MOHINI KAPOOR, J. - (1.) SMT . Aneesa, divorced wife of the petitioner moved an application for grant of maintenance on behalf of her two minor sons Shahid Ali and Sadiq Ali. On this application, an order was passed on 19th July, 1990 for grant of interim maintenance of Rs. 150/ - per month to each of the son. This amount was payable from 1lth April, 1990. Rs. 500/ - were allowed by way of costs and the payment was adjustable according to the final decision. The petitioner filed a Misc. Petition against this interim order and on 4th September, 1990, the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 550/ - by way of costs of expenses and the petitioner was further directed to deposit Rs. 200/ -per month out of which Rs. 75/ - were to be adjusted towards the past arrears. This petition was consigned to record on 21st November, 1991 when no one appeared.
(2.) ON 11th October, 1991 the application for maintenance was finally decided by Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Tonk and each of the minor son was allowed maintenance @ Rs. 200/ - per month and this final order has been challenged by the father, petitioner in a petition Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The first preliminary objection of the learned Counsel for the res pondents is that a revision against the impugned order is maintainable but the petitioner has not chosen that remedy and this Court should not interfere under its inherent powers. There is no doubt that the matter before the trial Court has been finally decided and the petitioner could be challenged the same Under Section 397 Cr.P.C. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order has been passed in -violation of statute hence, he has approached this Court Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, AIR 1983 SC 67, it was observed that Section 482 Cr.P.C. has a different paramater and is a provision independent of Sec tion 397(2) Cr.P.C. and Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. and clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the interlocutory orders passed in appeal, enquiry or other proceedings. In this case, the matter related to quashing of complaint and it was held that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are if no offence is made out then the High Court is justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of powers Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Mithya and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 1987 (1) R.L.R. 145, wherein even after the expiry of the six months of notice, pro ceedings under Secs. 107 and 108 Cr.P.C. were continued. Proceedings before High Court Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were only for exemption of attendance but the High Court suo moto exercising the powers Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. issued orders for dropping proceedings as a whole.
(3.) IN the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. against a final decision of the application Under Section 125 Cr.P.C. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the order of the learned Magistrate was an interlocutory order or interim order so as to bar a revision Under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Violation of statute can be looked into in revision also and inherent powers of this Court Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not meant for purpose of looking into legal questions alone. They are to be normally exercised where no remedy is available to a party only then the same are to be exercised for the reasons which have been mentioned under this Section In my view, a petition Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable and in view of this, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that this matter may be treated as a revision. Without going into the controversy as to whether the petitioner should have approached the Sessions Judge, this matter is being disposed on merits and arguments on merits have been heard.;