MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant tenant's second appeal in a suit for arrears of rent and eviction and raises certain important questions of law.
(2.) THE material facts are these. It is admitted that the defendant took the plaintiff's house on rent by means of a rent-note Ex. P. 1 dated the 26th May, 1956, by which it was stipulated that he would pay a rent of Rs. 25/- per mensem plus a further sum of Rs. 1/4/-as house tax. THE plaintiff's case was that the defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent and house tax from the 1st July, 1958, to the 30th June, 1959. amounting in all to Rs. 315/5/- and further that he also required the suit premises for his reasonable and bonafide personal occupation, and, therefore, he gave two notices to the defendant asking him to vacate the premises in question, but without any result. He consequently instituted the present suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment in the court of the Munsiff, Jaipur City, on the 8th July, 1959. The defendant resisted the suit. He denied that he was a defaulter. He also denied that the plaintiff had any reasonable and bonafide necessity for the occupation of the house. He further disputed the legality of the notice to suit. Issues were framed on the 5th November, 1959, and the plaintiff led his evidence from the 26th February, 1960, to 12th May, 1960. On the 4th December, 1959, the plaintiff submitted an application under Sec. 13 (5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, (Act No. XVII of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act) praying that the defendant be ordered to deposit the rent in court from the 1st July, 1959. to the 1st December, 1959, plus house tax, amounting in all to Rs. 131/4/ -. The court passed an order accordingly on the 7th January, 1960. It further passed an order that rent for the month of January, 1960, be deposited by the 15th of February, 1960, and he should act likewise for the further months also. An application was then moved by the plaintiff on the 12th May, 1960, stating that the defendant had defaulted in depositing the entire amount of rent upto the end of December, 1959, inasmuch as the total amount due upto the end of December, was Rs. 157/8/- but the defendant had deposited a sum of Rs. 131/4/- only on the 13th January, 1960, and further that he had committed defaults in depositing rent for the succeeding months. It was, therefore, prayed that the defence of the defendant be struck out under S. 13 (5) of the Act. By its order dated the 29. 8. 1960, the court ordered that the defence of the defendant be struck out under the aforesaid section and that the defendant be placed under the same position as if he had not defended the suit. Thereafter the court allowed the defendant to produce evidence so far as his liability to pay house tax was concerned if he wanted to do so. It seems that the defendant did not want to lead any evidence as directed and so the case was posted for arguments and these were heard on the 2nd November, 1960, and the plaintiff's suit was decreed for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3 15/-as also for eviction by the trial court by its judgment and decree dated the 7th November, 1960. The defendant then went up in appeal to the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, but was unsuccessful. He has now come up in second appeal to this Court. The main contention raised by learned counsel for the defendant appellant is that the courts below have fallen into a grave error of law in striking out the defence of the defendant in a suit which had been brought against him on other grounds than mere nonpayment of rent. The submission of learned counsel is that sub-section (5) of S. 13 of the Act applies only to a suit which has been brought on the ground of default alone and not otherwise, and that if a suit has been brought, not on the ground of default at all or not on that ground by itself, then this sub-section has no application whatsoever and its provisions cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff landlord, and in such a case no order under subsection ) requiring the tenant to deposit the rent in court month by month could be made nor could the court on the defendant-tenant's failure to deposit such rent, as required under that sub-section, visit him with the penalty of striking out his defence. The question for decision, therefore, is what is the correct scope and import of sub-section (5) of S. 13 of the Act. Or, putting the matter in a slightly different manner, the short question is whether a suit like the one with which we are concerned in this case and which was brought] not solely on the ground of default is within the scope of sub-sec. (5) of S. 13. Quite clearly, if the present suit does not fall within the ambit of this sub-section, then an order for striking out the defence could not be lawfully passed and would be illegal. But if it does fall within this sub-section, then such an order could certainly be passed provided the other conditions laid down therein stand fulfilled. Now, there is no decision of our court which directly bears on this question. Sub-section (5) of S. 13 reads as follows: - "if, on the first day fixed for the hearing of such a suit, the tenant expresses his intention to contest the same or if he fails to make the payment referred to in sub-sec. (4), the court shall proceed with the hearing of the suit and may, on the application of the landlord made at any stage of the suit, and after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, make an order, requiring the tenant to deposit in court month by month the rent at the rate at which it was last paid. On his failure to deposit the rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the suit," It is