- (1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of the Deputy Collector Jagir Pah dated the 21st October, 1961, preferred u/s 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Jagirdar.
(2.) A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the State that this appeal is time-barred. The memo of appeal had been presented on 25. 1. 62. Calculating from 21. 10. 61 the date of judgment, the memo appears to have been submitted on the 95 days instead of within 90 days permitted vide sec. 39 (1) of the Act. On behalf of the appellant various allegations have been made to justify the delay viz. the judgment has been wrongly dated to have been written on 21. 10. 61, and the presence of the counsel for the appellant before the Dy. Collector Jagir on 21. 10. 61 has been wrongly shown. None of these arguments is, however, worth giving any consideration whatsoever. It is a well settled principle of law that the proceedings of a court shall be presumed to have been taken on the date and in the manner they have been shown to have been taken. Simply because of an affidavit by counsel or any party their validity cannot be doubted. There is, however, a particular circumstance obtaining in the present case which cannot be overlooked. It is that the proceedings of the case continued in the presence of the legal adviser to the Government and counsel for the appellant upto 31. 8. 61 when the case was fixed for 21. 9. 61 pending the receipt of the order of the recognition of the title of the appellant to the jagir from the Jagir Commissioner. After this date the case was not taken up on 21. 9. 61 as fixed. Instead it was taken on 3. 10. 61. The order of this date states that it was put up on receipt of the file. The presence of the appellant as well has not been recorded on this date. Nor could he be possibly present that day when the date had not been fixed and the parties had not been called. On this date, 3. 10. 61, the case was ordered to be put up on 21. 10. 61. There is no direction, however, on the order-sheet to issue any notice to the parties on that date. On 21. 10. 61 the judgment was written and pronounced on the basis of the evidence produced and the arguments heard about 5 or 6 months earlier. The Code of Civil Procedure has not been made directly applicable to the trial of such cases by the Deputy Collector Jagir. R. 45 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Rules 1954 however, does lay down that in contesting cases the enquiry shall be made in the manner provided by law for the trial of a suit in a Revenue Court and in un-contested cases in the manner provided by law for the trial of an application by a Revenue Court. Procedure for the trial of cases by a Revenue Court is what is laid down in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Sec. 208 thereof makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable thereto except when found to be inconsistent with the provisions of that Act. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act does not provide any special procedure for the trial of cases by the Revenue Courts. It means that the same procedure as has been provided by the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed, if not in letter at least in spirit, by the Officers trying the cases under the Act as well. Now, O. 20, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that the Court shall pronounce judgment in open Court after the case has been heard, either at once or soon thereafter as may be practicable on some future date. Further, it lays down that if and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future date, the court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. The learned Deputy Collector Jagir was, therefore, bound to inform the appellant of the date on which he wanted to pronounce the judgment. There is nothing on the record to show that he has done so. Instead it can be very well said after examination of the record that no such intimation was ever given to the appellant. The judgment dated 21. 10. 61 can therefore be taken in the present case to have been pronounced in the absence of, and without information to, the appellant. The judgment shall, therefore, be taken not to have been given in accordance with the prescribed procedure. And the date of the judgment cannot for the same reason be taken to be a point for start of limitation against the appellant. The limitation will therefore, start as against the appellant not from the date of the judgment but from the date of his having got the information thereof. The authority for this, if needed, will be found in 1961 RRD 181, Motilal Vs. State of Rajasthan and 1961 RRD 114 Rameshwar Vs. Kishorilal. In the latter case, one of the learned Members deciding it has also held that order 20, Rules 1 and 3 have to be read together and for that purpose the order is to be dated and pronounced in the open Court and any order passed without informing the parties of the date on which it is to be pronounced shall not therefore be an order pronounced on the date given on it, and the question of limitation running from that date will not arise. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case detailed above the learned Government Advocate also concedes, and so very rightly, that the limitation will not start against the appellant from the date given in the judgment (i. e. 21. 10. 61) but from the date he came to learn of the same. From the record and from the allegations made by the appellant, it appears that the copy of the judgment and the final award was forwarded to the appellant on 2. 12. 61 and was received by him on 4. 12. 61. The Limitation against him can, therefore, run only from this date. The appeal is not barred by time from this date, 4. 12. 61. The preliminary objection is, therefore, hereby over-ruled. Now, about the merits of the case. The item questioned are grazing fees and income from the non-agricultural uses of land. These items have been disallowed by the learned Dy. Collector Jagir on the ground that the entries in the "rokar-bahi" produced by the appellant have not been corroborated by any other evidence in the form of receipts, etc. and that the oral testimony produced only goes to corroborate them generally. The learned counsel for the appellant does concede that the case was so. He however, pleads that the appellant being in military service could not himself prosecute the case and the person in whose hands it was left did not take the care that he should have done, perhaps in the absence of the proper legal guidance as well. The appellant is said to be still in active military service. The 'rokar-bahis' have been produced in this case which have been also got audited and not taken any objection to by the learned Dy. Collector. Oral evidence has also been, produced by the appellant about these claims, although specific questions have not been asked of the witnesses about the specific entries in the 'rokar-bahis\ It is not necessary that the entries in the books of accounts be corroborated by written evidence only. Under the circumstances, this appears to be a case fit for being remanded for letting the appellant have an opportunity of producing all his evidence in corroboration of the books of accounts produced. The learned Government Advocate also, under the circumstances, objects only about the cost. This is a valid objection. It, therefore, appears proper that the case be remanded for re-enquiry on the two items under appeal for letting the appellant have another opportunity of producing his evidence and the State Government the rebuttal thereof, of course on payment of a cost of Rs. 75/- to the Government. The appeal is, therefore, hereby accepted, and the order of the learned Dy. Collector Jagir, so far as it relates to the incomes from the grazing fees and the non-agricultural uses of land, is set aside and the case remanded on the condition of the appellant first depositing in this Court a sum of Rs. 75/- by way of cost to be paid to the Government Advocate within a period of one month. This order shall be carried out only if the cost is deposited as above. In case it is not so deposited, the appeal shall be submitted back to this Bench for necessary orders. .;