G. M. LODHA, J. - (1.) THIS is a civil second appeal against the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer. The matter relates to a suit for eviction under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ).
(2.) THE plaintiff's suit was decreed by the trial court but dismissed by the first Appellate Court. THE defendant-respondent was a tenant of the plaintiff appellant, in respect of a shop, the construction of which was completed in the year 1963. THE plaintiff terminated the tenancy by a notice dated 18th May, 1967. THEreafter, the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction on 3rd July, 1967 at a time when a period of seven years from the date of completion of the construction of suit premises had not expired and in view of Section 2 (e) of the Act, the other provisions of the Act did not apply. THErefore, the suit was decreed on 31st May, 1969. The appeal was filed on 30th July, 1969. During the pendency of the appeal, the said period of seven years expired on 31st Oct. 1970. Accordingly an application was filed by the appellant that the Act has now become applicable to the suit premises, and therefore, no decree for eviction can be passed unless one of the ground in Section 13 is alleged and proved. The first Appellate Court was of the view that since exemption contemplated by Section2 (e)of the Act has ceased to exist, therefore, the decree of ejectment cannot be sustained. It relied upon the judgment of this Court in Narayan Chand vs. Krishnakumar (1) which was observed as under: - "the concession envisaged in Section 2 (e) of the Act is available to the landlord upto the last day of the period of seven years and no court in spite of Section 13 of the Act would deny the landlord his right to get a decree for ejectment of his tenant if he does not perform the terms of the covenant entered into between the landlord and the tenant. But no sooner the period of seven years is passed the tenant can, with all justification, seek the protection given to him by the Act, and if for one reason or the other he is in the possession of the premises after the lapse of a period of seven years, he can claim that he can be ejected from the rented premises only in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act by which the legislature has, in the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the country, provide special safeguard for the tenants. " Mr. Maloo, the counsel for the appellant, submitted that after the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Firm Amarnath vs. Tek Chand (2), it is settled law that the exemption has been granted to the completed and constructed buildings in a particular year from the applicability of Rent Control Legislation that exemption cannot be taken away in that case when the time has expired during the pendency of the appeal or otherwise. Mr. Maloo also invited my attention to the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramdas Chiman Lal vs. Kusum Bai (3 ). My attention was also invited to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Garikapati vs. Subhash Choudhary (4 ). Mr. Bhargava submitted that in view of the above decision, the first appellate court was not justified in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court. Shri Bhargava further argued that so far as a part of section 13 is concerned, it would apply only to those decrees which are passed under the Rent Control Laws and not to those decrees which are passed in general law. The above submissions of Shri Bhargava were controverted by Shri Mathur, the learned counsel for the respondent. Shri Mathur in support of his argument relied upon the decision of this Court in Ramjilal v. Ram Kishan (5 ). Ave carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties In my view, so far as this Court is concerned, the entire controversy has come to an end after the authoritative decision of Division Bench of this Court in Ramjilal vs. Ram Kishan (supra ). In this case, a reference was made by the Single Bench of this Court to a Division Bench in view of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Firm Amarnath's case (supra) there were two decision of this Court in Narayan Chand vs. Krishna Kumar (supra) and Umed Ram vs. Rameshwar (6) in which the view was taken that any decree passed on account of in application of Rent Control Laws by virtue of exemption granted under Section 2 (e) of the Act would not remain valid either in appeal or execution in case seven years period expires.
(3.) THE learned Single Judge referred the case to the Devision Bench. THE Division Bench took the view that it was correct that the shop in question was constructed within a period of seven years on 23rd April, 1959 and the suit was brought in 7 years on account of which section 2 (2) (e) of the Act was applicable. THEir Lordships of the Division Bench then scrutinised the analogous provisions to section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. In Punjab a notification was issued which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the above case. Their Lordships of the Division Bench then held as under: - "in view of proviso (e) to Section 2 (2), the provisions of the Act would not be applicable to any of the classes of premises mentioned therein. The Act was made applicable to the town of Hindaun, but because of clause (e) of the proviso, the provisions of the Act did not apply to the shop of the plaintiff-landlord for a period of seven years from the date of its completion. After the expiry of seven years, the provisions of the Act came into force. As soon as the provisions of the Act became applicable, Section 13 came into play. Section 27 was enacted as an abundant caution to apply to pending matters. Postponement of the applicability of Section 13 (1) could not be urged, when once the Act had come into force. The result was that the tenant was protected and could not be dispossessed except under the circumstances enumerated in Section 13. It was not correct to say that Section 27 (1) was applicable only to those cases which were pending on the date the Act came into force in 1950, and that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to those suits which were filed within the period of exemption under Section 2 (2), proviso (e ). " Then the Division Bench held that the view taken in Narain Chand's case (supra) and accepted in Umedram vs. Rameshwar Prasad (supra) is correct. Finally it was observed as under : "on the mere ground that in some cases trial is protracted or the litigation becomes tortuous we are not prepared to accept the construction, as suggested by Mr. Garg, as it would, in our opinion lead to a result which is not warranted either by clause (e) of Section 2 (2) or by section 13 (1) of the Act. The position can be visualised the other may round as well. A landlord may file a suit on the last day of the exemption period of seven years, he can equally claim to have his tenant evicted under the ordinary law relating to landlord and tenant. It may take several years to obtain the decision of the last court and a good period of 18 years is also available to him to execute his decree. According to the interpretation put on behalf of the appellant. Sec. 13 (1) of the Act, even when the Act has come into operation after the period of seven years, will not effect the claim of such a landlord. We are not disposed to hold that such a consequence will follow by the mere fact that a suit for ejectment has been filed within the period of seven years. In our considered view, postponement of the applicability of Section 13 (1) cannot be urged, when once the Act has come into force. It must have its full effect, no sooner the Act comes into operation. The result would be that the tenant shall be protected and he cannot be dispossessed except under the circumstances enumerated in sec. 13. In Punjab, the notification dated 30-7-1655 made all the difference when it made sec. 13 of the Punjab Act inapplicable under certain conditions. " (Para 20) I am, therefore, of the view that the decision of the first appellate court is in consonance with the view taken by the Division Bench, referred to above I am further of the view that the distinction drawn between the Punjab Law and the Rajasthan Law by their lordships of the Division Bench is also correct and requires no reconsideration by any reference to the larger bench as suggested by Shri Bhargava. ;