WANCHOO, C.J. - (1.) THIS is an application by Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multi-purpose Union Ltd. under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India against the Appellate Authority, Rajasthan and Regional Transport Authority. Jaipur, and three others.
(2.) THE application is verbose, ill-drafted, contains a lot of irrelevant matter, and is in every way what an application under Art. 226 should not be. We would like to point out that an application under Art. 226 should be concise and to the point, should clearly indicate the facts on which it is based and the grounds on which the relief is sought and the nature of the relief desired, with due realization of the position that this Court is not a court of revision or appeal under that Article. We would like to sound a note of warning that such ill-drafted petitions containing so much irrelevant matter may in future be dismissed on that very ground. We find considerable difficulty in setting out the case for the applicant concisely on the basis of this application. How* ever, the case of the applicant, as we have understood it to be, and as it was put in the arguments, appears to be that the applicant is a limited company desirous of running buses on the Dholpur-Agra route. A notification was issued by the Transport Commissioner, Jaipur, on the 7th July, 1951, inviting fresh applications for stage carriage permits on this route. THEre were 50 applicants for permits, and the names of these applicants were published as required by law, in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated 15th September, 1951. THE present applicant's name does not appear in this list. THE applicant Company was apparently formed in October, 1951, and 12 persons, who were among the 50 applicants and who had formed this Company, applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur that permits may be issued in the name of the applicant company instead of in their individual names. THE matter came up for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority on the 26th of October, 1951, and four permits were granted to the Dholpur Motor Transport Association, opposite party No. 5, while two permits were granted in the applicant's name. No permits were granted to Sat Narain Singh, opposite party No. 3, and Khazan Singh, opposite party No. 4 Satnarain Singh is said to have applied for a permit, but Khazansingh is said to have not applied at all. No representation is said to have been made to the Regional Transport Authority against any of the 50 applicants. THEre was then an appeal by Satnarain Singh to the Appellate Authority, and it was prayed that a permit should have been granted to him and that no permit should have been granted to the present applicant. Khazan Singh also filed an appeal. His case appears to have been that he was a partner in the Dholpur Motor Transport Association, and that Association had so manoeuvred matters that out of its five houses, the one, in which Khazansingh had a share, was not included in the four permits issued to it. THEse appeals were decided by the Appellate Authority on the 30th July, 1952. We are not concerned with the nature of that order for present purpose. Suffice it to say that the applicant as well as the Dholpur Motor Transport were dissatisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority, and made applications under Art. 226 of this court. After hearing parties, this Court quashed the order of the Appellate Authority and the judgment is reported in 1953 Rajasthan Law Weekly, 324. THE main ground on which the applications were allowed was that the Appellate Authority was not properly constituted, and had therefore, no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It was also directed that the appeal of Satnarain Singh and Khazansingh should be disposed of a duly constituted Appellate Authority in accordance with the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules thereunder. It appears that thereafter rule 76 of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act was amended so that the constitution of the Appellate Authority may be according to law and rules. Thereafter, the two appeals came up for decision by the reconstituted Appellate Authority, though the individuals composing the tribunal were still the same. The Appellate Authority allowed the two appeals on 29.1.1953 and granted one permit each to Satnarain Singh and Khazansingh, and cancelled the two permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority to the applicant. Thereafter the present application made by the applicant. We shall now briefly indicate the grounds on which the order of the Appellate Authority is being challenged before us. These grounds are : - (1) that the rules framed under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Ordinance No. XIV of 1950 on the 30th March, 1951, which are still in force with such amendments as might have been made later are all invalid as they were not placed before the legislature as required by sec. 133(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which came into force in Rajasthan on 1st of April, 1951 by the Part B States (Laws) Act (No. III) of 1951. In particular it is urged that the amendment of rule 76, which was made after the legislature had came into existence in Rajasthan in March, 1952, was invalid, as it was not put before the legislature as required sec. 133(3). It was therefore, urged that the Appellate Authority, which decided the two appeals, was still not properly constituted, and had therefore no jurisdiction to heir the appeals in 1953; (2) that the order of the Appellate Authority is mala fide; (3) that there was no proper appeal, at any rate, of Khazansingh before the Appellate Authority, and it had no jurisdiction to grant any relief to him. This was because Khazansingh had not applied for permit and his appeal was, in any case, beyond limitation; (4) that the Appellate Authority had no right to cancel the permits of the applicant when there was only an appeal under sec. