R.S.VERMA, J. - (1.) BRIEF facts giving rise to the writ petition are as follows: 1. The petitioner Smt. Sahida was initially appointed as work -charge employee on 5.6.1986 on daily wages at Rs. 11/ -per day by respondent No. 2 vide Annex. 1. This appointment was for a fixed period of 28 days. However, her appointment was renewed from time to time and as admitted by the respondents she entitled to serve with same intermittent breaks from 5.6.1986 to September 88. Her services were purely temporary and on daily wages. The petitioner's case is that she was workman within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the act'). The respondent No. 2 was an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. The services of the petitioner were terminated on expiry of 28 days from the date of last extension granted by Annx.3 dated 26.8.1988 and this termination amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(00) of the Act. The case of the petitioner is that she was selected as a regular basis vide annexure 3, yet she was retrenched on completion of 28 days thereafter she was not allowed to join her duty and she was asked orally not to came to attend the job in future.
(2.) THE termination was made without complying with the provision of Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act. The case of the petitioner further was that and feeling aggrieved, the petitioner moved an application before the Labour Commissioner, Jodhpur conciliation proceedings under Sections 12(4) of the Act. Due to indifferent attitude of respondent in conciliation proceedings, the same failed as would be evident from Annx.4 dated 9.4.91. Thereafter, no action has taken by respondent No. 1 to refer the matter to Industrial Tribunal. On the aforesaid premises, the petitioner submitted that termination of her services was ex facie being in contravention of the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that posts are lying vacant with the respondents and she was entitled to be reinstated. Upon such pleadings, the petitioner has claimed the following reliefs: 1) It be declared that petitioner stands substantively appointed on the post on and from 5th June, 1986 and the respondent be directed to give all the benefits consequent to such declaration being given. 2) That the order of termination of the services of the petitioner be declared to be invalid and be quashed and it be declared that the petitioner to be continued in services as if aforesaid termination was never made. The respondent be directed to pay the petitioner accordingly. 3) Further the respondent be directed to pay the petitioner in the pay scale of Class IV employees on and from the 6th August 1988 and be paid her all that becomes due on this account with interest at the rate of 18% per annum on and from as and how the amount become due till the same is paid. The writ petition was opposed on behalf of the respondents. It was averred that petitioner though allowed to continue on daily wages basis from 5.6.1986 till 28.9.88, she never completed 240 days in any financial year, namely 1986, 1987 and 1988 and therefore it was not necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 25F(a)(b) of the Act. It was averred that petitioner was paid her wages in terms of her engagement while discharging duty on casual labour. The respondents did not deny that number of posts were lying vacant with them. However, the case of the respondents was that work of the petitioner was not satisfactory and hence her services were not continued beyond 28.9.1988. It was averred that the feet that posts were lying vacant with the respondent, had no connection with the present controversy and the petitioner could not take advantage of these vacant posts lying with the respondents, because petitioner was then engaged on daily wages basis only.
(3.) IT may here be stated that respondents admitted that conciliation proceedings were initiated and failure report was also made on 9.4.91. It was pleaded that since final order had not been passed by the State Government Under Section 2 of the Act, the writ was premature and on this ground, the writ was liable to be dismissed.;