SINGHVI, J. - (1.) AFTER having virtually conceded all the points in the Lower Appellate Court and having taken six months time to vacate the premises, the appellant Amar Singh has filed this Second Appeal challenging the judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court. Shri D. P. Chadha, learned counsel for the appellant, has vehementally submitted that several important and substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this Appeal. Shri Jain has opposed the submission of Shri Chadha and argued that on the issue of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and bonafide necessity, the findings recorded by the Trial Court have been affirmed by the learned Lower Appellate Court because the learned counsel for the appellant, who argued the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, himself realised that there was no merit in the claim made by the appellant and, therefore, conceded that the findings recorded by the Trial Court were correct. Shri Jain argued that in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant before the Lower Appellate Court, the Lower Appellate Court has affirmed the decree passed by the Trial Court. Now it is not open to the appellant to raise same pleas before this Court.
(2.) IN a suit filed by the Respondent No. 1 for rent and ejectment against Laxman Das, Kanhaiya Lal and Amar Singh, the learned Munsiff appreciated the evidence led by both the parties and decided the issues relating to the default in payment of rent, sub-letting, reasonable and personal bonafide necessity of the landlord in her favour & against the appellant. IN the Lower Appellate Court the learned counsel for the appellant conceded that the present appellant was a sub-tenant. He did not make any submission against the findings of default in payment of rent which was recorded by the Trial Court. He also did not make any argument before the Lower Appellate Court on the issue of personal and bonafide necessity of the landlord. The learned Lower Appellate Court has recorded that there was no ground for interference with the findings recorded by the Trial Court and on that basis it affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. The Lower Appellate Court then noted the request made on behalf of the appellant that six months' time be allowed to the appellant for vacating the disputed premises. After taking note of this request, the learned Lower Appellate Court granted six months time to vacate the premises. Before this Court an affidavit has been filed by the appellant on 29. 4. 92 in which he has stated that he was not present in the Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur when his appeal was argued. He was also not present in the Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City on 10. 7. 92 when the judgment of the appeal was pronounced. He has then stated that he did not instruct his counsel in the Appellate Court not to argue the appeal on merits and had not instructed his counsel to seek time for vacating the premises. The submission of Shri Chandha that in fact the learned counsel , who appeared on behalf of the appellant before the Lower Appellate Court, had made confession without any authority, cannot be accepted. In the first place he has not shown that in the authority/power given to the learned counsel, who appeared in the Lower Appellate Court, there was any specific stipulation about the scope of the intructions which were given to the learned counsel or that there was any restriction in the authority to make submissions before the Court during arguments. In the absence of such evidence having been produced, the Court will have to proceed on the assumption that the counsel, who appeared before the Lower Appellate Court on behalf of the appellant, had full authority to make concessions. In my opinion, it is not open to the appellant to raise a plea before the Court that the learend counsel has no authority to make a particular submission before the Lower Appellate Court or to make such a concession. I find support in taking this view from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, (1) and also from the decisions of Calcutta and Mysore High Courts in Mohd. Seraj vs. Adibar Rahaman Sheikh (2) and Mallappa Fakirappa Sanne Nagashetti and ors. vs. Saivappa and another (3 ). In view of the above, it must be held that no question of law much less substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this Appeal. The Appeal, therefore, fails and it is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. Shri Chadha then submitted that since the appellant is a poor person, he be allowed some time to vacate the premises. Although Shri Jain opposed this request, I grant three months time to the appellant to give vacant possession of the premises to the respondent. He shall pay arrears of rent if due, within a period of one months from today to the Respondent No. l. He shall also continue to pay rent for the paid of three months, during which he will remain in occupation of the suit premises in terms of the order of this Court. If the arrears are not paind within one month from today, the respondent will be free to proceed with the execution of the decree. The appellant shall furnish a written undertaking before the learned Munsiff within two weeks that he will hand over vacant possession of premises-within three months to the respondent No. 1. . ;