TIBREWAL, J. - (1.) BOTH these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution may be disposed of by a common order as common questions of law and facts are involved. The petitioners were not allowed to appear in the Senior Higher Secondary School Examination, 1992 for short attendance.
(2.) THE facts are not in dispute in both the petitions. In writ petition No. 2649/92, the petitioner was a regular student in Khandelwal Vaishya Central Senior Higher Secondary School, Jaipur in Class XII in the Session 1991-92. He filled in the examination form for appearing in Senior Higher Secondary School Examination, 1992 conducted by the respondent Board. THEre were 340 meetings of the lectures in the School. As per the Regulations, a student is required to attend minimum 75% meetings to be eligible to appear in the examination. THE petitioner had attended only 226 meetings while he was required to attend 255 meetings, as such, there was a shortage of 29 meetings. In writ petition No. 2654/92, the petitioner studied in Tegore Vidhya Bhawan Senior Higher Secondary School, Jaipur, as a regular student in Class XII in the Session 1991-92. THEre were 333 meetings in all during the session and the petitioner had attended only 200 meetings while the minimum meetings required to be attended was 248. Thus, there was a shortage of 48 meetings. There is no dispute before me that as per the Rajasthan Secondary Regulations, 1957 (in short, the Regulations) a student is required to attend 75% of the meetings in an academic session to be eligible to appear in the examination. There is also no dispute that both the petitioners did not attend the requisite meetings and there was a short fall of 29 and 48 meetings respectively. There is also no dispute before me that as per para 4 (3) of Chapter 22 of the Regulations, the Head of the Institution is competent to condone the attendance of a candidate falling short upto 10 meetings due to illness or any other reasons which is considered sufficient by him. The Chairman of the Board may further condone the short fall of 15 meetings in special circumstances. Thus, as per the Regulations, in no case, more than 25 meetings can be condoned in case the meetings fell short. Therefore, it is not in dispute before me that in the instant cases, even the Chairman of the Board could not have condoned the short fall in the meetings as they exceeded his powers. The learned counsel for the petitioners have made the following contentions. Firstly, that the petitioners had fallen ill during the session and the period of their illness should be condoned in addition to 25 meetings which could be condoned by the Head Master of the Institution and the Chairman of the Board. Secondly, the order of the Board denying them to appear in the examination is violative of the principles of natural justice as no notice was given to them to put their defence. Lastly, it was contended that the petitioners have appeared in the examinations, though under the orders of the Court and the Court has power under Article 226 of the Constitution to condone the short fall in the meetings even being more than 25. In writ petition No. 2649 of 1992, the Principal of the Institution has filed the return denying the submissions made in the writ petition. On behalf of the Institution, it was pleaded that in the examination form, it was clearly mentioned that there was a short fall by 29 meetings and as such, the petitioner was not eligible to appear in the examination. It was also stated that in all 25 meetings could be condoned on any sufficient ground including the sickness of a candidate and even on the ground of sickness, condonation above 25 meetings is not permissible under the Regulations. It was, then stated in the reply that the petitioner was given notice in writing on 10. 12. 91 and 4. 2. 92 informing him about the short fall of his attendance but, he did not improve the same. In the attendance register also, the signatures of the petitioner were obtained in the months of October a. 11. 1991 at the end to bring to his notice that his attendance was short. Then, it was submitted that the petitioner was given intimation about the shortage of the attendance in the form Ann. R-l/7. Similar reply was filed in writ petition No. 2654/92 on behalf of the respondent Board. The Board has taken the plea that there was a short fall of 48 meetings and the petitioner could be given relaxation of 25 meetings in all by the Principal of the Institution and the Chairman of the Board. It was pleaded inter-alia that as per the Regulations, the petitioner was not eligible to appear in the examination as a regular student on account of short attendance. With regard to the certificates filed by the petitioner, it was contended that all those certificates were obtained on March 18, 1992 and they have been got prepared falsely. Then, it was submitted that the petitioner did not submit the medical certificates before the respondents. Lastly, it was contended that even in the case of sickness, the maximum relaxation of 25 meetings was available to a student. I have given my careful consideration to the above submissions. This Court examined a similar question as back as in 1960, in the case of Yadav Chandra vs. Board of Secondary Education (1 ). After consideration of the Regulations, it was held that if a candidate did not attend 75% of the meetings the school remained opened, he is not entitled to appear in the examination. This Court also considered the question as to what should be done in hard cases in which the life of a student is involved. It was held as under : " We are not unmindful of the fact that in some cases, and probably the appellant's may be one of such genuine cases, there so construed the regulation may result in hardship. May be that a candidate who on account of illness or for any unavoidable cause is prevented from attending the school for some days be still able to complete the required percentage if the institution remained open for a minimum period of 210 days in one academic year. Consideration of hardship however, cannot affect the mind of the Court in deciding what is the true construction of the Regulation. It is to the Board that the candidate must appeal for relief and not to the Court. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant had to be present at least on 75% of the days on which the school remained open for the minimum period of 210 days in one academic year. " This judgment was followed in Suman Lata vs. Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer & Anr. The Bench observed as under : It has been contended by Shri Lodha, learned counsel for the petitioner that it was beyond the control of the petitioners to have attended 75% of the meetings. He has referred to the cases of some of the petitioners showing that they remained absent due to illness. They filed affidavits with regard to their illness. On perusal, it is found that they are undated and, hence they do not inspire confidence. Even otherwise, even if the petitioners would have fallen ill, even in that case, the shortfall beyond 75% could not have been condoned as there is no such power with the Chairman of the Board, for any reason whether it has been due to illness or otherwise, and no relief could have been granted under the Regulations. " In Deeraj Joshi & Neeraj Joshi Vs. The Board of Secondary Education & Anr. (3), this question was again examined by a Division Bench of this Court. Placing reliance on the judgment in Suman Lata's case (supra), the Bench held that the Regulations framed by the Board impose a prohibition against a candidate being permitted to appear at the examination unless he fulfills the requirement of minimum attendance of 75% and relaxation upto the limit of 50 meetings is permissible in certain exceptional circumstances (that was a case of Secondary Examination in which relaxation upto the limit of 50 meetings was permissible ). In Hari Kishan Meena vs. Board of Secondary School Education, Ajmer & another (4), a similar view was taken by the Single Bench of this Court and it was held that even the Chairman of the Board was not authorised to condone the shortage of meetings which is beyond 25 meetings.