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, before it, and no appeal under sec. 64(f); (5) that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record, and therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority should be quashed; and (6) that the appellate Authority, in so far as it based its decision on grounds which were irrelevant and extraneous to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules thereunder, exceeded its jurisdiction and its order is liable to be quashed. It was, therefore, prayed: - (1) that a writ of prohibition may be issued to the Regional Transport Authority not to cancel the permit of the applicant to buses; (2) that a writ of prohibition may be issued to that Appellate Authority and the Regional Transport Authority ordering them not to prohibit the applicant from plying the two motor buses on the Dholpur-Agra route; (3) that the Appellate Authority and the Regional Transport Authority may be prohibited from issuing any permits to Satnarainsingh and Khazansingh in pursuance of the order of the Appellate Authority, dated 28th of January, 1953, and if such permits have already been issued to Satnarainsingh and Khazansingh, they may be prohibited from plying their buses on the said route, (4) that a writ of certiorari may be issued quashing the proceeding and the order passed by the Appellate Authority on the 28th of January, 1953. (5) that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Appellate Authority to decide the two appeals according to law and rules. Finally it was prayed that any other writ, order or direction, which may be appropriate, may be granted. The application was opposed by the Appellate Authority, as well as by the Regional Transport Authority, and also by Satnarainsingh and Khazan Singh. Their reply to the various points raised by the applicant is this: - (1) The rule framed under the Motor Vehicles Act on the 30th March, 1951, were valid when they were framed, and it was not necessary to place them before the legislature when it came into existence in March, 1952, As for the amendment of rule 76, it was laid on table of the legislature on the 25th February, 1953, in accordance with the provisions of sec. 133(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1949. (2) The order of the Appellate Authority was not mala fide and was passed in due course, (3) This question cannot be raised on an application under Art. 226 as the Appellate Authority full jurisdiction to decide whether Khazansingh was entitled to it and whether his appeal was within limitation, (4) The Appellate Authority had full powers to pass such orders as seemed proper to it on an appeal under sec. 64 (a), (5) There is no such error apparent on the record as would justify this Court in interfering by a writ of certiorary. (6) In the first place, the Appellate Authority did not take into account any irrelevant or extraneous matter, and, in any case, even if some such matter has been considered, it does not vitiate the order of the Appellate Authority, and this Court should not interfer in its extraordinary jurisdiction, if, on the whole, the order appears to be based on considerations relevant to the law and rules. We shall first consider whether the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance No. XIV of 1950, which came into force from 30th March, 1951, were valid, even though they were not placed before the Legislature when it met, for the first time, in March, 1952. The Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Ordinance did not contain any provision corresponding to sec. 133(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The rules, therefore, which were framed on the 30th March 1951, were not required to be placed before any legislature. The contention of the applicant is that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 came into force from the 1st April, 1951, in Rajasthan and sec. 133(3) of the Act requires that all rules made under it by the Central Government or by any State Government shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Central or State Legislature, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modification as Parliament or such Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. Therefore, the rules, which were made on the 30th March, 1951, should have been laid before the State legislature when it met, for the first time, in March, 1952. The reply to this contention is, in our opinion, simple. