DAVE, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by the State against the order of the City Magistrate, Jaipur, dated the 30th March, 1960, acquitting accused Ram Pyari and Kalyani of offences under Secs. 3 and 4 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, which will hereinafter be referred as "the Act. "
(2.) A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Magistrate has acquitted both the accused on the ground that the entire investigation in the case was done by the Circle Inspector and the challan was also put up by him although it was required under the Act that a special police Officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police should have dealt with the case under Sec. 13 thereof. It is contended by learned Assistant Government Advocate that the Magistrate ought not to have passed on order of acquittal. At the same, it is conceded by him that the Magistrate was not wrong in observing that the whole investigation in the case was wrongly done by the Circle Inspector and that the challan was also put up by him. It is only prayed by the Assistant Government Advocate that the Magistrate ought to have quashed the charge and directed a re-investigation instead of acquitting the accused. Learned counsel for the accused has frankly conceded that the position taken up by learned Assistant Government Advocate is correct. It may be observed that Sec. 13 (1) of the Act provides that there shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a special police Officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that area. Sub-sec. (2) further provides that the special police officer shall not be below a certain rank. In the present case, clause (c) of Sub-sec. (2) will be applicable and, therefore, the Officer contemplated is the Deputy Superintendent of Police. In other words, so far as Rajasthan is concerned, the special police officer who is not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police is not authorised to deal with the offence. It is no doubt provided under Sub-sec. (3) that for the efficient discharge of his functions in relation to offences under this Act the special police officer of an area shall be assisted by such number of subordinate police officers as the State Government may think fit, and it appears that the Circle Inspector, who investigated the present case, was one of the police officers contemplated by Sub-sec. (3) (a), but this does not mean that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was the special officer for dealing with the offences, should have abandoned the duty cast upon him by law and left the entire case to be dealt with by the Circle Inspector. The Deputy Superintendent of Police could only take his assistance under Sub-sec. (3 ). It is, therefore, clear that since the Deputy Superintendent of Police (special police officer) did not apply his mind to the investigation of the case and he did not put up the challan, the provisions of Sec. 13 (1) of the Act were contravened. The Magistrate should not have, however, acquitted the accused for that reason. Since he had framed a charge against the accused, the proper course for him was to take action to quash that charge and to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to re- investigate the matter and then proceed according to law. That order will have to be passed by this Court now. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order of the Magistrate acquitting the accused is set aside and the charge-sheet presented by the Police and the charge framed by the trial court are hereby quashed. It is left to the special police officer appointed under Sec. 13 of the Act to re-investigate the case and present a fresh charge-sheet if he so desires. . ;