BAPNA, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the decree-holder in execution proceedings.
(2.) THE appellants obtained a decree for 1706. 4. 6 on 15th January, 1932 against one Ram Richhpal. Ramrichhpal having died, the appellants sought execution of the decree against his legal representatives and attached certain house property left by the deceased judgment-debtor in the hands of the respondents on 26th January, 1947. THE respondents filed an objection that they were agriculturists and the building attached by the decree-holders was being used for purposes of advancing agriculture. The trial court accepted the objection and released the property from attachment and the same judgment was upheld on appeal. Learned counsel for the decree-holders appellants argued that it had not been alleged or proved that Ramrichhpal, who was the original judgment-debtor and who undoubtedly the owner of the property sought to be attached was an agriculturist and therefore exemption from attachment mentioned in sec. 60 (l) (c) C. P. C. could not be allowed to the respondents. It was conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that on the material on record there was no proof that Ramrichhpal was an agriculturist. The main point for determination which, therefore, remains is whether a house or other building belonging to a judgment-debtor who was not an agriculturist becomes exempt in the hands of his successors who are agriculturists under sec. 60 (1) (c) C. P. C. On this question judicial opinion is divided. In Girwardayal vs. Narain Singh (1) (A. I. R. 1928 All. 211-2.) Ashworth J. relying on Radha Kishan Hokumji vs. Balwant Ramji (2) (I. L. R. VII Bom. T30) held that the sons of a deceased judgment-debtor occupying the house to be attached as agriculturist are entitled to the exemption allowed by sec. 60 (1) (c) C. P. C. without proving that their father who was the original judgment-debtor occupied the house as an agriculturist. The Allahabad case is however distinguishable as the decree was passed against the sons after the death of their father and they were the judgment-debtors themselves. The Bombay case relied upon by Ashworth J. is also distinguishable as not only the son who was occupying the house at the time of attachment was an agriculturist but this lather who was the original judgment-debtor had also occupied the house as an agriculturist and the point for determination in that case was whether the exemption ceased after the judgment-debtor, and it was held that as the son was also an agriculturist and came to occupy the property of his father who was an agriculturist he was entitled to the protection afforded by sec. 60 (1) (c) C. P. C. The other case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is Badri Chandan vs. Raja Indrajit Pertab Bahadur Sahib (3) (A. I. R. 1932 All. 508.) in which certain observations have been made which support the respondents but the case can again be distinguished. The decree was passed against Badri as legal representative of his father Ramjas. The house belonged to a joint Hindu family consisting of Ramjas and Badri while the decree was passed against the assets of Ramjas in the hands of Badri. It was held that the property being owned by the joint Hindu Family of which Badri was also a member the occupation of Badri was to be considered and not that of his father Reliance was placed on Girwardayal vs. Narainsingh (1) and Radhakishan Hokumji vs. Balwant Ramji (2) which have already been distinguished. The other view is to be found in Dhaniram vs. District Official Receiver, Amritsar (4) (A. I. R. 1943 Lah. 19-F. B.) in which it is held that in order to claim exemption as an agriculturist under sec. 60, the status of the judgment-debtor has to be seen and not that of his legal representatives. It is not necessary to deal with the previous Lahore cases relied on by learned counsel as this Lahore case is a Full Bench case. Apart from these decisions, the language of sec. 60 indicates that the word "agriculturist", in sec. 60 (1) (c) C. P. C. refers to the judgment-debtor. Under sub-sec. (1) after mentioning certain classes of property which are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree it is said that all other saleable property belonging to the judgment-debtor is liable to attachment and sale save as mentioned, in the subsequent parts. The exemptions which follow can only purport to refer to the property of the judgment-debtor according to the plain reading of the section. Sec. 60 in the first place provides for attachment of all the property of the judgment-debtor and mentions the exemptions. The exemptions are therefore to be strictly constructed. Now if the property which belongs to the judgment-debtor is not exempt, it would not become so by any subsequent act of the legal representative, who takes the property, subject to the liability to pay the debts of the predecessor. The appeal is therefore accepted, the orders of the lower courts granting exemption from attachment are set aside and the objection made by the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor, who are respondents in this appeal, is dismissed. The objectors-respondents will pay costs of the appeal to the appellants. . ;