WANCHOO, C. J. - (1.) THIS is a civil revision by the State and has arisen in the following circumstances.
(2.) MEHTA Govind Singh opposite party No. 1 had a decree against Sobhag Singh opposite party No. 2, Jagirdar of Nawa, Tehsil Didwana, District Nagaur. MEHTA Govind Singh put this decree in execution on 14th November, 1950. , in the Court of the District Judge at Merta and a receiver was appointed to realise the income of the Jagir. The Receiver realised some amounts and deposited them on various dates in the Court of the District Judge. On the 23rd October, 1951, the then District Judge enquired from the Collector of Nagaur whether any amount was due to Government on account of land revenue and if so the account should be sent to him. It seems that the then District Judge must have made this enquiry because he thought that the money due to Government had to be paid first. In any case, the Collector wrote back on the 1st of December, 1951, that a sum of Rs. 11,666/7/6 was due from the Jagirdar for rekh and chakri lor the Samvat years 2006 and 2007. The matter came up for consideration before the court on 6th December and on that date the Jagirdar said that he would make other arrangement for payment of this amount to Government and that the amount deposited in Court be paid to the creditor. The District Judge, however, ordered the Jagirdar to get a letter from the Collector agreeing to this proposal, of his. No letter from the Collector was, however, received. In the meantime that District Judge was transferred and another District Judge took charge. The matter came before the new Judge and a dispute seems to have arisen whether the amount due to Government as rekh and chakri had to be paid out first, out of the money deposited in Court, or not. The Government Pleader who put in appearance on behalf of the Government took time to submit arguments in support of the Government's case. Eventually arguments were heard on the 17th March, 1952, and the District Judge decided that as there was no decree in favour of the Government about this rekh chakri which was being claimed, be could not pay anything to the Government. It seems that on the same day after this judgment, the decree holder MEHTA Govind Singh took away the money which was deposited in Court. The Govt. Pleader does not seem to have taken steps to request the Court to stay payment for some time to enable the Government to move higher authority in the matter. Two questions arise for determination in this revision. The first is whether the order of the District Judge by which he held that unless there was a decree in favour of the Government nothing could be paid to them out of the income of the Jagir for rekh and chakri dues, is correct or not. It seems that in the lower Court reliance was merely placed on a circular order No. 3021/f-P/l-Jagir, dated 14th May, 1930. The District Judge came to the conclusion that this order stood abrogated because the Code of Civil Procedure was in force in Rajasthan. He applied sec. 73 C. P. C. and held that the Government could not claim priority because it had no decree in its favour with respect to this amount. We must say that the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure was in force in Rajasthan has nothing to do with the question of the abrogation of the order of 1930. At the same time, though the District Judge did not understand the correct position with respect to the order of 1930, there can be no doubt that that order, whatever may have been its value up to the 6th April, 1949, when the present State of Rajasthan was formed, has now no effect as it is not a law or a rule based on any law. We have seen the order which is published in Marwar Gazette of 24th May, 1930, at page 508. By its language, it is a personal order issued by the Vice-President of the State Council at that time. Such an order, whatever may have been its value so long as the former State of Marwar was in existence cannot avail the Government now. But the learned Assistant Government Advocate has drawn our attention to the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 and relies on certain provisions of that Act. It may be pointed out that in the lower Court no argument was based on this Act and there is no reference in the judgment of the District Judge to show that he was even aware that such a law existed. Sec. 4 (iv) of the Act defines "land revenue" as any sum payable to the Government on account of an estate or survey number and includes rekh chakri and bhombab. In the present case as the amount was due from the Jagirdar for rekh and chakri it was obviously "land revenue". Sec. 108 provides as follows: "in the case of (every mahal, the revenue assessed thereon shall be the first charge on the entire mahal and on the rents, profits or produce thereof. The rents, profits or produce of a mahal shall not be applied in satisfaction of a decree or order of any Civil Court until all arrears of the revenue due in respect of the mahal have been paid. " This is a very clear provision which gives the State first charge on the rents, profits or produce of every mahal. Further it is specifically provided that the rents, profits or produce of a mahal shall not be applied in satisfaction of a decree of a Civil Court until all arrears of the revenue due in respect of the mahal have been paid. Sec. 115 provides the method for realising the land revenue and gives power to the Deputy Commissioner to attach and sell movable property of the Jagirdar. Taking these two provisions together it is clear that it is not necessary for the State to get a decree for arrears of revenue due to it from any court. As soon as the revenue falls due, the Deputy Commissioner or the Collector has the power to attach the movable property of the defaulter. There are other powers also which the Deputy