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, has been applied to Rajasthan by the Part B States (Laws) Act (No III) of 1951. Sec. 6 of the Act provides for repeal of corresponding law in Part B States. Proviso second to sec. 6 of that Act provides that anything done, or any action taken (including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation form, bye-law or scheme framed, certificate obtained, patent, permit or licence granted or regulation effected) under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Act or Ordinance as now extended to that State, and shall continue to be in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the said Act or Ordinance- Therefore, the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 continued in force the rules which had been made in Rajasthan on the 30th March, 1951, and these rules were to remain in force unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was, therefore, in our opinion, unnecessary to place these rules, which had already been passed on the 30th March, 1951, and which were continued by the Part B State (Laws) Act at a time when there was no duly constituted legislature in Rajasthan and legislative power vested in the Rajpramukh under Art. 385 of the Constitution, before the legislature which met, for the first time, in Rajasthan in March, 1952. It is true that the proviso says that the rules will be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, those corresponding provisions being contained in secs. 21, 41, 68, 70, 91 and 111 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The proviso, in our opinion, did not require that the rules should be placed before the legislature in Rajasthan when it came into existence in March, 1952, for sec. 133(3) was a new provision which became applicable to Rajasthan, for the first time, on the 1st April, and would apply to all rules framed after that date, and not to rules which were deemed to have been framed under the corresponding provision of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, by virtue of the proviso to sec. 6 of the part B States (Laws) Act. Therefore, all those rules, which are in existence since the 30th March, 1951, and have not been amended after the 1st April, 1951, did not require to be placed before the legislature. We are, however, particularly concerned with rule 76, and that has certainly been amended after the 1st April, 1951, The amendment in rule 76 certainly required to be placed before the legislature under sec. 33(3), and find from the reply of the Appellate Authority that the amendment in question was placed before the legislature on the 25th of February, 1953. It is nowhere the applicant's case that the amendment of rule 76 was not placed before the legislature as soon as possible after it was made and for the requisite period of 14 days. Under these circumstances the amendment of rule 76 by which the Appellate Authority was reconstituted, cannot be said to be invalid on this ground, We now come to the second contention, namely that the order of the Appellate Authority is mala fide, and as such is no order in law and must be set aside. In that connection, the applicant made certain allegations against the chairman of the Appellate Authority in paragraph 44 (4) of the petition. These allegations have been traversed by two affidavits filed by Shri Kishorilal who was one of the members of the Appellate Authority which heard the two appeals on the 28th January, 1953. In view of these affidavits, we are not prepared to hold that the order in question was mala fide. In any case, the allegations are only against the Chairman of the Appellate Authority, and not against the other two members, and there is, therefore, no reason for holding that the order of the Appellate Authority mala fide. We may add that we are not disposed to place any reliance even on the allegations made against the Chairman of the Appellate Authority. The next point is whether there was a proper appeal by Khazansingh, and whether the appeal filed by him was barred by limitation. This raises the question of the extent of our jurisdiction to interfere with the order of a tribunal by a writ of certiorari. The scope of our authority in the matter of issuing writs of certiorari has now been settled by an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court in Ebrahim Aboobakar vs. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi (1) (AIR 1952 S.C. 219.). In that case the jurisdiction of the Custodian General was challenged by a writ of certiorari, and it was contended that no court of limited jurisdiction could give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit of its jurisdiction depended, and that the questions involved in the appeal were collateral to the merits of the case. What are collateral matters and what are not was considered in Reg. vs. Income-tax Commissioners (1882-21 Q.B.D., 313, by Lord Esher M.R. and the following observations are of great value : - "When an inferior court, tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of fact exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things but otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists, as well as the jurisdiction on finding that it does exist to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." In every case, therefore, it has to be seen whether the decision, which is challenged by a writ of certiorari, is on a point collateral to the merits of the case or a part of the very issue which a lower court has to enquire into. If it is the former, certiorary will lie; but if it is the latter, certiorari will not be granted (vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edition, volume 9, paragraph 1485. p. 881). The question whether the matter is collateral or part of the very issue in the case depends upon the powers granted to the tribunal by the legislature. If the powers granted are of the second kind mentioned in Lord Esher's observations, the tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide the matter and it will not be collateral. The Supreme Court considered the power granted to the Custodian General by sec. 24 of the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and after quoting the section observed as follows at pages 322-323: - "Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts. Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of preliminary issue by the parties. Jurisdiction is inherent in its very constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether a party has 'locus standi' to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is form one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within class 2 of the classification of the Master of the Rolls." It was held that the Custodian General was a tribunal which came in class 2 and his decision could not be challenged on the ground that a wrong finding was arrived at on a question of collateral fact, though, of course, if there was violation of the principles of natural justice, or an error of law apparent on the fact of the record or a clear excess of jurisdiction certiorary may still issue. Let us now look into the powers of the Appellate Authority as given by the legislature. These are contained in sec. 64. That section merely prescribes that any person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the Regional Authority an opportunity of being heard. These words, are in our opinion, of the same amplitude as the words of sec. 24 of the Evacuee Property Act conferring powers of appeal on the Custodian General, Rule 108 provides for appeals against orders of the Regional Transport Authority, and prescribes the period within which the appeal has to be filed, and the manner in which it shall be filed. Reading sec. 64 with rule 108 the conclusion is obvious that the Appellate Authority has the widest power and comes within the second class of tribunals envisaged in the observations of Lord Esher M. R., which we have already quoted. We are, therefore, of opinion that Ebrahim Aboobakar's case (1) (AIR 195 S.C. 319.) applies with full force to the case before us so far as the powers of the Appellate Authority are concerned and the Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to determine questions of limitation, and locus standi, and we cannot interfere with their decision on a writ of certiorari. It is not the applicant's case that any principles of natural justice were violated by the Appellate Authority. We shall consider later whether there are errors of law apparent on the record to enable us to issue a writ of certiorary; but so far as the locus standi of Khazansingh and the question of limitation with reference to his appeal are concerned, these were within the powers of the Appellate Authority to decide, and we cannot question that decision, even though it may be wrong, by a writ of certiorary. In view of the decision in Aboobakar's case(l) these cannot be called collateral matters on which the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority depended. There is no force in this point either. The next point is whether the Appellate Authority, while allowing the appeals of Satnarainsingh and Khazansingh under sec. 64(a) acted within their jurisdiction in cancelling the permits of the applicants or whether their order cancelling the permits of the applicants was in excess of their jurisdiction. There are as many as seven clauses in sec. 64 under which a right of appeal arises. Of these clauses (a) and (f) are relevant for our purposes, and may be put down here. Any person (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the Provincial or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or (f) being a local authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority. The contention of the applicant is that there was no appeal before; the Transport Authority under clause (f), the two appeals being only under clause(a), and, therefore, the Appellate Authority, while dealing with an appeal under clause(a), could not cancel permits which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority. It is not seriously challenged that there was no appeal under sec. 64(f) before the Appellate Authority and that the two appeals before it were only under sec. 64(a). The question, that falls for determination, is whether, on an appeal under sec. 64(a), the Appellate Authority has the power to cancel the permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority, and in their place substitute order permits granted to other persons by itself. The answer is a matter of some difficulty, particularly as in most cases the number of permits to be issued on a particular route is limited under sec. 48(a). In the case before us, it has been agreed between the Dhol-pur and Agra authorities that six permits on the Dholpur Agra route will be granted by the Dholpur Authorities (which means the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur) and six by the Agra Authorities. Another difficulty, which arises, is that the section does not lay down the nature of order which the Appellate Authority will pass in appeal. It may be argued, because the nature of the order in appeal is not prescribed, that the Appellate Authority may pass any order which it considers just and proper. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that sec. 64 has seven clauses dealing with specific grievances which give rise to appeal, and it should be clear that the order of the Appellate Authority must have reference to the grievance put before it. For example, sec. 64(b) provides for appeal by a person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit granted to him. Now in such an appeal the Appellate Authority would have the power only to set aside the revocation or suspension, and it can hardly be contended that it would have, while setting aside the revocation or suspension, the power to revoke or cancel some other person's permit. Therefore, if the power of the Appellate Authority to give relief is circumscribed by the clause under which the appeal is filed, and this appears to us to be evident, the question arises whether, on an appeal under clause (a) the permit of some other person can be cancelled. A person appealing under the first part of clause (a) merely appeals against the refusal of a permit to him. He does not appeal against the grant of a permit to somebody else. The right to appeal against the grant of a permit to somebody else is contained in clause (f) and is limited only to (i) a local authority, or (ii) police authority, or (iii) an association which, or (iv) a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grantee thereof. Now supposing there was no opposition by any of these four to the grant of permits to the numerous applicants who always apply for such permits,and further suppose that one out of new applicants is granted a permit, while one of the persons, who was providing transport facilities previously, does not get it; can this person, not having opposed the grant of a permit to the new applicant and thus not being entitled to appeal under clause (f), say that, because he has appealed under clause (a) for refusal of a permit to him, the permit granted to the new entrant should be cancelled in order to find a place far him in the list of permit holders, taking it for granted that the number of such permits is strictly limited. Put this way, the answer to our mind seems clear. If the person has no right of appeal under sec. 64(f), it seems unfair that he should get by an appeal under sec. 64(a) what he could no get because of the fact that he had no right of appeal under sec. 64(f). It seems to us therefore, that by an appeal under sec. 64(a). The Appellate Authority can only consider whether the refusal of the permit to the appellant was correct or not. If it comes to the conclusion that the refusal was correct, if will dismiss the appeal. On the other hand, if it comes to the conclusion that the refusal was in-correct, it will allow the appeal and grant him a permit. But there can be no difficulty in holding that on an appeal under clause (a) of sec.64, it has no further authority to cancel somebody else's permit, because the number of permits to be granted is strictly limited, and the Appellate Authority decides to set aside the order of the Regional Authority and grant a permit to the appellant. In such circumstances, the course open to the Appellate Authority is to grant one more permit to the person appealing, if it thinks that the permit has been wrongly refused to the appellant.
(3.) IT may be urged that this view unduly limits the powers of the Appellate Authority under sec. 64(a) and makes it impossible for it to grant relief in a case in which a relief should be granted, particularly if it is also of the view that the number of permits should not be increased. This difficulty is no doubt there. IT seems to us however that if those applying for permits want to lay a foundation for the Appellate Authority to interfere by cancellation of permits which might be granted by the Regional Transport Authority it is their duty, if they are entitled to object under clause (f) to do so, and thus create a right of appeal under clause (f). If such right of appeal has been created by an objection being taken by any person, there will be material before the Appellate Authority to decide whether a particular permit granted to a particular man should be cancelled. But if no such foundation has been laid, there will generally speaking be no ground before the Appellate Authority to decide whose permit to cancel in order to give relief to an appellant under sec. 64(a). IT may be accepted that when there is an appeal before the Appellate Authority under sec. 64(a), the whole matter may be open for its consideration, provided a foundation has been laid by an objection of the nature specified in clause (f) before the Regional Authority. If such foundation has been laid, the mere fact that an appeal has been made under sec. 64(a) will not preclude the Appellate Authority from going into the entire matter. But if no such foundation has been laid, and no one has objected to the grant of a permit to any of the applicant, then it seems to us that the Appellate Authority in an appeal under sec. 64(a) can only consider the question of grant of a permit to the appellant before it and cannot cancel the permit granted to some other person. The conclusion, therefore, to which we arrive at, is that where an appeal has been made under clause (a) against the refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority will generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but will not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by clause (f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. If such objection has been made then it does not matter whether that particular person appeals or not. In such a case, on an appeal under sec. 64(a), the Appellate Authority may consider the