Vineet Kothari, J. - (1.) HEARD . By the impugned order dated 02.05.2012, the learned trial court of Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 3, Jodhpur, has rejected the defendants/petitioners' application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written -statement, which application was filed by the defendants on 08.07.2011 at the stage of defendants' evidence for which also, number of opportunities had already granted to the defendants.
(2.) MR . Narendra Thanvi, learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Rehman & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Raldu & Ors. reported in : 2013 DNJ (SC) 75 and in the case of Vallala Yashodha Vs. Vallala Naga Venkata Laxmi & Ors. reported in : 2013 (2) CCC 352 (A.P.) submitted that amendment ought to have been allowed in the larger interest since the change in the nature of relief does not change the character of the suit. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of reasons given in para 4 of the impugned order that the facts sought to brought on record by way of amendment application, were already within the knowledge of the petitioners/defendants and the statement of defendants' witnesses have already recorded, on which, they were cross -examined by the plaintiffs' counsel. Therefore, at this stage there was no need to amend the written -statement and such amendment application was rightly rejected. So far as the case -laws cited at bar by the learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants are concerned, the facts of the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants are distinguishable since here the bonafide need of the landlord has to be adjudged on the date of filing of the suit itself.
(3.) THIS Court is satisfied that such interlocutory order of the learned trial court do not require any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope of which is very limited. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shettey & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in : 2010 AIR SCW 6387, has held that the scope of interference with the interlocutory orders passed by the learned trial court is very limited and unless there is a glaring mistake or miscarriage of justice in the orders passed by the courts below, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, cannot be invoked to correct even it were any error here or there in the interlocutory orders. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: - 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. reported in : (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter -productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform.;