also necessary to read sub-section (4) of this section as the two provisions are obviously inter-related. Sub-section (4) reads as follows: - "in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) the court shall on the first day of hearing thereof by order determine the amount of rent due from the tenant, which is in arrears, upto the date of such order as also the amount of interest thereon at the rate of six percent of the suit allowable the tenant to pay the per annum and of the costs to the landlord and direct aggregate of the amounts so specified on or before a date fixed thereby, which shall not be beyond the fifteenth day from, but exclusive of the date thereof. If on or before the date so fixed for payment, the tenant deposits in court the aggregate of such amounts, the suit shall be dismissed and the sum so deposited shall be paid to the landlord; Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to the benefit of protection against eviction provided by this sub-section if he has made default in the payment or tender of the amount of rent due from him for any two months on three occasions within a period of eighteen months. " Now the first point which deserves to be noticed while reading sub-section (5) is that it does not in so many words mentions to what type of suit it relates. In the very first line of the sub-section we have the phrase "such a suit" and then this is followed by the phrase "contest the same", and then the expression "the suit" occurs at three different places. In order, therefore, to determine to what type of suit sub-section (5) refers, we must necessarily look elsewhere, and quite properly therefore we must look at the provision contained in the next preceding sub-section, that is 8. 13 (4 ). I have set out this sub-section in extenso above. It begins like this "in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1 ). " Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) reads as follows: - "that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for any two months. " In other words sub-sec. (4) stands limited to a suit for eviction brought on the ground of default in the payment of rent, and the 'default' has been defined in clause (a) and is constituted by failure of payment or tender of the amount of rent due from the tenant for any two habitual defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to sub-sec. (4) he will still be entitled to the benefit of the sub-section which, if I may say so, is the last opportunity which the Legislature affords to a defaulting tenant to save himself from eviction, and where he does comply with the order passed by the court under this sub-section, the suit for eviction must be dismissed. Pursuing the matter further, it is clear that in this type of case, if the tenant "expresses his intention to contest the suit" at the first hearing thereof (and that phrase may been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, reference among which may be made to Shambhoo Ram Vs. Mangal Singh (1) and Moti Ram Vs. Parma Nand (2) then under sub-S. (5) the court shall proceed with the hearing of the suit, that is, thereby the tenants disentitles himself to the benefit of sub-sec. (4 ). Similarly, if an order is made under sub-sec. U) and the tenant fails to make the payment by or before the time fixed there under, then too he cannot take advantage of the order passed under sub-sec. (4) and the court must proceed to hear the suit on the merits. There is a further provision made under sub-sec. (5) that it is open to the landlord in such a suit to make an application that the tenant be ordered to deposit rent in court month by month at the rate at which it was last paid and in such a case on the tenant's failure to deposit the rent by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the court must order the defence against eviction to be struck out and the tenant is then relegated to the same position as if he had not defended the suit, so far as ejectment is concerned. Turning next to the second type of case to which I have referred above, that is where a suit has not been based on the ground of default at all, sub-sec. (4) does not come into play, and it must follow as a corollary that sub-sec. (5) also cannot come into play, with the result that there being no provision in the Act for calling upon the tenant to deposit rent in court month by month, it cannot be held that there is any failure to do so within the meaning of sub-sec. (5) and consequently an order striking out the defence in such a case would not be lawful. So far there seems to me to be no difficulty in interpreting sub-secs. (4) and (5 ). There is, however, a third type of case and that is where a suit might have been brought on a number of grounds and default in payment of rent is also one of the grounds on which the plaintiff relies. The question is whether sub-sec. (5) is also attracted in this type of case. This in turn would clearly depend on whether sub-sec. (4) applies to such a case or not. For, if the last-mentioned sub-section properly applies to it, then sub-sec. (5) will be immediately attracted. But if the former does not, then I find it extremely difficult to hold that the latter sub-section can at all come into play. And this brings us back to the meaning of the phrase "in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1 ). " Does it mean that a suit where eviction is claimed on other grounds in addition to the ground of default is within the ambit of sub-sec. (4) ? I confess, the question is not free from complexity, and, therefore, I have given my most careful and anxious consideration to it and I have fully pondered over the rival considerations. On the one hand, it can be contended, not without some force, that if sub-sec. (4) is restricted in its application to a suit