Wanchoo, C.J. - (1.) THIS is an application by Dholpur Co -operative Transport and Multi -purpose Union Ltd., under Art., 226, Constitution of India against the Appellate Authority, Rajasthan and Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur, and three others.
(2.) THE application is verbose, ill -drafted, contains a lot of irrelevant matter, and is in every way what an application under Art. 226, should not be. We would like to point out that an application under Art. 226, should be concise and to the point, should clearly indicate the facts on which it is based and the grounds on which the relief is sought and the nature of the relief desired, with due realization of the position that this Court is not a court of revision or appeal under that article. We would like to sound a note of warning that such ill -drafted petitions containing so much irrelevant matter may in future be dismissed on that very ground. We find considerable difficulty in setting out the case for the applicant concisely on the basis of this application. However, the case of the applicants, as we have understood it to be, and as it was put in the arguments, appears to be that the applicant is a limited company desirous of running buses on the Dholpur -Agra route. A notification was issued by the Transport Commissioner, Jaipur, on 7 -7 -1951, inviting fresh applications for stage carriage permits on this route. There were 50 applicants for permits, and the names of these applicants were published as required by law, in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated 15 -9 -1951. The present applicant's name does not appear in this list. The applicant Company was apparently formed in October, 1951, and 12 persons, who were among the 50 applicants and who had formed this Company, applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur that permits may be issued in the name of the applicant company instead of in their individual names. The matter came up for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority on 26 -10 -1951, and four permits were granted to the Dholpur Motor Transport Association, opposite party No. 5, while two permits were granted in the applicant's name. No permits were granted to Sat Narain Singh, opposite party No. 3, and Khazan Singh, opposite party No. 4. Satnarain Singh is said to have applied for a permit, but Khazansingh is said to have not applied at all. No representation is said to have been made to the Regional Transport Authority against any of the 50 applicants. There was then an appeal by Satnarainsingh to the Appellate Authority, and it was prayed that a permit should have been granted to him, and that no permit should have been granted to The present applicant, Khazansingh also filed an appeals His case appears to have been that he was a partner in the Dholpur Motor Transport Association, and that Association had so manoeuvred matters that out of its five buses, the one, in which Khazansingh had a share, was not included in the four permits issued to it. These appeals were decided by the Appellate Authority on 30 -7 -1952. We are not concerned with the nature of that order for present purposes. Suffice it to say that the applicant as well as the Dholpur Motor Transport were dissatisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority, and made applications under Art. 226 to this Court. After hearing parties, this Court quashed the order of the Appellate Authority, and the judgment is reported in - 'Dholpur Co -operative Transport and Multipurposes Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (Transport), Rajasthan', : AIR 1953 Raj 193 (A). The main ground on which the applications were allowed was that the Appellate Authority was not properly constituted, and had therefore, no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It was also directed that the appeal of Satnarain Singh and Khazansingh should be disposed of by a duly constituted Appellate Authority In accordance with the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules thereunder. It appears that thereafter R. 78 of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act was amended so that the constitution of the Appellate Authority may be according to law and rules. Thereafter, the two appeals came up for decision by the reconstituted Appellate Authority, though the individuals composing the tribunal were still the same. The Appellate Authority allowed the two appeals on 28 -1 -1953 and granted one permit; each to Satnarainsingh and Khazansingh, and cancelled the two permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority to the applicant. Thereafter, the present application was made by the applicant.
(3.) WE shall now briefly indicate the grounds on which the order of the Appellate Authority is being challenged before us. These grounds are: (1) that the rules framed under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Ordinance No. 14 of 1950 on 30 -3 -1951, which are still in force with such amendments as might have been made later are all invalid as they were not placed before the Legislature as required by s. 133(3), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which came into force in Rajasthan on 1 -4 -1951 by the Part B States (Laws) Act (No. 3) of 1951. In particular it is urged that the amendment of R. 76, which was made after the Legislature had come into existence in Rajasthan in March, 1952, was invalid, as it was not put before the Legislature as required by S. 133(3). It was, therefore, urged that the appellate authority, which decided the two appeals, was still not properly constituted, and had therefore no jurisdiction to hear the appeals in 1953; (2) that the order of the Appellate Authority is mala fide; (3) that there was no proper appeal, at any rate, of Khazansingh before the Appellate Authority, and it had no jurisdiction to grant any relief to him. This was because Khazansingh had not applied for permit and his appeal was, in any case, beyond limitation; (4) that the Appellate Authority had no right to cancel the permits of the applicant when there was only an appeal under S. 64(a), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, before it, and no appeal under S. 64(f); (5) that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record, and, therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority should be quashed; and (6) that the Appellate Authority, in so far as it based its decisions on grounds which were irrelevant and extraneous to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules thereunder, exceeded its jurisdiction and its order is liable to be quashed.;