Mohammad Rafiq, J. - (1.) THIS appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff -Om Prakash against the judgment of the Additional District Judge (FT), No. 1, Karauli at 1.4.2010, who while dismissing the appeal of the appellant confirmed the decree dt. 30.11.2005 passed by the Civil Judge (L.D.), Karauli dismissing the suit filed by him. In the suit, plaintiff has prayed for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the respondents from making any recovery from him as a result of termination of contract for permit fee and royalty on Cheja stone and Morum sand transported in different villages adjoining the town Karauli including the mineral which pass through Naka Mandarayal Road. The contract was awarded for a sum of Rs. 2,12,001/ - per annum. The agreement was executed on 22.4.1994. The period of contract was between 22.4.1994 to 21.4.1995. The appellant started operating contract from 23.4.1994 after taking possession and deposited Rs. 53,000 as security. He was required to deposit Rs. 53,000 every quarter. The appellant deposited the said amount for the period from 22.4.1994 to 21.4.1995. According to the appellant his contract on that date came to an end, whereas the defendants have contended that the award of contract was for a period of two years from 22.4.1994 to 21.4.1996. Plaintiff contended that they had surrendered the contract by written application, whereas according to defendants when the plaintiff failed to deposit the quarterly installments of the first three months of the next year, his contract was terminated by invoking clause 11 of the agreement, forfeiting the security amount of Rs. 53,000 by order dt. 18.1.1996. Prior to termination of contract, 15 days notice was sent to the petitioner on 6.5.1995, which was served upon him on 17.5.1995.
(2.) SHRI R.P. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court erred in law in not accepting the prima facie case of the appellant. The appellant pointed out to the respondents that before the contract was awarded to him, another contract for the permit fee and royalty collection of Cheja stone and Moharrum sand was already given to some other contractor for Bahadurpur area and therefore the appellant could not have collected the royalty for that period in that case. The appellant requested authorities several times to do needful, but assurance was given to him that the amount of contract shall be reduced. Nothing was however done. It was thereafter that the appellant surrendered the contract on 21.4.1995. He could not be required to pay the royalty for the subsequent period. Learned counsel submitted that appeal raises substantial question of law that when the appellant surrendered the contract, would he still be required to pay the royalty amount and whether forfeiture of the security money could be made by the respondents. The trial Court as well as appellate Court have thoroughly analysed the evidence. The trial Court has noted while dealing with the prima facie issue that in fact the contract was cancelled by the respondents when the first installment was not deposited by the appellant. The first notice was served upon the appellant on 6.5.1995 and thereafter another notice of 15 days was given to deposit the outstanding amount. When the appellant failed to comply, the contract was cancelled and the security amount was forfeited on 18.1.1996 and the contract was completely revoked. On his cross examination, plaintiff -appellant admitted that the mineral that is excavated from Bahadurpur area has to pass through Karauli and Naka Mandarayal Road and he used to collect royalty. The learned trial Court has held that a contrary argument cannot be accepted when there is no pleading by the appellant that as to how the mineral excavated from that does not pass through Naka Mandarayal Road. Contention that appellant gave in writing to surrender the contract was not accepted because the appellant failed to prove any receipt of such written application.
(3.) IN the face of above, there is hardly any scope to argue that the present appeal raises any question of law, much less any substantial question of law because those findings are essentially based on questions of fact, which apparently are not perverse or erroneous. I find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.;