JAGAT NARAIN, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision application by the defendants against an order of the District Judge, Balotra, holding that he had jurisdiction to try the present suit which was instituted against them by the plaintiff on the basis of a Hundi.
(2.) THE plaintiff is a firm carrying on business at Barmer. Defendant No. 1 is a firm carrying on business at Bikaner. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners of the firm who reside at Bikaner. THE plaintiff firm trades in wool and had dealings with the defendant firm. THE case put forward in the plaint is that a sum of Rs. 33,000/- was due to the plaintiff firm from the defendant firm and in part payment of this amount a Hundi payable at sight for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- drawn by the defendant firm on a Bombay firm, Hira Lal Rajender Prasad, was sent to the plaintiff at Barmer. THE plaintiff endorsed the Hundi in favour of another Bombay firm for collection. THE Hundi was presented to the drawee, but was dishonoured. Notice of dishonour was served on the defendant and the present suit for recovery of Rs. 10,000/- principal and Rs. 3,100/- interest was instituted in the court of the District Judge, Balotra, on the basis of the Hundi. THE suit was resisted by the defendant inter alia on the ground that the court at Balotra had no jurisdiction to try the suit. THE question of jurisdiction was tried as a preliminary issue. On behalf of the plaintiff reliance was placed on the following observation made by Wadia J. reported in Jivatlal Vs. Lal Bhai (1): - "the cause of action on a negotiable instrument generally arises wherever any one of the facts, the proof of which is essential under the circumstances of the case, occurred. THE place of the making of the promissory note is an essential part of the cause of action so as to give the court of that place jurisdiction to try the suit on the note. THE promissory note was admittedly passed at Ahmedabad and the court at Ahmedabad would certainly have jurisdiction to try the suit on the note. It may sometimes happen that a promissory note is executed in one place but delivered to the promisee at another place and that moneys due thereunder are payable at a third place. In such a case part of the cause of arises at one of these places, and a suit may be filed at any one of these places at the plaintiff's option. " After the above authority was cited the learned counsel appearing for the defendants did not challenge that the suit was triable by the District judge, Balotra. The preliminary issue framed on the question of jurisdiction was accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff. Against the above decision the present revision application has been filed. It is urged that as the Hundi was executed at Bikaner and was payable at Bombay a suit for recovery of the money on the basis of the Hundi can only be instituted either at Bikaner or at Bombay. It is urged that the observation of Wadia J. relied upon is merely obiter and that the delivery of a bill of exchange to the plaintiff at a particular place is no part of the cause of action. No authority was cited in support of the last contention. The above observation made by Wadia J. is certainly obiter. But I have no doubt that the cause of action in a suit on a bill of exchange in part arises at the place where the bill is delivered to the payee. A bill of exchange is not a legal tender and the payee is not bound to accept it in payment of the debt. It is only when the payee accepts the bill in payment of the debt that liability attaches to the drawer. The passing of the bill is thus part of the cause of action in a suit based on it and the place where the bill is passed is therefore a place where the cause of action in part arises. The above reasoning finds support from the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Chapman Vs. Cottrell (S. C. 34 L. J. Ex. 186) reported in English Reports Vol. 159 at p. 774. The following passage from the judgment of Martin B. contains a concise statement of the facts of the case and the reason for the decision: - "the defendant, a British subject, residing at Florence, there signed two promissory notes, and sent them by post to London, where they were delivered to the payee; and the question is whether the contract was at Florence or in London. There can be no doubt that the contract was in London, for the defendant did not make any binding contract until the notes were handed over by his agent to the payee. Cox Vs. Troy (5b ald. 474) is an express authority that the mere act of writing an acceptance, if nothing more be done, does not make a valid bill of exchange. There Bayley, J. , said: The question is, when the drawee comes under an engagement, whether by the act of writing something on the bill, or by the act of communicating what has been written to the holder, and I have no difficulty in saying, from principles of common sense, that it is not the mere act of writing on the bill, but the making a communication of what is so written, that binds the acceptor; for the making the communication is a pledge by him to the party, and enables the holder to act upon it. But while it remains in the drawee's hands, it seems to me, the acceptance is not fully binding on the person who signed it, and he is at liberty to say, before he parts with it, "i have not yet entered into an engagement to accept. I accede to every word there said. " Bramwell expressed his agreement with the judgment of Martin B. in the following words: - "i am entirely of the same opinion, and fo the same reasons. There is no pretence for saying that the payee had any right or title to this paper until it was handed over to him in London, and then only was there any binding contract by the defendant. " I accordingly hold that the cause of action in the present suit arose in part at Barmer within the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Balotra. The decision of the court below is thus correct and I dismiss the revision application. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this application. .;