DWARKA PRASAD,J. - (1.) THIS revision petition raises a short question as to whether the defence of the defendant-tenant against eviction was wrongly struck off by the Courts below.
(2.) THE facts which have led to the filing of the present revision petition may be briefly state. The opposite party Madhu Sudan filed a suit for eviction against the petitioner Madan Mohan in respect of a shop situated in Kuchaman City. The plaintiff also claimed recovery of arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 468/-, at the rate of Rs. 13/- per month. The suit was filed on two grounds, namely, that the defendant had committed defaults in payment of rent for a period of more than six months and had become defaulter within the meaning of Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and that the plaintiff had bonafide and reasonable personal necessity for the shop in dispute. On the application of the defendant, the trial Court by its order date August 2, 1976 determined the amount of arrears of rent which was payable by the tenant and held that rent for 40 months from March 17, 1973 to July 16, 1976, at the rate of Rs. 13/- per month, in all Rs. 515/-, together with interest thereon at the rate of Rs. 13/- per month, in all Rs. 515/-, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum was payable by the defendant-tenant to the landlord-plaintiff. The trial Court directed upto August 17, 1976. The defendant paid a sum of Rs. 557.57 p. to the plaintiff on August 17, 1976 in respect of arrears of rent upto July 16, 1976 and interest thereon, as directed by the trial Court and a receipt evidencing the said payment was produced before the trial Court. Thereafter on April 15, 1977 the plaintiff submitted an application under sub-section (5) of Section 13 stating that the defendant had failed to pay the rent month by month during the period after July 16, 1976 and as such his defence against eviction should be struck off. The defendant file a reply stating that he was continuously paid rent month by month and since no default has been committed by him in payment of rent the defence could not be struck off. The trial Court, by its order dated May 9, 1977 held that the defendant had deposited in the Court on September 22, 1976 rent for two months for the period from July 17, 1976 to September 16, 1976 by means of a tender and thereby the rent for the period from July 17, 1976 to August 16, 1976 was not paid or deposited within the period of 15 days of the succeeding month. It was also held that the rent for the period from February 17, 1977 to March 16, 1977 was also not deposited by the tenant within the prescribed time, but the same was deposited on April 5, 1977. On the basis of the aforesaid defaults in payment of rent, month by month, during the pendency of the suit, the trial Court held that the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13 were not complied with by the defendant-tenant and as such his defence against eviction was struck off. The defendant preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Mehta but the same was dismissed by the order April 10, 1980.
(3.) IN this revision petition, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that so far as the period from February 17, 1977 to March 16, 1977 is concerned, the rent was deposited by the defendant-tenant on March 15, 1977 and as such the two Courts below were no right in striking off the defence of the defendant-petitioner on that ground. I have gone through the record of the trial Court and a receipt of the deposit of rent for the period from February 17, 1977 to March 16, 1977 on March 15, 1977 by means of tender was found at p. D 36/1 in the record of the trial Court. Thus, the learned counsel is right that the rent for the period from February 17, 1977 to March 16, 1977 was deposited by the tenant within time. The receipt regarding payment of rent made by the defendant-tenant on April 5, 1977 must necessarily relate to the subsequent period from March 17, 1977 to April 16, 1977. Learned counsel for the opposite party also could not raise any objection so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned.;