solely based on the ground of default, then the plaintiff has merely to add other grounds one or more as have been specified in clauses (b) to (1) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 and thereby the tenant would be left purely at the mercy of the plaintiff landlord, and he would not be entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (4) even where such other ground or grounds may eventually be given up by the plaintiff or the latter may be unable to establish any of them at the trial. And that being so, on this interpretation, the tenant will have no remedy against ejectment which he would have certainly been able to avoid in case the suit had been brought against him on the ground of default alone. I am not prepared to say that there is nothing in this contention. But on the other hand, it can be argued with equal and even greater force that it is not the business of the courts to interpret the provision of a statute on a priori considerations, and that it must take the provision as it stands, and if it is capable of being given a sensible meaning on its plain language, the court must disregard all other considerations and give effect to such meaning without deviating from it. And on this line of reasoning, it is contended that sub-sec. (4) governs and is intended to govern a suit for eviction brought on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 alone, that is on the ground of default and does not refer to a suit which has been brought on any other ground mentioned in clauses (b) to (1) of sec. 13 or to a suit brought on any of those grounds in addition to the ground of default. It is further submitted that the entire texture of sub-sec. (4) tends to show that that is the correct meaning which should be put on sub-sec. (4 ). Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention in this connection to the judgment of Bhargava J. in Labhchand Vs. Ganpatlal (3 ). wherein in paragraph (5) the learned Judge expressed himself as follows: - "sub-sec. (4) applies where the suit for eviction is instituted on the ground set forth in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 i. e. where the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due for any two months. It the said suit is filed on this ground alone the court is empowered under the said sub-section to fix the amount of arrears along with the interest thereon and costs of the suit on the first day of the hearing of the suit and direct the tenant to deposit the said amount on or before the date fixed by it. In sub-sec. (5) there is a further provision for the same type of suit when the tenant expresses his intention to contest the same. The words 'such a suit' occurring in sub-sec. (5) which again means a suit based on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 (this appears to be a printing error for sec. 13) sub-sec. (4) and (5) are to be read together and sub-sec. (5) is not independent of sub-sec. (4) because in sub-sec. (5) there is nothing to indicate the type of suit it is dealing with. " (The italic is mine) Now these observations fell to be made in a case which was brought on the ground of default along with certain other grounds which seem to have been given up at the trial. The suit was contested by the defendant tenant apparently on all the grounds. The main question, apart from the question of the retrospectiveness of the second proviso to Sec. 13 (1) (a) which arose before the learned Judge for decision was as to what was the meaning and scope of the contest referred to in sub-Sec. (5), and this question was answered by saying that the contest referred to in sub-Sec. (5) was only that which relates to a tenant's liability for the payment of the arrears of rent and not to contest with regard to the other grounds set forth by the plaintiff for the ejectment of the tenant. The learned Judge then proceeded to hold that sub-Sec. (5) did not apply in that case so as to deprive the defendant of the benefit of sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 13, and, therefore, as he had complied with the order of the court and deposited the whole amount of rent within the time specified by it, he was entitled to ask the court to dismiss the suit. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent raised two points with regard to this judgment. First, that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge was not quite consistent with the major premise or premises laid down therein and secondly that the point which arises for decision in the present case did not arise in that case, and, therefore, that is no authority governing the point before me.
(3.) NOW, so far as the first point is concerned, I desire to point out, with all respect that I am not so much concerned with the actual conclusion at which the learned Judge arrived in the case before him and that case can be authority only for the principle which it propounded. And confining myself to that principle only, it may be permissible to point out that Bhargava J. was inclined to the opinion that sub-sec. (4) would apply only where the suit for eviction is instituted on the ground of default alone, and I would leave this point at that. So far as the second point raised by learned counsel is concerned, I entirely agree that the precise question which arises before me for decision did not arise before Bhargava J. , and, therefore, that case cannot in its ultimate analysis be taken as any authority directly governing the point for decision before me one way or the other. Turning back from this digression to the crucial point for consideration before me, what I desire to say is that having given the matter my most careful and earnest thought I have come to the conclusion that on a balance of all the considerations, sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 