MEHTA, J. - (1.) THE brief facts of this case are that on May 28 1971, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar, sent a report to the Station House Officer. Parbatsar, to the effect that he had come to know that Ramchandra and his in Suraj Narain of Jaipur had entertained 500 to 600 persons on May 27 and 28, 1971, against the provisions of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 and, therefore, proceedings should be started against the guilty persons. On receipt of the above complaint the Station House Officer went to the spot and investigated the matter. He then submitted his report on May, 29, 1971, requesting she court to take cognisance of the offence under sec. 7/3 of the Essentital Commodities Act read with rule 3 of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965. On receipt of that report the Sub Divisional Magistrate ordered to register the case under the aforesaid provisions of law and issued warrants of arrest against accused Ramchandra and Suraj Narain on 14-5-1971. THE petitioners went up in revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta, against the cognisance of the alleged crime having been taken by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Mr. S. C. Calla, Sessions Judge, Merta, rejected the revision-petition on October 12, 1971.
(2.) AGGIEVED by the above order of learned Sessions Judge, Merta, Ramchan-dra and Suraj Narain have taken this revision-petition before this court. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Sessions Judge has gone wrong in not taking into consideration the fact that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, was rescinded by the Government by their Notification No. S. O. 29, dated September 9, 1971, published in the Rajasthan Gazette of the same date. It is an admitted position that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, published in the Rajasthan Gazette, extra-ordinary part IV, dated the 12th September 1965, was a temporary enactment. There is also no controversy that temporary statute was rescinded by the State Govenment by its Notification No. S. O. 29 dated September 9, 1971. Further, there is no dispute that in the above Notification no saving clause has been inserted, providing that the cases which were pending on September 9, 1971, would remain unaffected. As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act expires no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore, offences committed against temporary enactments have to be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires, and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terminate. In this connection a reference is made to Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, pages 577 and 578 In S. Krishnan vs. State of Madras(l), it has been observed by his Lordship Patanjali Sastri : "This general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision, to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires." The matter also received consideration of a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Krishna Chadra vs. Sushila(2). In that case it was held : "After the expiry of a statute, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, no proceedings can be taken on it and proceedings already taken ipso facto determine." Likewise, in a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, reported in Rabindra Nath vs. Gour Mondal(3), it was laid down : "Ordinarily, no action can be taken under a temporary statute after it has expired and all proceedings pending at the date of its expiry terminate auto-mati-cally. But there may be provision to the contrary in the Act itself. And it has to be seen whether it contained any provisions indicating an intention that even after its expiry it would remain alive for certain purposes." In another Full Bench decision of the same High Court in Tarak Chandra vs. Ratan Lal(4), it has been observed : "The general rule is that unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, a temporary Act ceases to have any further effect after it has expired. No proceedings can be taken under it any longer and proceedings already taken and pending terminate automatically as soon as it expires." There is also a later decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reported in Gopichand vs. Delhi Administration(5). In that case his Lordship Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the court, observed : "Since the impugned Act does not contain an appropriate saving section the appellant would be entitled to contend that, after the expiry of the Act, the procedure laid down in it could no longer be invoked in the cases then pending against the appellant," Here, as an illustration, I may also refer to a decision in Wicks vs. Director of Public Prosecutions(6). In that case an offence against the Defence (General) Regulations made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, was committed during the currency of the Act and the offender was prosecuted and convicted after the expiry of the Act. A contention was raised before the House of Lords on behalf of the offender that his prosecution and conviction were invalid because at the relevant time, the temporary act had ceased to exist. That plea was rejected in view of the provisions of sec. 11 sub-sec.(3) of the Act. That sub-sec. had provided that the expiry of the Act would not affect the operation thereof as respects things previously done or omitted to have been done. The authorities relating to expiry of temporary statutes are few in number in England. Apart from Wicks' case (supra), there is another citation reported in Spenser vs. Hooton(7) and R. vs. Ellis Ex-parte Amalgamated Engineering Union(8) In both these authorities it has been held that a special jurisdiction conferred by certain temporary statutes ceases absolutely on their expiry to the detriment of the pending proceedings. In the present case the Notification No. S. O. 29, dated September 9, 1971, rescinding the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, does not contain an appropriate saving clause and, therefore, the accused are well within their right to contend that after the expiry of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, the procedure laid down in it would no longer be invoked in the case then pending against them. Such being the settled law, the petitioners Ramchandra and Suraj Narain cannot now be prosecuted under the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965. | I accordingly accept this revision petition and quash the order of learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar, dated June 14, 1971, as also that of learned Sessions Judge, Merta. dated Octobor 12, 1971. The accused stand discharged. They are on bail and they need Dot surrender to it. ;