MATHUR, J. - (1.) BOTH these writ petitions involve common question of law and facts, therefore,- they are disposed of by this common order.
(2.) FOR the convenient disposal of both these writ petitions, the facts given in the case of M/s. Jodhpur Cement Industrial Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Others S. B. Civil writ Petition No. 2552 of 1989 are taken into consideration. The petitioner is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and deals in the manufacture of cement. The State of Rajasthan issued a scheme known as Rajasthan Grant of Subsidy for the Purchase of Generating Sets Regulations, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations of 1982 ). These regulations were provided on account of shortage of power in Rajasthan as it became necessary to encourage the small scale sector industries to install their own Diesel Generating Sets for generating power for their requirements. On such purchases the State Government provided subsidy to the extent of 50% of the capital costs of the Diesel Generating Sets subject to a maximum of Rs. 2. 50 lacs to these small scale industries. While coming across these regulations the petitioner placed an order for purchase of diesel generating sets with M/s. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. , M. I. Road, Jaipur on 20. 12. 1984 with the request that the diesel generating sets may be supplied to it by August 1985. The diesel generating set was despatched by the Company on 1. 4. 1985 and the bill of the same was received by the petitioner on 17. 9. 1985 and the same was installed and started functioning some where in the month of October, 1985. The State Government reviewed its decision and passed an order on 25. 7. 1985 whereby the subsidy was discontinued from 1. 4. 1985, in pursuance of the Cabinet decision of the Government of Rajasthan on 21. 4. 1985 and a communication was sent on 25. 7. 1985 to the Director of Industries, Rajasthan, Jaipur. A copy of the gist of Cabinet memo dated 9. 7. 1985 has been placed on the record as Annex. 3. It is submitted that the petitioner felt satisfied that since the subsidy has been discontinued from 1. 4. 1985 therefore, no application was made. But subsequently the petitioner came to know of the judgment of the Jaipur Bench given in M/s Khemka Cement vs. State (1) on 31. 8. 1987 and on account of that decision the petitioner moved an application for grant of subsidy on 27. 9. 1988. This application was rejected by the respondents by the communication dated 22. 4. 1989, which has been placed on the record as Annex. 5. It has been stated that since the scheme has been discontinued with effect from 1. 4. 1985 and the diesel generating set was purchased on 17. 9. 1985 by the petitioner. Date of billing has been considered as the date of purchase in all cases where the D. G. set has been purchased, therefore, subsidy cannot be granted to you. Secondly, it was also mentioned that by the advertisement in the Rajasthan Patrika dated 3. 3. 1988 it was clearly mentioned that the incumbents should apply for 50% D. G. Set subsidy upto 31. 3. 1986 and thereafter the applications will not be entertained,but you submitted the application on 10. 10. 1988, therefore, also on this ground also the subsidy cannot be granted to you. Aggrieved against this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. The principal submission of the petitioner is that the petitioner is entitled to subsidy by virtue of the principle of promissory estoppel when the petitioner had purchased the D. G. set on the representation made by the respondents and the petitioner cannot be denied the 50% subsidy. Secondly, it is submitted that the petitioner could not make the application in time because the petitioner thought bona fide that by virtue of the decision of the Government that the subsidy has been discontinued w. e. f. 1. 4. 1985 the petitioner may not get the subsidy, but on account of the decision given in the case of M/s. Khema Cement Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) by the Jaipur Bench of this Court the petitioner felt persuaded to file this writ petition. A reply has been filed by the respondents and the respondents have admitted the issuance of the notification for giving subsidy to the extent of 50% on D. G. sets. It is submitted that the State Government thereafter reviewed its decision for grant of subsidy and has dispensed with it w. e. f. 1. 4. 1985. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to subsidy. It is also submitted that by the notification dated 3. 3. 1986 published in the Rajasthan Patrika it was notified that the incumbents should apply through the Rajasthan Financial Corporation or District Industry Centre before 31. 3. 1986 and any application made after this date will not be entertained. A communication dated 10. 3. 1986 addressed to the Secretary, Jodhpur Industries Association has also been placed on record as Annex. R. 2 where the Secretary, Jodhpur Industries Association was advised to inform its members, who are eligible industrial units which have purchased the set prior to 1. 4. 1985 and have not moved the application because of discontinujrtion of this scheme earlier to apply for D. G. Set subsidy along with necessary information/papers before the expiry of 31,3. 1986 and if the application is received thereafter then the same will not be accepted. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged before me that since the petitioner has purchased the D. G. set in view of the promise/representation made by the State Government in view of the difficult position of the power supply to the industries, therefore, the Government encouraged the industrial units to install their Own D. G. sets and if they purchased the D. G. sets then the State Government will give subsidy to them to the extent of 50% with a maximum of 2. 5 lacs and in pursuance of this the petitioner placed the order and received the D. G. set. Therefore by virtue of principle of promissory estoppel, the respondents cannot withdraw that representation and the respondents are bound to pay the subsidy. In support thereof the learned counsel has invited my attention to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of M/s Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2), Pournami Oil Mills etc. vs. State of Kerala and another (3), Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Asstt.) Dharwar and others vs. Dharmendra Trading Co. etc. (4), Pyare Lal Sharma vs. Managing Director, Jammu & Kashmir Industries Ltd. and others (5) and Suresh Pal and others vs. State of Haryana and others (6 ).
(3.) MR. B. Prasad learned counsel for R. F. C. submitted that these regulations have not been issued under any statutory provision. They are of administrative nature. Learned counsel submitted that the Rajasthan State Aid to Industries Act, 1961 holds the field on the subject, therefore, this court should not interfere, in support of his contention, learned counsel has invited my attention to Narendra Kumar Maheshwari vs. Union of India & Others (7) and Amrit Banaspati Col. Ltd. & Another vs. State of Punjab & Another Apart from the above, MR. Bhagwati Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent-Rajasthan Financial Corpn. submitted that the Government can change the policy on account of tight financial position and such change in the policy cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties. So far as the principle of promissory estoppel is concerned, it is well established by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that once the State Govt. has made a representation and the party has acted on that representation unless the statute prohibits then the Government is bound to abide by the promise. In this connection, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) has laid down the principle of promissory estoppel. It has been observed as under : - "the true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the terms. It is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. " ;