13 should be confined to suits brought on the ground set forth therein, that is, on the ground of default alone. The first reason which impels me to come to this conclusion is that if that was not the intention of the Legislature, there was nothing to prevent it from expressing its intention clearly the other way about. That is, instead of saying in sub-Sec. (4) that it referred to a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-Sec. (1), it could have very easily said, if that was its meaning, that the sub-section applied to a suit for eviction based on any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (1) thereof. That it did not say, and, therefore, it seems to me that this provision was intended by the Legislature to be applicable to a suit which was purely brought on the ground of default and no other. The second reason which impels me to come to the same conclusion is that where acting under this provision, the court has determined the amount of rent in arrear together with the amount of interest and costs payable to the landlord and directed the tenant to pay the aggregate of these amounts on a date to be fixed as specified in the section itself and where the tenant does comply with this order, the sub-section provides that the suit shall be dismissed. (The italic is mine ). It is obvious, therefore, that sub-Sec. (4) is intended to apply to that class of case where on compliance with certain things thereunder the suit is capable of being dismissed, and thereafter it does not remain alive. A composite suit, if I might use that expression, brought on a number of grounds including default could not possibly be dismissed because assuming for the sake of argument that an order under this sub-section has been passed therein and has also been complied with by the tenant, the suit would still remain alive for the other grounds on which eviction is claimed such as the plaintiff's personal necessity or sub-letting by the defendant or a like ground will yet remain to be tried out. The phrase "the suit shall be dismissed" in my opinion, furnished the true key to the proper interpretation of this sub-section as to the class of case to which it is intended to apply. That can only be a case based on the ground of default where the court having determined the rent payable by the tenant together with the amount of interest and the costs, the tenant has paid the same within the time required by the statute and there remains nothing more to do or decide except to dismiss the suit. This sub-section therefore does not apply to any other class of suits than the one I have pointed out above. I should like to take the opportunity of pointing out at this juncture that if the other view were to be accepted, we shall have to add after the phrase "the suit shall be dismissed" some words as "so far as the ground set forth above is concerned". But that would be against the well established cannon of the interpretation of statutes that a court has no business to add to or subtract from the words of a statute if they are capable of sensible meaning as they stand. Again, it is noteworthy that all the cases of our court which have been reported and have been brought to my notice or on which I have been able to lay my hands in this connection are all cases which were purely based on the ground of default and it was in these cases that the benefit of sub-sec. (4) was extended. Perhaps, the only exception is the case of Labhchand Vs. Ganpat Lal (supra) decided by Bhargava J. But there again, it is significant that all other grounds were given up by the plaintiff. The only difficulty which was strenuously pressed before me against the acceptance of this view was that those tenants who would otherwise be able to have the benefit of sub-sec. (4) would be deprived of that, such tenants having only defaulted once or twice in the payment of rent but not more than that and would therefore be out of the mischief of the proviso to this sub-section, and the plaintiff would be able to achieve this result merely by adding one more ground to that of default howsoever fictitious such ground may turn out to be in the sequel. This argument, however, pre supposes or presumes that plaintiffs as a class are prone to bring forward false cases. I do not suppose that a sweeping presumption like that can be properly raised in interpreting a provision of law. As I have already pointed out above, there are any number of reported decisions of our Court in which the plaintiffs have brought their suits only on the ground of default and it is in such cases that the benefit of sub-sec. (4) was claimed or given. If, however, the court does come across a dishonest plaintiff in a case here or there, I think, the equities of the case could be met by awarding suitable costs to the defendant against such plaintiff. It can ofcourse be argued that this would be a poor relief to a defendant who would otherwise be entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (4 ). Then I should like to point out that the scheme of our Act is not to favour the defaulters in payment of rent or to offer any premium to them and the possible evictions which they may have to suffer in such cases will be the outcome of their own default in payment of rent at the due time. I cannot do better in this connection than to reproduce the observations which I felt impelled to make after due deliberation in the case of Hari Narain Vs. Badri Das (Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 223 of 1961, decided on the 30th July, 1960, still unreported) : (subsequently reported as 1962 RLW 471) "if I might broadly sum up the entire position in its essence on the subject of the protection which the Act of 1950 affords to a tenant ready and willing to pay rent for the premises occupied by