Dwarka Prasad Gupta, J. - (1.) THE only question which arises in this appeal is as to whether there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the State of Rajasthan within the meaning of Article 229 of the Constitution. The trial court held that there was absence of a completed contract within the meaning of Article 229 of the Constitution, because the alleged contract was neither expressed to be made by the Governor of the States nor it was executed by or on behalf of the Governor.
(2.) IN this appeal, it was argued by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State, that the contract was executed by the General Manager of the State Woollen Mills, Bikaner, who was an officer duly authorised to execute the contract on behalf of the Governor of the State and merely because the contract has not been expressed to have been executed on behalf of the Governor of the State, the same would not amount to non -compliance of the provisions of Article 229 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. : [1964]3SCR164 and in Davecos Garments Factory and Anr. v. : AIR1971SC141 in support of his above contention. Rallia Ram's case : [1964]3SCR164 , which related to Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is similar to Article 229 of the Constitution of India, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that execution of a formal document by the contracting parties is not necessary for due compliance of the conditions of Section 175 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and completion of contract may result from correspondence, if the requisite conditions of Section 175(3) were fulfilled. In that case a tender for the purchase of goods, in pursuance of a notice issued by or on behalf of the Governor General of India, was accepted in writing which was expressed to be made in the name of Governor General and was executed on his behalf by a person duly authorised, was held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 175(3). In Davecos Garment Factory's case an agreement expressed to be in the name of the Governor of the State of Rajasthan and executed by the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, who was duly authorised by the Governor of Rajasthan, on behalf of the Governor was considered to be sufficient to constitute a legal contract within the meaning of Article 229(1) of the Constitution. It was observed in that case that in the absence of properly framed rules, there is no specific requirement of mentioning the words "on behalf of the Governor" at the place where the person, authorised by the Governor to enter into the contract, has to append his signature to and in the absence thereof it is not possible to hold that the contract did not comply with the requirements of Article 299(1) of the Constitution.
(3.) IN the present case also, it is not disputed that the General Manager of the State Wcollen Mills was a person duly authorised by the Governor of Rajasthan to execute the contract on his behalf and learned Counsel for the appellant argued that merely on account of omission of the words "on behalf of the Governor of Rajasthan", while the General Manager of State Woollen Mills executed the agreement by appending his signature thereon, it should not be held that Article 299(1) of the Constitution was not complied with and it must be presumed that the contract was executed on behalf of the Governor. The argument is plausible so far as it goes, however, a formidable defect lies in the way of learned Government Advocate in as much the agreement in the present case has not been executed in the name of the Governor of Rajasthan. In Bhikraj Jaipuria v. : [1962]2SCR880 which case again related to the interpretation of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: It is clear that the Parliament intended in enacting the provision contained in Section 175(3) that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorised contracts and with that object provided that the contracts must show on their face that they are made on behalf of the State i e. by the bead of the State and executed on his behalf and in the manner prescribed by the person authorised. The provision, it appears, is enacted in the public interest, and invests public servants with authority to bind the State by contractual obligations incurred for the purposes of the State.;