(3.) THUS, from the above decisions of this Court it is clear that the maximum relaxation in the instant cases permissible was upto the limit of 25 meetings and it was beyond the powers of the Principal of the Institution and even of the Chairman of the Board to grant relaxation more than 25 meetings. The relaxation of 25 meetings is also not permissible in routine manner without any sufficient cause. The sickness of a candidate may be a ground to provide relaxation but it is permissible upto 25 meetings and not beyond that. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable and can be rejected outright. Otherwise also, the matter of relaxation has to be considered by the concerned authorities and it is not for this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to examine as to whether the petitioners had fallen sick or not. In educational matters, ordinarily this Court does not interfere in the decisions of the authorities as the educational institutions and the Board/university are best fitted to examine the matter. This Court should not normally impose its decision on them. The Regulation providing minimum 75% attendance is for the advantage of the students for a qualitative education. It also leads to a sound foundation of education at school level. The Regulations providing educational discipline should not be permitted to be violated. The Regulations of the Board are meant to be obeyed and not flouted and the Court should not become a party in flouting the Regulations on the ground of misplaced sympathy towards the students. In any event, it is mere a matter of policy for the Board and a facet of the system of education for the educationist to consider, which should be beyond the scope of judicial review in the present proceedings. The next limb of the arguments i. e. the violation of the principles of natural justice may now be examined as the learned counsel for the petitioners have strongly canvassed it. The learned counsel, in support of their argument, have placed reliance in The Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. and others vs. Kumari Chittra Srivastava and Others (5 ). From the various decisions of the Apex Court of the Country e. g. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei's case (6) , A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India (7) and the landmark decision in Maneka Gandhi's case (8), and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (9), the law can be said to be fairly settled that as a general rule, every person or authority empowered to decide a matter, which may affect rights, would be under a duty to hear the person who may be affected by such a decision and such a duty would be implied even if the statute may be silent with regard to the right of representation. It is equally well settled that there are well known exceptions to the rule and one of these is that the exclusion of the principle may also be judicially inferred if there is an express provision to that effect in the legislation or such an exclusion could be justified on the basis of necessary intendment. It is also equally settled that the principles of natural justice are not embodied rules and there is no rigid measure as to the extent of the hearing. The purpose of the principle is that the matter is dealt with by the authorities in a just and fair manner and to prevent the miscarriage of justice. Therefore, in each case, the question has to be examined and the requirement of the principle in educational institutions should not be stretched in cases of eligibility of students to appear at examinations beyond a reasonable limit and the requirement of the principle would be satisfied if the student knew why he was being held to be ineligible and had a fair opportunity to explain the contrary point of view. Applying this test to the present cases, it could not be said that the petitioners were denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The ground of ineligibility in the present case is the shortage in attendance of the lectures, a fact which was within the knowledge of the petitioners at all material times. They also knew well that on account of shortage of attendance in the meetings, they were being considered as ineligible for appearing at the examination. The petitioners were supposed to know the number of meetings/lectures held and the number of lectures/meetings attended by them. It is also significant that in the present cases, he extent of shortage of the meetings is not disputed and that the short fall was beyond the minimum requirement. Even after providing maximum relaxation as per the Regulations, The petitioners were not eligible to appear at the examinations. The position may had been different one if the case of the petitioners was within the limit of relaxation which could have been provided by the principal of the Institution or the Chairman of the Board and the petitioner had submitted their representations of relaxation. In the decision of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. & Ors vs. Kumari Chittra Srivastava & ors. (supra), the petitioner was allowed to appear at the examination inspite of the shortage in attendance at lectures and thereafter, her examination was cancelled without giving any show cause notice to her. In that situation, it has been held that the Board, in cancelling the examination, was exercising quasi-judicial functions and it was incumbent upon it to issue a show cause notice to the candidate before inflicting the penalty of cancellation. In this very judgment, it has been observed as under: " We should not be taken to have decided that this rule will also apply when a candidate is refused admission to an examination. We are not concerned with this question and say nothing about it. " ;