BALIA, J. - (1.) PETITIONER has submitted above petition for setting aside/modifying the order passed by this Court on 6/11/1989 by which D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3643 of 1989 was disposed-of.
(2.) THE petition has arisen in the circumstances stated hereinafter. Rahim Bux petitioner had filed suit No. 70/1985 against Mst. Sayra and two others under sections 91 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for injunction against the defendants. Likewise, Smt. Sayra also filed suit No,. 265/81 (20/77) against Rahim Bux, present petitioner, for possession of the land in dispute. THE Sub Divisional Officer, Sriganga Nagar dismissed both the suits vide common order dated 12/5/86. Both the parties preferred appeals before the Revenue Appellate Authority who by a common judgment dated 26/5/1989 dismissed the suit filed by the petitioner Rahim Bux and decreed the suit filed by Smt. Sayra, respondent. Petitioner filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue challenging the judgment and decree passed against him and claimed an interim order staying the execution of decree passed against him. In the first instance on 1/6/1989, the Board of Revenue had passed an interim order in favour of the petitioner staying the execution of the decree under appeal. However, it was brought to the notice of the Board of Revenue that before the interim order was passed on 1/6/89, the decree under appeal was already executed on 31/5/89 by delivering the possession of the land in dispute to Smt. Sayra and a report about the execution of the decree was also placed on record. Petitioner contended that inspite of the report of the execution of the decree, he continues to be in actual physical possession of the disputed land and, therefore, the execution of decree, reported to have taken place on 31/5/89, be ignored and he be allowed to continue in possession by staying execution of the decree. This contention of the petitioner did not find favour with the Board of Revenue as the Board was of the view that the decree having been executed on 31/5/1989, the interim order passed by the Board of Revenue on 1/6/89 was infructuous and the execution of decree under appeal cannot be stayed. It was against this order of the Board of Revenue dated 11/9/1989, the petitioner had filed a D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3643 of 1989 before this Court which was disposed-of on 6/11/1989 confirming the order of the Board of Revenue. A review petition against the said order was filed before this Court on 23. 11. 1989 which was having been presented with certain defects numbered as '993/89 on the defects side. The petitioner also preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed by order dated 19/4/1990 which reads as under:- "the High Court has directed that so far as agriculture land is concerned, it must continue in possession of respondent No. 2 on her furnishing solvent security within one month from today. Counsel for the petitioner, however, states that the High Court's observations proceeded on a wrong footing because the site inspection report of the Commissioner shows that even Smt. Sayra admitted that the petitioner is in physical possession of the land in dispute. It is open to the petitioner to move the High Court and point out this discrepancy and seek appropriate order. With these observations the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. " It appears that it was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a review petition against the order of the High Court under appeal was already preferred by the petitioner and was pending before this Court when the order was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner without referring to the earlier petition filed by him, preferred the present petition which was labelled as Misc. Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the very same prayer which he had already prayed under the first review petition and stated that this petition has been filed in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. A notice of this petition was issued and an interim order was also passed in favour of the petitioner on 23. 6. 90, The respondents filed reply to the application on 28/2/1991 and brought to the notice of the Court the facts about the filing of earlier review petition and that the petitioner has concealed the material fact about pendency of his review petition before this Court. A rejoinder to this was also made on 10. 05. 1991 stressing that the Miscellaneous petition is being filed in pursuance of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and filing of review petition earlier is hardly of any consequences. Thereafter on 4/7/1991, the first review petition was got dismissed by pleading no instructions. Counsel for the respondent urges a preliminary objection that this petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that earlier review petition has been dismissed. It is also contended that review petition was already filed and pending when the special leave petition came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But the petitioner did not disclose this material fact before the Supreme Court and secured the observation about approaching this Court whereas he had already approached this court on that very ground. He also did not disclose the fact about pending of previous review application on the same ground when he moved this application through a different lawyer and obtained ex parte interim order by concealing this material fact. Subsequently the earlier review petition was got dismissed by pleading no instructions. This conduct of the petitioner amounts to gross abuse of the process of the court and the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.
(3.) MR. MRidul, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that present petition cannot properly be termed as Review Petition. He contends that while first petition was disposed-of as review petition, present petition is a misc. petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and has been preferred independently as a consequence of the direction contained in order of Hon'ble Supreme Court. This petition is unaffected by any previous petition. He also contends that since earlier petition was not decided on merits, subsequent petition on the same ground is not barred and powers of the Court under Art. 226 are plenary and ought to be exercised to do justice uninhibited by any plea of technicalities. He places reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath vs. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and anr. (l ). Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival contentions, we have no hesitation in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. Merely by labelling the petition as Misc. petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a petition for reviewing the order passed by the High Court disposing of a writ petition cannot be termed as a petition to set aside the order passed this Court by issuing a writ, order or direction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It needs no elaboration that this Court acting in its judicial capacity cannot be said to be an authority subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution so as to amenable to issuance of any prorogative writs. Such a petition would be nothing else but a petition for reviewing its earlier order. While this proposition is firmly established that the High Court being the Court of plenary jurisdiction while exercising powers under article 226 of the Constitution has inherent powers to review its own orders to correct patent errors. The learned counsel infact contends that the jurisdiction of review is also exercisable under Article 226 only in which the powers of widest amplitude to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave or palpable error made by it. However, widest the power under Art. 226 may be, while exercising it in first instance, once a petition under Art. 226 has been disposed off on merits the scope of review is not the same as at first hearing. Moreover once it is accepted that power to review its own order inheres in extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 it cannot be doubted that exercise of the extra ordinary powers under Art. 226 ought not to be made where petitioner misconducted himself by concealing material facts while seeking to invoke such extraordinary jurisdiction. From the facts stated hereinabove, it is apparent that only contention raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the High Court's observation proceeded on a wrong footing because the site inspection report of the Officer shows that even Smt. Sayra admits that the petitioner is in physical possession of the land in dispute. On the basis of this statement the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is open to the petitioner to move, the High Court to point out this discrepancy and to seek appropriate orders. This observation cannot be interpreted to mean that if the petitioner has already moved the High Court pointing-out the alleged discrepancy for seeking appropriate order, yet the petitioner by ignoring his earlier application, could file a fresh application irrespective of the outcome of his pending review petition. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly mean that the point raised by the petitioner properly calls for making of a review petition and is not to be agitated in appeal and that is why the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The review petition having already been filed, the petitioner chose to file another review petition and obtained an interim order by concealing the fact about filing of previous review petition, which was then pending, not to say that this fact was not even disclosed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court do not lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was permitted to file successive petition for reviewing the very same order on the very same grounds. Not only that the petitioner did not disclose the filing of a earlier review petition but even after the objection about filing of the first review petition was made known to the petitioner in the reply filed by the respondents on 28. 2. 91, instead-of pursuing the first review petition, petitioner chose to get it dismissed by pleading no instructions because he had served his purpose by obtaining an interim order by filing the second review petition without even a whisper about the pendency of the first review petition. This conduct of the petitioner to say the least amounts of abuse of the process of the Court and this alone is sufficient to disentitle the petitioner any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may also be stated that while the power of the High Court to review its own decision under Art. 226 of the Constitution forms the part for every Court of plenary jurisdiction inheres. It hardly needs to be emphasized that once the Court has exercised its power under Article 226 by deciding a petition on merits, its review can be permissible only on the limited grounds while are permissible for reviewing the orders. ;