objection of the nature specified in clause (f) before the Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter. The same applies to the other clauses of sec. 64. We are supported in this view to a certain extent; by a decision of the Madras High Court in Nadar Transports Tiruchirapalli vs. The State of Madras (1) (AIR 1952 Nag., 353.). We feel that we cannot go further than what has been decided in that case as to the limits of the powers of the Appellate Authority on an appeal under sec. 64(a). In the case before us it is not in dispute that no one made any objection to the grant of a permit to anybody before the Regional Transport Authority. Under these circumstances, no foundation was laid for an appeal of the nature specified in clause (f). The Appellate Authority, therefore, could grant relief to the appellants before it by giving them permits, but could not cancel permits granted to others, and in so far as it did so, it clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. It may be said that in this case, by an inter-state agreement, the Dholpur authorities can only grant six permits. That only means that the Dholpur authorities can grant six permits for buses plying from Dholpur right up to Agra ; but they can certainly grant permits from Dholpur up to the border of the State of Rajasthan and leave it to Satnarain Singh and Khazan Singh to get their permits countersigned under sec. 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Agra Authorities. Relief could therefore,, be granted by the Regional Transport Authority to Satnarain Singh and Khazan Singh to this extent only in the circumstances of this case, and the Appellate Authority could not cancel the permits of the applicants. The next point that is urged is that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and therefore the order of the Appellate Authority should be quashed. Before we consider whether there is an error of law apparent on the record in this case, it is well to define the scope of this expression. The meaning of this expression is well settled, and the error of law envisaged should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was error. Where two views are, however, possible, or where the decision as to whether there is error of law can only be arrived at after long arguments such error cannot be called error of law apparent on the record. Only those errors of law, which are patent on the face of the record, can form the basis of interference in certiorari. This has been made clear in two cases of this court, namely Nanagram vs. Ghinsilal (1) (1952 RLW 29.) and Shriniwas vs. Collector, Sawai Jaipur(2) (1952 RLW 117.). The view taken in this Court is supported by the decisions of the Bombay High Court in K. P. Mushran vs. B. C. Patil(3) and Batuk K. Vyas vs. Surat Borough Municipality (4). In Mushran's case (3) (AIR 1952 Bom. 235.) the following observations appear at p. 241 - "The error of law which can be considered to be apparent on the face of the record is not an error which can be pointed out to the superior court after a long and elaborate argument. It has often said that a court of jurisdiction may decide wrongly in law and yet the superior court will not interfere with its decision. But the error of law contemplated is an error so patent, so manifest, that the superior court will not permit the subordinate court to come to a decision in the face of a clear ignorance or disregard of a provision of law. If a section of a statute is clearly misconstrued, or if a provision of the law is overlooked or not applied, and that appears from the judgment of the lower court itself, then the superior court may interfere by a writ of certiorari." In Vyas's case(4) (AIR 1953 Bom 133.), it was urged that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record in as much as R. 17(4) which was framed under sec. 58 of the Municipal Boroughs Act was ultra vires of the Municipality. The following observations at p. 137 show clearly the extent and scope of the words ferror apparent on the face of the record' - "It is difficult to understand how this is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Even assuming that there is force in the argument advanced by Mr. Phadke, the mere fact that two views are possible on a question of law does not make the decision of a Tribunal with jurisdiction bad on the ground that it has erred in law and the error is apparent on the face of the record. We have had occasion several times to point out that only that error will be corrected by this court which is clearly apparent on the face of the record and which does not become apparent only by a process of examination or arguments " It is in this light that we have to examine the contention of the applicant that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. All that has been urged on behalf of the applicant in this connection is that if the judgment of the tribunal is read, certain inconsistencies between one part or another would be found. It is nowhere suggested that the law is enshrined in a particular section or rule, and the Appellate Authority, in any part of its judgment, has clearly misunderstood the obvious import of the law or rule. Even taking it for granted that there is some inconsistency in the argument of the Appellate Authority with respect to various points which it decided, that, in our opinion, cannot be called an error of law apparent on the record. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Authority on this ground. ;