PANWAR, J. - (1.) THIS appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, "the Act") is directed against the judgment and Award dated 26-8-97 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dungarpur (for short, "the Tribunal"), whereby the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition filed by the appellant- claimants (for short, "the claimants" ). Aggrieved by the judgment and Award impugned, the claimants have filed the instant appeal.
(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment and Award impugned and also gone through the record of the Tribunal. Briefly stated, the facts and circumstances, which are relevant and necessary to decide this appeal are that on 19-2-90, at about 1:30 P. M. , deceased Kana was hit by a bus bearing No. RSG 2814 which was being driven at a great speed rashly and negligently by its driver, respondent No. 1 Prabhu Lal. Due to this accident, Kana was grievously hurt and succumbed to the injuries instantaneously. Claimants, who are the parents of deceased Kana, filed a claim petition for compensation before the Tribunal on 20-9-96. The plea of limitation was raised before the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, on appreciation of the evidence produced before it, came to the conclusion that the said accident resulted due to rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver and held him responsible therefor. The said bus was owned by respondent No. 2 at the relevant time and it was insured with respondent No. 3. While making computation of the amount of compensation, the Tribunal computed it to the tune of Rs. 92,500/ -. However, on the issue of limitation, the Tribunal held that the claim petition was barred by limitation and dismissed the same. In the instant case, the claim petition was filed on 20-9- 96, i. e. after coming into force of the Amendment Act (No. 54 of 1994), which came into force w. e. f. 14-11-94, by which sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act was omitted and as such, on the date of filing of the claim petition, i. e. on 20-9-96, sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act was not on the statute. Before the Amendment Act (No. 54 of 1994) came into force, sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act was operative, which provided six months' limitation for filing a claim and the outer limit was that of one year. Before sub-section (3) of Section 166 was omitted by the Amendment Act, the period of limitation was six months and not later than one year. The Legislature realised that the great injustice and injury, was being occasioned to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims dying in accidents due to by rejection of their claim petitions only on the ground of limitation and, therefore, by the Amendment Act No. 54 of 1994, it omitted sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act from the Statute. Thus, on the date of filing the claim petition on 20-9-96, in the instant case, there was no bar of limitation operating against the claimants in law as no period of limitation was prescribed for filing the same. Moreso, it is settled law that the Law of Limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of filing the claim petition must apply to it. In C. Beepathuma & Ors. vs. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolithaya & Ors. (1), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that there is no doubt that the Law of Limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of suit shall apply to it. Thus, on the date of filing of the claim petition in the instant case, the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1994 shall be applicable and as such no period of limitation was prescribed on the date of filing the claim petition. The learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition on the ground that after omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 by the Amendment Act, 1994, the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply and the Tribunal proceeded with the premises that Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides the period of limitation of three years in those cases where no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. The view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained for the reason that the Motor Vehicles Act is a "special statute" and the claim for compensation is governed by the special statute and if the Legislature, in its wisdom, has omitted the clause of limitation from the said statute then the provisions of the Law of Limitation cannot be made applicable thereto. The provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act do not apply in the claim cases filed under Section 166 of the Act and the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act govern the applications filed under the Code of Civil Procedure only.
(3.) IN Ajaib Singh vs. The Sir Hind Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anr. (2), the Hon'ble Apex Court, while interpreting the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, held that regard must be had to the provisions contained in all the earlier Articles. The other Article in the Third Division to the Schedule refers to the application under the Code of Civil Procedure with the exception of applications under the Arbitration Act and also in the cases of applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was further held by Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that one factor atleast remains constant and that is that the applications must be to courts to be governed by the Articles in this division. The scope of various Articles in this division cannot be held to be so enlarged as to include within them the applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial Tribunal or even an Executive Authority. In Sakura vs. Tanaji (3), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the provisions of the Limitation Act applied only to proceedings in courts and not to appeals or applications before the bodies other than the courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or the executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested within them certain specified powers conferred on the courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (4), and Nityanand M. Joshi vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India In Ajaib Singh (supra), the issue of limitation came to be considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to the disputes referred under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Their Lordships held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. ;