him, that position is that the tenant must not only be ready and willing to pay the rent whenever he chooses to do so, but he must be punctual in the payment or tender of the full amount of rent due from him at all times, and he must not allow the rent to fall due against him without such payment or tender for any two months in succession. For if he does so, a suit may be filed against him. " Again, it is not an uncommon experience in our courts that where tenants have been only guilty of one or two defaults, they still have wisely or foolishly contested such suits; and it is well established law so far as our courts are concerned that where the contest raised is on any point except mere arithmetical errors as to calculation of the amount of rent or interest or the costs of the suit, then too such tenants must stand deprived of the protection available under sub-sec. (4), howsoever good these points of contest may be and the suit must be set down for hearing on the merits. The point that I wish to make is that the Act does not give a sort of carte-blanche to the tenant. Undoubtedly, the Act has been enacted largely to protect him against rapacious or oppressive landlords and to give him a security of tenure and the fixity of rent within certain limits. But along with these, certain obligations have also been placed on the tenant, and one of the most important of such obligations is that he has to be punctual in the payment of rent and if he transgresses the limit set out by law in this connection, he must suffer the consequences thereof and the ordinary law of landlord and tenant must prevail. Therefore, I am unable to see anything so serious in this argument that it necessarily militates against or outweighs the view which I have felt persuaded to accept above. If I may point out even at the risk of some repetition, it seems to me that the idea underlying this sub-sec. (4) of our Act seems to be two-fold : (1) to provide the very last opportunity to the tenant to save himself from eviction in a certain type of cases under certain conditions and (2) to provide for the expeditious disposal of such cases by practically eliminating all contest on the merits. Thus it is that where a suit is brought on the ground of default and the tenant is not a habitual defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to this section, but he nevertheless is or is alleged to be a defaulter and he does not wish to contest the suit, then he is to be put on certain terms and must pay the arrears of rent due from him upto the date of the order, and what is more, must also pay interest at the statutory rate of six per cent thereon and the costs of the suit. Says the Legislature to him. You are a defaulter no doubt, but not a habitual one. So 1 will give you the last chance of protection from eviction. "you must pay your dues together with interest and costs of the suit. [ take it that you have no desire to contest the suit except as to sheer arithmetical errors of calculation in the matter of arrears of rent, interest or costs. " Replies the tenant : "i entirely accept. 1 have no contest to raise on the merits. I undertake to comply with the order passed on me within the period fixed by the court. " The payment is then made. Nothing more remains to be done. The entire suit is then dismissed. What has to be noted is that this is precisely the type of case for which sub-sec. (4) makes a provision and for no other. What then is the resultant position ? The tenant gets his protection ; the landlord his dues together with some sort of compensation for the delay in the payment. The suit stands finally disposed of without any investigation. No trial is necessary. It is a natural corollary from this scheme of things that where the tenant contests the suit - be he a defaulter of one occasion or more, or where he fails to comply with the order of payment made on him, he entirely forfeits the protection of sub-sec. (4) and the suit must proceed on the merits, and the ordinary law between a landlord and tenant must prevail. Not much reflection, in my judgment, is required to come to the conclusion that the two objects set forth above cannot be fulfilled if the suit becomes a contentious one, or when the suit happens to be brought on multiple grounds including that of default. For, not only in the very nature of things such a suit (save perhaps in rare cases) is bound to be disputatious; nay what is more, supposing for a moment that an order under sub-sec. (4) can lawfully be passed in such a case, then too the suit cannot possibly be dismissed. It must yet remain very much alive. The issues relating to the other grounds of eviction must be tried out. The question is whether sub-sec. (4) is intended to provide for such a suit. The more I think over this matter, the more confirmed I feel in the opinion that it is not such a type of suit which has been brought on multiple grounds for which sub-sec. (4) makes a provision. An order under sub-sec. (4) in cases of this type speaking as a rule seems to me to serve no useful purpose. It also seems to me, with all respect, not a little incongruous to think that in enacting sub-sec. (4) the Legislature was making a provision in relation to this composite type of suit, that the tenant must pay the arrears of rent, nay interest thereon and what should be still more remarkable the "costs" of the suit when the suit would and could not be finally disposed of and the parties have joined issue, and quite obviously the entire costs of the suit cannot possibly be assessed. I venture to submit, therefore, that I have no doubt, speaking for myself, that if the real intention of the Legislature underlying sub-sec. (4) were different from what I understand it to be, then its language would have been distinctly different from what it is. ;