- (1.) THIS is an appeal u/s. 66 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as Act) preferred against the decision of the Add ). Collector, Ajmer dated 22. 4. 60 given under Sec. 7 of the said Act.
(2.) THE appellant preferred an application in form No. A IIV to have certain property declared as his personal property. This was opposed on behalf of the Government on the ground that the appellant was not an "intermediary" as described by the Act. THE parties were given an opportunity of producing evidence in this behalf. After recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Addl. Collector came to the. conclusion that the appellant had come into the possession of the estate of which he claimed to be an intermediary through partition, which was not permissible without previous sanction as laid down by Secs. 25 and 36 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877, the estate being admittedly a Bhoomia land. He rejected the plea of the appellant that he had been recorded as Bhoomia in the record of rights. THE appellant was, therefore, declared not to be an intermediary and as such not entitled to declaration of any property to be his personal u/s 7 of the act. It has been very vehemently urged on behalf of the appellant that the Compensation Commissioner had vide his order dated 27. 10. 61 recognised him to be an intermediary and that, therefore, the learned Addl. Collector could not have rejected his application for the declaration of the personal property. The contention is that he was an 'intermediary' as defined by Sec. 2 (viii) of the Act, being Guzaredar of the present Bhoomia, Shri Ratan Singh, and was, therefore, entitled for the declaration applied for. It has also been urged that the restriction on transfer provided by the Ajmer Board Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877 did not at all apply to his case. It has been further urged that it had been proved by the evidence produced that there was a custom in the family entitling the grant of a land for the 'guzara. The foremost (question that poses for determination is whether the order of the Compensation Commissioner dated 27. 10. 61 recognising the appellant as an intermediary was binding on the Addl. Collector acting u/s 7 of the Act. The obvious answer is that the Compensation Commissioner's order was dated 27. 10. 61 about four months and few days later than that of the Addl. Collector. There could not, therefore, arise any question ever of its being considered by the learned Additional Collector while passing the impugned order. Besides, as laid down in R. 12 of the Rules made under the Act dealing with the declaration of private property u/s 7, the Collector was required to forward a copy of the list with a copy of his order passed under sub-rule (4) to the compensation Commissioner for his information. No such duty was cast by any Rule on the Compensation Commissioner to convey his decision to the Additional Collector acting u/s 7. Nor does the appellant appear to have ever represented to the Addl. Collector that the matter was pending before the Compensation Commissioner a well such an allegation is not made even now. The question of the Addl. Collector being guided by the order of the Compensation Commissioner did not, therefore, at all arise. Nor do we find any provision in law that make it binding upon the Addl. Collector to follow any order given by the Compensation Commissioner under any other provision of the Act. Rather, Sub-sec (2) of this Sec. 7 very clearly lays down that on any question arising whether any property is of the nature referred to in Sub-sec. (1) i. e. whether it is private property or not, it shall be referred to the Collector who after making such enquiries as he deems necessary may make such order thereon as he deems fit. The matter, therefore, rested entirely within the discretion of the Collector. Nor another order referred to on behalf of the appellant passed in his favour by the same Addl. Collector somewhere in 1959 about the private property in another village can be considered for holding that the learned Addl. Collector committed any mistake in passing the impugned order. Nowhere is it alleged that this order now being referred to had been submitted to the learned Addl. Collector when the present case was being decided by him. Now, "guzara" has been defined by Sec. 2 (vii) of the Act to mean a fixed cash annuity or specified area of land in an estate granted by an intermediary for the maintenance of the younger members of his family or other relatives and dependants or for the maintenance of any place of religious worship. The expression "guzaredar" has to be construed by that very clause accordingly. The expression "guzaredar" holding any land in an estate granted to him as "guzara" is covered by expression "intermediary" by sub-clause (g) of clause (viii) of Sec 2. A "guzaredar" having specific area of land in any estate granted to him as "guzara" shall, therefore, be an "intermediary" according to the Act and for the purposes thereof. The learned Addl. Collector does not seem to have examined the case from this point of view. The appellant will, therefore, be an "intermediary" if he is proved to be a "guzaredar" As discussed above the learned Addl. Collector has found the appellant to have come to possess part of the estate through partition (takasma ). Having been confronted with this, the learned counsel for appellant has contended that the evidence produced had gone to prove that the appellant had come to possess part of the estate not by way of partition but by way of "guzara". We have, therefore, gone into the evidence along with the parties. We do not, however, find that there is any evidence to suggest that the land had been given to the appellant by way of "guzara"excepting that the parent Bhoomia and another relative of his have stated that the part of the estate has been given to appellant as such and that such portions were given in the past also to various other relatives of the Bhoomias, The evidence of the Patwari examined by the appellant very clearly goes however to show that the portion under dispute had been transferred to the appellant by way of partition. The learned Addl. Collector cannot, therefore, be called to have committed any mistake in the circumstances, when he found that the appellant had come to possess portion of the estate by way of partition. Now about the restrictions laid down by Secs. 35 and 36 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulations, 1877. The claims for maintenance, or to hold land in lieu of maintenance from a Bhoomia, by any member of his family were required to be preferred vide Sec. 35 thereof to the State Government whose decision was to be conclusive. Sec. 36 restricts all alienations and charging of the Bhoom land except as provided therein. The granting of a specific area of land in an estate by way of "guzara" could, therefore, be done only under the permission of the State Government as laid down by Sec. 35 of this Regulation. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to urge that with the passing of the Rajasthan Revenue Laws, (Extension) Act, 1957 the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation 1877 was repealed with effect from 7. 1. 58. Even if it is so, the Rajasthan Revenue Laws which covered the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, as provided by Sec. 5 (ii) of this Extension Act, came into force. The Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, vide Sec. 137 thereof, renders continuing in force for the purpose of governing the succession to an transfer of an estates the law, usage or practice of the local area in which the estate lay. This means that the restrictions on the transfer continued. In other words the transfer could be made only with the permission of the State Government even for the purposes of maintenance or "guzara", not to speak of partition. The result is that the learned Addl. Collector, cannot be called to have committed an error in holding that the appellant was not an "intermediary". He has, therefore, rightly die-allowed the application preferred to him u/s. 7 of the Act. This appeal is, therefore, hereby rejected as being without any force. . ;