- (1.) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenges the fixation of provisional sur-charge u/s. 51 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). Section 51 of the Act reads as under : - "provisional payments - Where the price to be paid for electricity by or to the Board under this Act cannot be finally ascertained until after the end of a year of account, the amount to be paid shall be ascertained as soon as practicable thereafter, but the party from whom the payment is due shall make to the other monthly payments on account of the net amounts due in accordance with estimate made for the purpose, subject to adjustments as soon after the end of the year of account as the actual liability can be ascertained. "
(2.) IT provides for the contingency where the price to be fixed by the Board cannot be finally ascertained until the end of the year of account. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the estimated price payable under this Section has to be paid by the consumer himself and that the board is not empowered to charge the same by preparing the estimates. The argument is not sound. Section 51, as quoted above, makes the provision for advance payment of electricity charges by the consumer as preparation of final bill of the electricity consumed may take some time. This section has a laudable object of realising provisional payments in advance by the Board. IT is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the estimate has to be prepared and paid by the consumer himself according to his own whims and caprices. A consumer is not supposed to have all the relevant figures, which are necessary for making an estimate. They are in the possession of the Board. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that upholding the contention of the Board would mean acceptance of arbitrary figures arrived at by an Accountant employed in the Board. This submission has no force. Language of S. 51 is clear and it does not support the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Because the legislature is, within constitutional limits, the supreme law making body, and because statutes are the sole constitutional vehicles for communicating its official will, the main function of the court is to find out what they mean and honour the meaning so found. (See. p. 13 of the book 'the Interpretation and Application of Statutes-Reed Dickerson ). In interpreting a provision of law, the intention of the legislature must also be looked into. Intent is also used in the sense of the intent objectively manifested by the language used. Because language has meaning independent of the actual intent of the user, the meaning actually carried may imply an intent that differs from the user's actual intent. It will be useful therefore, to distinguish actual intent from manifest intent. The essence of language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called a conceptual map of human experience. ' As with any map, it has little or no significance apart from what it mirrors.
(3.) WORDS are partly known by their backgrounds, their pasts like man; and like men they do not have their full significance when standing alone but are known by the company they keep. A word is essentially contained in a context and the full effect of the word is felt only when it appears in context (C. Cherry, On Human Communication 10, 72 (2d ed. 1966 ). Context prepares the correct interpretation of the words by indicating at least the direction or sphere in which the topic is to be sought and in many cases it indicates the topic much more precisely : we know what the other man is talking about (see G. Stern, Meaning and Change of Meaning 144 (1931 ). Applying the aforesaid principles of law, we find that the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the petition about Section 51 of the Act is untenable. A consumer is liable to pay provisional electricity charges on the basis of estimate prepared by the Board. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the present writ petition has raised all those points which have been decided by us in Banwara Syntex Ltd. vs. Raj. State Electricity Board and ors. (1 ). No other point excepting that the interpretation of S. 51 of the Act arises for decision. We have already held in M/s. Rathi Alloys & Steel (P) Ltd. case (2) that the fuel sur-charge is payable by a consumer. For those reasons, we hold the same thing in this petition as well. ;