- (1.) THIS is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on behalf of His highness Shri Bhagwat Singhji, Ruler of Mewar, and arises under the following circumstances: on the demise of his father, late His Highness Maharana Bhopal Singhji, who was the Maharaj Pramukh of Rajasthan, the petitioner discharged certain employees of the Motor Garage as they became surplus on account of the office of the Maharaj Pramukh being abolished on the death of his father. Thereupon these employees claimed compensation for retrenchment and made a representation through the Motor (Workers) Mazdoor Union Udaipur (Respondent No. 3 in the Writ petition) to the Rajasthan Government (Respondent No. 1) which by notification No. F9 (15)Lab. /57, dated Jaipur the 18th of December 1957 made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (Respondent No. 2) for adjudication of the dispute. The petitioner took several objections to the maintainability of the reference. The first objection was that in view of the provisions of Section 87-B read with Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure the reference was not tenable without the previous consent of the Central Government. The second objection was that on the date when the reference was made no Industrial Tribunal was constituted under the amended Act as held by this Court in the unreported case in Civil Writ Petn. No. 107 of 1958 --Nundra Metal Works Private Ltd. , Bikaner v. State of Rajasthan, D/- 303-1959 (Raj) and no fresh reference was made after the Tribunal was constituted in accordance with law. We need not set out the other objections taken as the Tribunal has so far decided only these two objections against the petitioner and is yet to decide the other objections.
(2.) IN this Writ petition it is urged that in deciding both these objections the tribunal had committed errors apparent on the face of the record and that on a correct interpretation of law on both these matters the Tribunal is not competent to entertain and decide the matter and therefore by Writ of Prohibition the tribunal should be directed from proceeding further in adjudicating the dispute referred to it. This Writ petition is contested on behalf of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and it is contended that the findings of the Tribunal on these points are correct.
(3.) THE first question that requires determination in this Writ petition is whether the industrial Tribunal is incompetent to proceed to adjudicate into the matter referred to it on account of the provisions of Section 87-B, C. P. C. It is not in dispute that (he petitioner is a ruler of the former Indian State. He is entitled to invoke the privileges contained in Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 86 which are available to a ruler of a foreign State. The relevant provisions of Section 86 are, as follows: "86. (1) No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government: provided that a person may, as a tenant of immovable property, sue without such consent as aforesaid a Ruler from whom he holds or claims to hold the property. * * * * * (3) No Ruler of a foreign State shall be arrested under this Code and, except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government, no decree shall be executed against the property of any such Ruler. " * * * * * the contention on behalf of" Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 which has been accepted by the Industrial Tribunal is that the petitioner is not being sued in any court, and, as such, he cannot claim the privilege contained in Section 86 (1 ). The Tribunal has held that the words 'may be sued' read with the words 'competent to try the suit' mean that Section 86 (1)is applicable when a suit is filed against a ruler and not to any other proceeding. It also took the view that the Industrial Tribunal is not a court within the meaning of Section 86. The petitioner has challenged this interpretation of the Tribunal. It is urged that the word 'sue' means taking any legal proceeding against a person and it cannot be confined only to the filing of a suit. Reliance in this connection is placed on the observations of Mahajan, J. in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani and co. , AIR 1950 SC 222. No doubt as observed by Mahajan, J. in that case, the expression "sue" means "the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings", yet in the context in which this word has been used, it means taking any legal proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure. It is to be kept in view that Section 86 is a provision of the Civil procedure Code and is to be read along with the other provisions of the Code. The code deals with suits, executions, appeals and other incidental matters. Under section 26 a suit is to be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Thus, when the words 'may be sued' have been used in Section 86 (1) they refer to the proceedings for enforcement of a legal right as contemplated under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. As pointed out by the Tribunal, this is further made clear when it is mentioned that the ruler of a foreign state cannot be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit. Sub-section (2) to Section 86 further says that the consent of the Central government may be given in respect to 'a specified suit'. Sub-section (3) also says that a Ruler shall not be arrested under 'the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code' and except with the consent of the Central Government no decree shall be executed against the property of the ruler of a foreign state. It is, therefore, difficult to divorce Section 86 and Section 87-B from its context and to say that immunities available to the ruler of a foreign state extend to all legal proceedings taken against him. We are therefore of the opinion that the Tribunal has committed no error of law in thus interpreting the words 'may be sued' in Section 86.;