P.K. Lohra, J. - (1.) THE petitioner -tenant has laid the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for assailing the part of the order dt. 11th May 2012 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Udaipur (for short, 'the Tribunal') whereby the learned Tribunal has rejected the application of the petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of written statement. By the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has decided two applications submitted on behalf of the petitioner -tenant. The application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for taking additional documents on record was allowed but the application for amendment in the pleadings was declined.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner -tenant Mr. Rajesh Shah has argued that having granted the indulgence to the petitioner -tenant on his application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the learned Tribunal ought to have allowed the amendment in the written statement because those amendments were consequential. Mr. Shah has further submitted that the proposed amendment in the written statement was just and by seeking amendment the petitioner -tenant has made endeavour to place on record certain subsequent events which have definite bearing on the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the amendment prayed for on behalf of the petitioner -tenant was necessary for disproving reasonable bona fide necessary of the respondent -landlord for the disputed premises. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in case of S.J. Ebenzezer vs. Velayudhan & Ors., : AIR 1988 SC 746. The Apex Court in that case while examining the grounds of bona fide need of the landlord and examining the importance of pleading and proof in such proceedings has made following observations in Para 8 of the judgment: 8. It is common fact that the principal ground on which the landlord sought eviction was that the building in his occupation was under immediate threat of acquisition by the Town Planning Authority under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It is again an undisputed fact that in the pleadings the first respondent required the premises in question for his residence and to conduct his 'affairs'. He has not disclosed in the application what those 'affairs' are. However, at the time of giving evidence he has submitted that he required the building for running his business which he is presently running in the premises in his occupation. The business mentioned by the first respondent was that of Travel agency. It is also an admitted fact that the first respondent was running his business in a room in Mascot Hotel. The Rent Controller, who had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witness, has stated as follows: - Even though the applicant would state that he needs the building to conduct his 'affairs' in the application he has not cared to disclose what those 'affairs' are. Nevertheless, at the time of enquiry he has disclosed those 'affairs'. According to him he needs the building for funding his business which is now being run in premises No. 13/1412. His business by way appears to be some travel agency, it would appear from the allegations that he needs this building since the building bearing door number 13/1412 is about to be acquired for some public purpose., Any how at the time of his cross examination he admitted that the Town Planning Scheme for which T.C. 13/1412 is about to be acquired envisages alternate accommodation to those who will be affected by the Scheme. If that be so there is no need to get the disputed building vacated. Probably due to this difficulty that the applicant was forced to sweat in the course of his cross examination that even if the Town planning Scheme does not materialise he had an idea to shift his business from the existing T.C. 13/1412. His evidence shows that he is very often altering his position to suit his convenience as the situation demands. In the cross examination he states that there are practical difficulties in running his business in T.C 13/1412 and so he needs the building involved in these proceedings. He has no such case either in his application or in the evidence adduced by him while being examined by his own counsel. While adverting to the limited powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court in case of S.J. Ebenzezer (supra), has made following observations in Para 16. 16. The above narration of facts is totally incorrect and contrary to the pleadings and evidence. A reading of the order of the High Court will show that it has substituted its view in the place of the view taken by the statutory authority which is not within the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Apart from the above, it is now an admitted fact that the alleged acquisition initiated in the year 1987 must be deemed to have been either given up or lapsed due to efflux of time. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the first respondent -landlord. If this is so, the principal ground on which the application for eviction was presented before the Rent Controller is not available to the landlord. This is yet another ground for allowing this appeal.
(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Shah has also placed reliance on a verdict of Apex Court in Koyilerian Janaki & Ors. vs. Rent Controller (Munsiff), Cannanore & Ors., : (2000) 9 SCC 406. In the said verdict while dealing with the pleadings and the evidence tendered by the landlord, the Apex Court has emphasized the need of the importance of pleading as well as proof and so also the revisional jurisdiction of the District Judge under the Kerala Rent Act. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 2 & 3 of the judgment. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that in the absence of any pleading in the petition and evidence to the effect that the married daughter and son -in -law are dependent on the landlady, the petition filed by the landlady for eviction of appellant was liable to be rejected and the revisional Court acted within its jurisdiction when it set aside the order of the appellate Court. On the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the landlady was required under law to plead and substantiate that her married daughter and the son -in -law for whose occupation the building was required were dependent on her. The relevant portion of Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act is extracted below: 11(3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Language of Section 11(3) of the Act is plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. A perusal of Section 11(3) shows that if the landlord is in bona fide need of the building for occupation by any members of the family dependent on him he may apply to the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant. Thus where eviction of a tenant is sought by a landlord for occupation of any member of his family, the landlord is required to plead and substantiate three ingredients. Firstly, a person for whose need the premises is required is a member of the landlord's family. Secondly, such member of the family is dependent on the landlord and thirdly, there is bona fide need. In the absence of any one of the three ingredients, the petition by a landlord under Sec. 11(3) would fail. In the present case, what we find is that, there was pleading to the effect that the building is needed for the married daughter and son -in -law. However, there is no pleading as regards the fact that the married daughter and the son -in -law are dependent on the landlady. The word "family" has not been defined in the Act. However, for the sake of argument we may assume that the married daughter and son -in -law are members of the landlady's family. In that case the landlady has to further plead and substantiate that they are dependent on her. Unless it is pleaded that the married daughter and the son -in -law are dependent on the landlady, a petition under Sec. 11(3) of the Act cannot succeed on the mere allegation that the building is needed for the occupation of the married daughter and the son -in -law. We are, therefore, of the view that in the absence of any pleading that the married daughter and the son -in -law are dependent on the landlady the appellate Court was not justified in allowing the petition of the landlady on the ground that the landlady bona fide required the building for occupation of her married daughter and son -in -law. 3. Once we are of the view that in the absence of any pleading as regarding one of the ingredients that the married daughter and the son -in -law are dependent on the landlady, the landlady cannot succeed in her petition for eviction of the tenant, the next question that arises is as to whether the learned District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could interfere with the order of the appellate Court. Section 20 of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction on the District Judge. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows: 20(1) In case where the appellate authority empowered under Sec. 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court and in other cases the High Court, may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under Sub -section (1) shall be in its discretion. The aforesaid Section empowers the District Judge in its revisional jurisdiction to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity and propriety of such order of proceedings and pass such order in reference thereto, as it thinks fit. On the wording of Section 20, we cannot hold that the revisional power with the District Judge is limited to the mere question of jurisdiction only. The said power is not akin to the jurisdiction under Sec. 115 CPC. In our view, the District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could go into the legality, regularity or propriety of any order passed by the appellate Court. In fact, the revisional power on the District Judge is of greater amplitude than the power of revision as we find, suffered from legal infirmity and, therefore, the District Judge was justified in setting aside that order. The High Court fell in error in holding that the District Judge has exceeded in his jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the appellate Court. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.;