Commissioner or the Collector has for realising the land revenue, but we are not concerned with them in this case. It was, therefore, open to the Collector to attach the money realised by the Receiver from the tenants of the Jagir even though it might have been lying in the civil court and it is the duty of the civil court on receiving an order of attachment from the duty of the civil court on receiving an order of attachment from the Collector to pay the amount up to the extent of the land revenue due to the Government. Further under the second part of sec. 108 the civil court is forbidden from utilising the rents, profits or produce of a mahal to satisfy any decree until the arrears of land revenue due in respect of the mahal have been paid. These provisions are so clear that we feel that if they had been brought to the notice of the District Judge or had been within his knowledge, he would not have passed the order which he did. In any case, the order giving away the money to the decree holder in the face of the prohibition contained in the second part of sec. 108 was clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the District Judge, or at any rate it was a material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. This brings us to the second question namely, whether the State can come to this Court and ask for redress under sec. 115 C. P. C. and whether in the circumstances of this case we should intervene in favour of the State. The argument on behalf of the decree-holder opposite party is that the State was no party to the execution proceedings in the Court of District Judge, and as such it has no locus standi to come to this Court in revision. We find, however, that the words of sec. 115 are of very general nature and the jurisdiction is conferred on this Court to interfere in appropriate cases. There is further, no indication in sec. 115 as to how the matter would be brought to the notice of the Court. There is no provision in that section to the effect that that jurisdiction is to be exercised on the application of a party and not otherwise. It has been held in a number of cases in other High Courts that such jurisdiction can be exercised in appropriate cases without even an application by the parties, though this will be done rarely. In Samasundaram Pillai Vs. Muthumanicka Nadar (1) (A. I. R. 1932 Mad. 714) it was held that the High Court was entitled in a proper case to interfere in revision even without an application to it by the party interested. Reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in Andrew Anthony Vs. Dupat (2) (I. L. R. IV Mad. 217.) where with reference to sec. 622 of the old Civil Procedure Code, which corresponded to sec. 115 now, the following observations were made: "the High Court can interfere under sec. 622 of the Code without an application made to it by a party to the suit". In Mst. Jaimala Kunwar Vs. Collector of Saharanpur (3) (A. I. R. 1934 All. 4.) the following observations appear at page 6: "the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court need not he invoked by the party and it may be exercised by the High Court of its own accord. " In Percy Wood Vs. Mrs. Samuel (4) (A. I. R. 1943 Nag. 333.) the following observations were made by Bose J. at page 334: "also under sec. 115, C. P. C. it is not necessary for a party to apply. Any person can bring any irregularity to the notice of the Court. It is true that the court will very seldom act unless the aggrieved party comes before it, but its power to do so is undoubted. " It is, therefore, in our opinion open to this Court to interfere in revision on the application of the State even though the State was not a party to the execution proceedings in the Court of the District Judge because the order passed vitally affects the interests of the State and as pointed out by Bose J. in the Nagpur case (4) a general and very important principle is involved.
(3.) WE, therefore, hold that in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the revision is entertain able even though filed by the State which was not a party to the execution proceedings. The next question then is whether we should interfere, considering that we have come to the conclusion that the order of the District Judge was patently wrong. We find two circumstances which make us hesitate to interfere at this state. The first is that the matter was not properly put on behalf of the State before the District Judge. As we have pointed out, it is very likely that if the provisions of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949, had been brought to the notice of the District Judge, he would not have passed the order which he did and in so far as this was not done, there was negligence on behalf of the State. In the second place, no steps were taken on behalf of the State to see that the money was not taken away from the Court. It was possible for the Government Pleader to apply to the District Judge to give him time and hold back the money so that he might ascertain whether the Government would like to go to a higher authority against the order of the District Judge. No such steps were taken and the money was allowed to be taken away by the decree-holder that very day. In the circumstances we feel that there will be a lot of complication if we set aside the order of the District Judge, even though it is wrong. It may be added that it is always possible for the Government to realise the land revenue because the Jagir is still there and they can attach it if any money remains due. The Government, therefore, does not stand to lose very much even if the order is not set aside in this case so long as the law is made clear for the future. With these remarks we, therefore, dismiss the revision. Considering the circumstances of the case we order parties to bear their own costs. .;