounded in the authorities cited by the respondents cannot over-ride the express provisions of Order 1, Rule 12 C. P. C. In view of the express provisions of Order 1, Rule 12 it cannot be held that Jodhraj could compromise the suit himself without the consent of the other co-plaintiff. The learned counsel of the respondents has urged that Ratanlal had no interest in the claim put forth on behalf of the plaintiffs in this suit and Jodhraj could therefore enter into a compromise in respect of the entire subject-matter of the suit with the defendants. This contention is based on facts which have not been enquired into by the lower court. We would, therefore, not express any opinion on this aspect of the case and would leave the parties to get the case determined in this respect, if they so desire to do, in the lower court. The compromise which has been entered into could be enforced as between the parties who joined it but the parties who did not join it cannot be bound by it. The decree which has been passed by the learned Civil Judge, therefore, cannot be upheld in so far as the rights of the appellant are concerned. It is therefore set aside and the case is remanded to the court of the Civil Judge, Sikar, with a direction to try the suit as between Ratanlal and the defendants. The question whether the compromise should be acted upon as between the parties who joined it under the circumstances of this case shall also have to be determined by the lower court after allowing the parties an opportunity to put their respective cases before it. The costs of this appeal shall abide the result of the case, in the lower court. .;