BHANDARI, J. - (1.) THIS is a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 27th of August, 1959 be quashed. THIS order of the Board of Revenue was passed under the following circumstances.
(2.) THE petitioner Rambhool Singh was the Biswedar of a piece of land Khasra No. 390 measuring 3 Bighas 15 Biswas in village Shahjahanpur (Tehsil Behror, Distt. Alwar ). He was in military service from which he was discharged in the year 1951. THE aforesaid land was given by the petitioner on lease to Ghisa Respondent No. 3 for one year and after the expiry of the period of lease he obtained possession of the land. THE case of Ghisa Respondent No. 3 throughout has been that he was illegally dispossessed from that land, while the case of the petitioner is that Ghisa surrendered the possession of the land on the expiry of the lease on 27th July 1952. On 28th of July 1952 Ghisa made an application under Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, 1949 (No. IX of 1949) hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, in the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Behror for his reinstatement. This, application was dismissed by the Sub Divisional Officer but the Board of Revenue reversed the decision of the Sub Divisional Officer acting in its revisional jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner after obtaining the discharge from the military had taken possession of his land by ejecting another tenant from the land and had granted the lease to Ghisa instead of cultivating it himself and the petitioner could not claim exemption from the operation of the Ordinance. THE case was remanded by the Revenue Board to the Sub Divisional Officer for trying the issue of forcible ejectment. THE Sub Divisional Officer on remand ordered reinstatement of Ghisa. THE petitioner filed a revision application before the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue dismissed it. He filed a Writ Petition under* Art 226 on the ground that under Notification No. 1 (4) Rev. 1 (51) Jaipur dated the nth of January 1951 published in the Rajasthan Gazette No. no dated the 20th January 1951, tenants of the land belonging to persons who were discharged from the military after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Ordinance were exempted from the operation of the Ordinance. This contention of the petitioner was accepted by the court in that Writ Petition. THE judgment of this Court is Rambul Singh Vs. THE Board of Revenue and others (1 ). After the judgment of this court quashing the order of the Board of Revenue for reinstatement Ghisa filed a suit for the possession in the court of the Assistant Collector, Behror, and this suit was decreed by that court on the 10th of October, 1957. THE petitioner filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ajmer, which was accepted on the 12th of August, 1958. Ghisa then went in second appeal before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer. THE Board of Revenue reversed the decree of the first appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court by its judgment dated the 27th of August 1959. In this petition it is urged that the judgment of the Board of Revenue is erroneous on the face of it and should be set aside by a writ of certiorari. Before we examine this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, we may point out that after the application under Sec. 7 of the Ordinance was allowed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Ghisa was put in possession over the disputed land on the 26th of June 1955 but the petitioner was restored possession on the 7th of August 1959 after this Court had set aside the judgment of the Board of Revenue, on the 12th of July 1956. During this period the Rajasthan Tenancy Act hereinafter referred to as the Act had come into force on the 15th of October 1955. Under sec. 15 of the said Act, subject to certain exceptions, every person who at the commencement of that Act was a tenant of the land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or a tenant of Khudkasht, was declared to be a Khatedar tenant in respect of that land. THE view taken by the Board of Revenue is that as Ghisa was in possession of the disputed land on the 15th of October, 1955 he acquired Khatedari rights in that land by the operation of sec. 15 of the Act. Taking this view of the matter, the Board of Revenue has held that Ghisa was not liable to be dispossessed from the land in dispute and was also entitled to recover possession of the land from the petitioner. In passing, the Board of Revenue has also observed that: - ". . . . . . even if this fact is ignored, it would be apparent that he (Ghisa) was entitled to continue in possession unless ejected in accordance with the provisions of the law" and that: - "a tenant who is wrongfully dispossessed would be deemed to be constructively in possession as against the trespasser. " It may also be mentioned that the trial court and the Board of Revenue both rejected the case set up by the petitioner that he had obtained the possession of the land on surrender by the tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that so far as the question of surrender is concerned, the finding of the Board of Revenue being a finding of fact cannot be questioned in this writ petition. He has, however, contended that Ghisa had obtained possession over the disputed land by virtue of the order of the Sub Divisional Officer passed on his application under sec. 7 of the Ordinance. This order was quashed by the order of this Court which has held that the protection under sec. 7 of the Ordinance was not available to Ghisa in view of the notification referred to above. After the order of this Court, the petitioner obtained the possession of the land in restitution. It is contended that in these circumstances the petitioner should be deemed to have always remained in possession of the land since the date he obtained possession of it on the 27th of July, 1952 and as such Ghisa had acquired no rights under sec. 15 of the Act. It is also contended that the petitioner had the ownership of the land in dispute and after the expiry of the period of lease he was entitled to obtain possession of it and he cannot be termed as trespasser when he obtained the possession of the land in 1952. This writ petition is contested by the respondents. Their contentions are that Ghisa being a tenant in possession on the 15th of October, 1955 acquired the Khatedari right under sec. 15 of the Act as has been held by the Board of Revenue and could not be dispossessed now. It is also contended that the petitioner was no more than a trespasser as defined in sec. 5 (44) of the Act. The first point for determination in this Writ Petition is whether Ghisa acquired the Khatedari right under sec. 15 of the Act. From the facts and circumstances narrated above it is clear that Ghisa had been dispossessed from the land in dispute on the 27th of July, 1952 after the expiry of the period of lease. We may take it for the purposes of this case that he was dispossessed forcibly. Nonetheless the fact remains that he was no longer in possession of the field after the 27th of July 1952. Subsequently he obtained possession of the land on the 20th of September, 1955 in execution of the order of reinstatement passed in his favour by the Sub Divisional