Modi, J. - (1.) THESE are two appeals, one filed by the State, and the other by the Municipal Council, Udaipur, against a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Udaipur, by which he set aside the conviction of the accused of an offence under sec. 16 (l) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (Act No. XXXVII of 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954), and acquitted him.
(2.) THE facts leading up to these appeals are simple. THE accused was a milk-vendor in the city of Udaipur and appears to have been carrying on this business for a considerable time. On the 22nd September, 1960, he was suspected of selling adulterated milk. THE Food Inspector of the Municipal Council, Udaipur, therefore took samples of the milk sold by him and sent them to the Public Analyst, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for analysis. THE latter was of the opinion that the samples were of adulterated milk and that they did not conform to the prescribed standard of purity. THEreupon, the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Udaipur, accorded its sanction to the prosecution of the accused and the Food Inspector instituted a complaint, out of which these appeals arise, before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Udaipur. THE learned Magistrate held the accused guilty of selling adulterated milk and convicted him under sec. 16 (l) (a) of the Act of 1954, and sentenced him to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default to a further simple imprisonment for three months. Against this decision, the accused went up in appeal to the Additional Sessions Judge, Udaipur. It was urged before the learned Judge that there was no proper sanction for the prosecution of the accused under sec. 20 (1) of the Act of 1954, and, therefore, the conviction of the accused could not be sustained in law. This contention prevailed with the learned Judge below with the result that the accused was acquitted. The principal question for determination before us in the circumstances set out above is whether there was no valid sanction, or, to use the precise phraseology of sec. 20 of the Act of 1954, "written consent" of the competent authority within the meaning of that section for the prosecution of the accused. We should like to quote sec. 20 at this place in so far as it is material for our present purposes: - "20 Cognizance and trial of offences - (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority. " The plain meaning of this provision is that as a condition precedent to the prosecution of an offender under this Act, the prosecution must have been instituted with the "written consent" of (1) the State Government, or (2) a local authority, or (3) a person authorised by the State Government in this behalf, or (4) a person authorised by a local authority in this behalf. It will be noticed that the various clauses set out above are disjunctive. It has also been held that before granting a 'written consent' as required by this section, the authority competent to do so should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prima facie case exists for the alleged offender being put up before a court. See State of Bombay Vs. Parshottam Kanaiyalal (l ). The question before us is whether the requirements of this section as set out above have been fulfilled in the present case. Now the position here is that the prosecution of the accused was sanctioned by the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Udaipur (vide page A-8 of the record ). The contentions raised before the appellate court below were (1) that the Municipal Commissioner had not been authorised by the Municipal Council to accord sanction in the matter of such prosecutions and (2) that in any case he had not applied his mind to the facts of the case before according sanction. Unfortunately an authenticated copy of the resolution passed by the Municipal Council, Udaipur, authorising the Municipal Commissioner to sanction prosecutions under the Act of 1954 was not produced before the court below and it was not produced in the trial court either, though a mention of the relevant resolution, being No. C/gen/712, dated the 31st October, 1958, was made in the letter of the Commissioner, Municipal Council, addressed to the First Class Magistrate, Udaipur, which was filed in court by the Food Inspector along with the Complaint. An authenticated copy of this resolution has now been brought on the record. A perusal of this resolution clearly shows that the Municipal Council had authorised the Municipal Commissioner to sanction prosecutions of persons accused of offences under Act of 1954 as required by sec. 20 thereof. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Municipal Commissioner was duly authorised to give his written consent to the prosecution of the accused in the present case as required by sec. 20 of the Act of 1954. The next question to consider is whether the Commissioner had applied his mind to the facts of the case before according the sanction. Our answer to this question is also in the affirmative. For, although the document at page A-8 to which we have made reference above does not expressly show that the Commissioner was cognizant of the facts of the case, we have on record a further letter from the Commissioner which he had addressed to the First Class Magistrate, Udaipur (this is at page A-6 of the record) which mentions the following facts: - "shri Mohammed Bux was found trading in milk on 22-9-60 and sample of the same was taken on the same day and sent to the Chief Public Analyst, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for necessary analytical report. The report received from that Officer indicates that the quality of the edible, in which the aforesaid gentleman was found to be trading, was below the prescribed standards and was thus unfit for human consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I am, therefore, sending herewith the requisite Prosecution Form against the defaulter Shri Mohammed Bux with the request that necessary action may kindly be taken against him at early date. " We have reasons to believe that this document and the one at page A8 of the record came to be written at the same time and they were produced in court on the 6th October, 1961, by the Food Inspector along with the challan. In these circumstances the plea of the accused that the sanctioning authority had not applied its mind to the facts of the case before according its sanction is futile and we wholly reject it as being without any foundation in fact. It must follow from the foregoing discussion that the reasoning on which the learned Additional Sessions Judge quashed the conviction of the accused cannot be sustained as correct. This brings us to the merits of the case. Ordinarily we should have thought it necessary to send the case to the court below for a decision on the merits as the learned Judge in that court did not consider it necessary to address himself to that aspect of the case in view of his decision on the legal issues arising in the case whereon we have not felt persuaded to sustain his judgment; but we think that no useful purpose will be served by our doing so in all the circumstances of the case. In his statement before the trial court, the accused unreservedly admitted all the facts for which he was being prosecuted and all that he said in excuse of his conduct was that it was not possible for him to do any chemical examination of the milk himself and that everybody was dealing in adulterated goods. This, in our considered opinion, cannot be accepted as any valid extenuation of the accused's conduct and if we may say so, this only serves to highlight the evil of adulteration which is so rampant in our country and which requires to be put down with a stern hand. We, therefore, entirely concur in the finding of the trial Magistrate that an offence under sec. 16 (1) (a) has been proved to the hilt against the accused and convict him accordingly. We also confirm the sentence awarded to the accused by the trial Magistrate. Though a sentence like that may appear to be harsh on the face of it, but we do want to set an example so that others dealing in adulterated goods will take a lesson. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow appeal No. 196 of 1962, set aside the acquittal of the accused and holding him guilty under sec. 16 (l) (a) of the Act of 1954, uphold the sentence awarded to the accused by the trial court. In view of our decision on this appeal, we need not pass any separate order on the other appeal filed on behalf of the Municipal Council Udaipur, being No. 181 of 1962, and that appeal would stand dismissed as such. We hereby direct that the District Magistrate, Udaipur, shall take the necessary steps to have the accused arrested, and send him to jail so as to serve out the sentence we have awarded to him. . ;