Bela M. Trivedi, J. - (1.) THE present appeal is directed against the order dated 17.1.2013 passed by Additional District Judge No. 13, Jaipur Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court') in civil misc. application no. 322/2012 in civil suit no. 170/2011, whereby the trial court has allowed the application of the respondent no. 1 -plaintiff filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC and has restrained the appellant -defendant & respondent no. 2 from alienating or transferring the suit property. In the instant case, it appears that the respondent no. 1 -plaintiff has filed the suit seeking cancellation of the sale -deed dated 18.11.2006 executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant -defendant. It has been alleged inter -alia that the respondent no. 2 had executed the sale -deed on the basis of a forged power of attorney in respect of the suit property. The respondent no. 1 had also filed an application seeking temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, which has been allowed by the trial court vide the impugned order.
(2.) IT has been sought to be submitted by learned counsel for the appellant -defendant that in view of the provisions contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, there was no necessity for the trial court to grant any injunction. He has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Rameshwar Lal & ors. Vs. Ramkumar & anr. -2010 WLC (Raj.) UC 223 and also the decision of Orissa High Court in the case of Upendranath Singh Vs. Smruti Ranjan Mohanty & ors. - : 2003 (2) CCC 432 (Orissa), in support of his contentions. This Court does not find any substance in the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, inasmuch as having regard to the findings recorded by the trial court, it appears that there are contentious issues involved in the suit as to whether the power of attorney allegedly executed by the respondent no. 1 -plaintiff in favour of the respondent no. 2 was forged one or not; whether the respondent no. 2 could have sold the suit property to the appellant on the basis of such power of attorney or not. Since it has also been alleged that the suit property was joint family property in which the plaintiff had only 1/5 share, the trial court has rightly observed that in order to avoid the further multiplicity of proceedings, the appellant as well as respondent no. 2 who are defendants in the suit, are required to be restrained from alienating or transferring the suit property. There cannot be any disagreement with the proposition of law laid down by this court in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, however they have no application to the facts of the present case. In the said cases, the temporary injunction having been refused by the trial court, this court had observed that there was no illegality committed by the trial court in refusing the temporary injunction as the pendante lite alienation would be covered by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. There is no proposition of law suggested in any of the said cases that in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, no temporary injunction should be granted by the trial courts, as sought to be suggested by Mr. Upman for the appellant. There being no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the trial court, the appeal is sans the substance. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed in limine.;