Officer. This Court, however, quashed this order as it was based on the erroneous view of law that Ghisa was entitled to a relief under sec. 7 of the Ordinance. The order of the Sub Divisional Officer for reinstatement and the subsequent order of the Board of Revenue confirming the order of the Sub Divisional Officer were in the view of this Court based on the wrong interpretation of the notification referred to above. Had these two orders not been passed Ghisa would not have been put in possession of the land in dispute. Both these orders having been quashed by this Court Ghisa could not rely on the possession obtained under; these orders for deriving benefit under sec. 15 of the Act. These orders could not confer any benefit on Ghisa to the disadvantage of the petitioner. The well-known principle of law is that the acts of the court should not be construed to the disadvantage of any of the parties. In Rodger Vs. Comptoir D'escompte de Paris (2), Lord Cairns observed: "one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to the suitors and when the expression "the act of the Court" is used it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court or of any intermediate Court of appeal but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. " As an illustration of this principle of law we may refer to Dagdu & others Vs. Kalu (3) in which the facts were that in a suit brought to recover possession of certain land the defendant pleaded limitation. He had held possession of the land adversely to the plaintiff from 1881 up to the 2nd of October 1895 when the suit was brought with the exception of a period of three years (viz. , 4th April, 1892, to 9th April, 1895) during which he was dispossessed under a decree of Civil Court of first instance obtained against him by a third person, which being reversed in appeal he was restored to possession on the said 9th April, 1895. It was held that the wrongful possession given by the Court to a third person did not (after possession had been restored to the defendant) prevent the statute from running during its continuance against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. This case was followed by this Court in Mst. Asa Bai Vs. Prabhu Lal & othere (4 ). We are therefore of the opinion that on the 15th of Oct. 1955 when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force Ghisa was not in possession of the disputed land as a tenant and he cannot take advantage of that provision. The Board of Revenue has wrongly held that Khatedari rights came to be conferred on Ghisa under sec. 15 of the Act as he was tenant of the land in dispute on 15th October, 1955. Ghisa cannot therefore claim possession of the disputed land on the ground that he had become a khatedar tenant of the land. We cannot also endorse the view taken by the Board of Revenue that a tenant whose period of tenancy had expired and who is wrongfully dispossessed by the landlord should be taken to be constructively in possession as against the landlord. After the expiry of the period of lease a tenant has, except for the specified remedies provided under the statute, no other civil remedy against the landlord even when the landlord forcibly dispossesses such a tenant. The English common law is enunciated thus: - "after the determination of the tenancy any act of the landlord showing an intention to take possession is sufficient to revest the possession in him so that the tenant becomes a trespasser. The landlord is entitled to re-enter and take possession, provided that he can do so peaceably, without contravening the statutes of forcible entry. After a peaceable entry, which is merely the exercise of an existing proprietary right has been completed possession can be maintained forcibly by the landlord. Thus, he can re-enter where the tenant has abandoned possession, or where he can effect the entry peaceably; and even if he enters forcibly, and is thus liable to crimi nal proceedings under the statutes, yet the tenant has no civil remedy against him in respect of the entry, or in respect of the eviction if no more force than is necessary is used. " (Hill and Redman's haw of Landlord and Tenant by Williams & Wells 1951, Edn. p. 498.) This common law doctrine is modified in India by statute to some extent as under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a tenant, who has been forcibly ejected, can bring a suit for possession against the landlord within six months, though he may have no right to retain the possession under the contract. The provisions of the Rajasthan Tenants Protection Ordinance were also of similar nature as it was found that the landlords were taking the law in their own hands to eject the tenants and relief was to be given to such tenants by providing summary remedy for reinstatement. Under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act such provision was incorporated in Sec. 186 which was later on deleted and in its place Sec. 187 B was enacted providing relief to the tenants by summary suits on their possession. But Ghisa, as is apparent from the judgment of the Revenue Board, did not avail of the remedy by way of an application under Sec. 186 but filed the present suit for possession on the basis of his alleged Khatedari rights in the land which in the eye of law he cannot be held to have acquired. By what we have said hereinbefore we should not be understood to say that the landlord can take the law in his own hands for dispossessing an unwilling tenant whose term of tenancy has expired. Under such circumstances the tenant may exercise his right of self defence or the landlord may be liable for trespass under the criminal law. As observed by Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 25th Edn. P. 1203, "in the majority of cases it will be desirable for the landlord to perfect his legal title by obtaining a writ of possession. "but under the civil law the landlord cannot be treated to be a trespasser and the tenant has no civil remedy against the landlord in respect of his entry. If in making the entry the landlord has caused some damage to the property of the tenant, the landlord may be liable even under the civil law in tort to the extent of the damage caused to the property of the tenant. Learned Assistant Government Advocate has stressed that under the Act, the trespasser has been defined in S. 5 (44) as meaning a person who takes or retains possession of land without authority. Without authority' means without any right. A landlord who enters on his own land after the expiry of the period of lease cannot be said to be doing so without authority. We are also of the opinion that the Revenue Board was wrong in holding Ghisa to be constructively in possession as against the landlord and as entitled to obtain possession. This proposition of law is not correct. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the Revenue Board is erroneous on the face of it. We therefore quash the judgment of the Revenue Board dated the 27th of August, 1959 and direct that the suit filed by Ghisa should be dismissed. It has been brought to our notice that Ghisa has obtained the possession of land by virtue of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated the 14th of October 1959. We direct that the Sub Divisional Officer should put the petitioner back in possession of the land in dispute. . ;